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1.  Introduction 
 
It is estimated that there are currently over 36 million people living with HIV/AIDS 
globally and in 1999, 5.3 million individuals were newly infected with the virus.1 
The organisations currently addressing this rapid and devastating spread of the 
pandemic clearly are not operating at sufficient scale or with enough impact to 
stem its progress. The areas of the globe where 95 per cent of those living with 
HIV reside, and which is experiencing the fastest and most relentless growth of 
the epidemic, are broadly defined as developing countries.  These are the very 
countries that are least able to afford to ensure broad and equitable access to the 
new anti-retroviral therapies against HIV/AIDS and treatments for opportunistic 
infections, or to provide care and support for those with HIV.  Thus there is an 
urgent moral dimension to the struggle to enlarge the scale of HIV/AIDS 
activities.  
 
AIDS activities initiated by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have been 
highly influential on thinking and strategies found within the HIV/AIDS sector. Yet 
despite their proliferation, NGOs often experience particular difficulties in 
increasing the scale of their activities to reach larger numbers of people, to have 
an impact at levels higher than the “community” and to address the broader 
social determinants of HIV/AIDS. Much of the pioneering contribution of NGOs 
active in HIV/AIDS to wider public debate and approaches in the sector has been 
spontaneous, as has often been the case in development, rather than a result of 
planned and deliberate strategy.  
 
Perceiving the urgent need for NGOs to expand the scale of their activities in the 
face of an escalating epidemic, Horizons and the International HIV/AIDS Alliance 
launched an initiative to examine the nature of the challenge to scale up in the 
context of HIV/AIDS internationally. This publication was prepared as part of this 
initiative and addresses the specific challenge of deliberately increasing the scale 
of HIV/AIDS prevention, care and support programmes in developing countries. It 
asks whether there are lessons from the broader literature on development which 
are of relevance to HIV/AIDS. An initial draft of this publication was presented to 
an international seminar convened as part of this project at which 12 NGOs from 
                                                          
1 UNAIDS/WHO AIDS Epidemic Update, December 2000 
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around the world presented their own experience of scaling up.2 Examples of 
increasing the scale of NGO activities in HIV/AIDS given here draw primarily on 
these case studies, presentations and comments at the seminar and relevant 
available published documentation. While the focus of the publication is on the 
activities of non-governmental organisations, it recognises that increasingly 
NGOs are engaging in partnerships with governments, academic institutions and 
other organisations in their quest to widen the impact of their activities.  
 
The publication consists of three main sections.  The first provides a background 
to and definitions of the term “scaling up” and describes contrasting perspectives 
to defining this term within the field of HIV/AIDS.  In section two, drawing on the 
existing broader experience of scaling up development programmes, a typology 
of these processes relevant to HIV/AIDS is proposed.  Substantial attention is 
paid to some of the risks inherent in the scaling up process, as cautionary tales 
for those interested in embarking on it. The publication also analyses the varied 
obstacles to scaling up programmes, both in general and how the sensitive 
nature of HIV/AIDS and diversity of contexts complicate the process.  The third 
section examines the institutional implications of scaling up and the many internal 
dimensions that must be taken into consideration to prepare for scaling up. The 
publication concludes with some discussion of the relevance of the arguments 
made here for both donors and AIDS-support organisations.  
 
 
2.  Why Scaling Up is Important 
 
The last quarter of the 20th century witnessed a proliferation of non-
governmental organisations in social development (Edwards and Hulme 1992) 
and in health specifically (DeJong 1991; Gilson et al. 1994; Jareg and Kaseje 
1998). Ironically, the role of NGOs was promoted both on the political left and 
right (Bratton 1989) and supported through donor assistance across the 
spectrum. On the one hand, NGOs were sought out by the political right as an 
avenue to circumvent the public sector, perceived to be slow in its response, 
bureaucratic and often corrupt. The advent of structural adjustment programmes 
calling for government cutbacks and a reduction in state-subsidised services 
paved the way for NGOs to fill the gaps left by reduction of state activity. At the 
same time, however, NGO expansion was also fuelled by voices on the left. They 
argued that their participatory nature, the fact that they represented the poor and 
marginalised, and their concern to address sensitive issues perpetuating 
                                                          
2 Horizons/Alliance Seminar on Scaling Up, Windsor, England, September 1-5, 2000. (Hereafter referred to as 
Horizons/Alliance Seminar)  See Appendix A for a complete description of these case studies.  Note that the authors of 
each case-study and his/her organisation have reviewed the edited text for content and accuracy.  Appendix D is a list of 
participants at the seminar. 
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underdevelopment and social problems make them a liberating influence on 
political processes in developing countries.  
 
A more pragmatic argument for the contribution of NGOs has arisen with the 
recognition that in resource-poor settings where state capacity is weak, achieving 
broad national coverage in all areas of social development is beyond the 
capacities – and indeed sometimes the interests – of governments acting alone.  
This is arguably particularly the case in HIV/AIDS.   
 
In recent years, however, this unchecked optimism has been somewhat 
moderated by the more sober assessment that while laudable, the impact of 
NGOs has often been limited in scale, in many cases fails to address the broader 
structural determinants of the problems they are addressing and does not 
translate into sustainable national programmes (Drabek 1987; Edwards and 
Hulme 1992). Moreover, there has been belated recognition that to achieve wider 
effect, in many cases NGOs need to abandon their staunch independence and 
forge better and more strategic links with government, despite the political 
difficulties in so doing on both sides of that relationship. NGOs, in this view, 
“ignore government at their peril” (Edwards and Hulme 1992). 
 
Thus in development circles at least, there has been a growing chorus of voices 
calling for NGOs to increase the scale and impact of their activities and to build 
strategic alliances such that the effects of any one organisation are multiplied and 
the pool of beneficiaries increases exponentially. Yet there has also been 
recognition that expansion may bring with it trade-offs – among them, between 
quality, quantity and costs, and between accountability to one’s declared 
constituency and accountability to external funders financing the costs of 
expansion (eg. Edwards and Hulme 1997; Pearce 1993). Thus, while a tentative 
consensus is emerging over the importance of scaling up, there is much less 
shared understanding of the contexts most conducive to scaling up, the type of 
organisations or programmes appropriate to expand, the relative costs of different 
types of programmes, the internal implications of scaling up, how to define 
objectives, measure the impact of scaling up and how these processes depend 
on and interact with the political and social environment.  
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3. The Need and Urgency to Scale Up in HIV/AIDS 
 
The most convincing argument behind pressing calls to expand the scale of 
activities in HIV/AIDS in developing countries is the moral and humanitarian one. 
Every day there are approximately 16,000 new HIV infections globally (UNAIDS 
2000). Epidemiologically, the rapid transmission of HIV/AIDS can only be 
countered when prevention efforts are organised at sufficient scale to affect the 
dynamics of the epidemic.  The demographics of the HIV/AIDS epidemic reveal 
the extent to which it is the working-age and younger generations that are 
disproportionately affected.  Internationally, the fact that more and more 
adolescents are having sexual relations before marriage (Smith and Colvin 2000) 
and that the age at which first sexual intercourse occurs is decreasing, means the 
pool of young women and men at risk of contracting sexually transmitted 
infections generally and HIV/AIDS specifically is ever-expanding. 
 
There is increasing frustration in development with the failure of many small-scale 
research, pilot or demonstration projects to get “out of the hothouse” to have a 
larger influence on policies and programmes (Myers 1992: 370). This frustration 
is perhaps more pronounced in the area of HIV/AIDS as the epidemic escalates. 
The World Bank report on Sub-Saharan Africa notes, for example, that among 
the lessons that have been learned about successful HIV/AIDS prevention efforts 
is that small pilot programmes with no chance of duplication or replication are not 
helpful (World Bank 1999).  In an article in Science (Binswanger 2000) the 
director for rural development and environment at the World Bank gives a stark 
example of limited coverage in the Kagera Region of Tanzania, where 200,000 of 
the region’s 1.9 million people are children orphaned by AIDS.  There, NGO 
directors stated that they operate mainly in two out of five districts, leaving three 
with almost no services, and in the two districts where they do work, they serve 
no more than an estimated 5 per cent of the population.  
 
Elsewhere, as the UNAIDS recent report states:  “…action remains sporadic and 
patchy rather than comprehensive.  ‘Boutique’ projects may provide services for 
one or two communities, while large areas of the countryside have nothing.  
Many programmes have yet to become comprehensive in either geographical 
coverage or content.” (UNAIDS 2000).  Indeed such is the lack of information 
about access and coverage that it is not generally known who has access to, let 
alone uses, HIV/AIDS related services (Paurvi Bhatt, USAID/DC, 
Horizons/Alliance Seminar).  Estimates of current levels of coverage in sub-
Saharan Africa for HIV/AIDS prevention interventions suggest that overall 
coverage is less than 20% of the target populations in most countries 
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(Kumaranayake and Watts 2000).  Clearly the onus is now on the HIV/AIDS 
community – including funding organisations - to explore the question of 
increasing scale and to make efforts, fully cognisant of the risks involved, to 
identify what programmes or which aspects of their programmes can be scaled 
up.  While there may be consensus on the need to scale up, there is less 
agreement over the objectives and the most appropriate approaches to scaling 
up, as will be addressed in the next section.  
 
 
4. What is Meant by “Scaling Up” in Development?  
 
Considerable confusion surrounds the various terms used to expand the scale of 
activities, whether “going to scale”, “scaling up” or “widening impact.” The word 
“scale” is both a relative and an absolute concept (Myers 1992) and thus may 
indicate on the one hand, reaching a greater number of people, or on the other 
hand, a notion of a particular size of population, activity or particular measure of 
interest.  The actual unit of measurement is also a source of confusion. In the 
development literature, scale has been used to refer to what could be described 
as both the “input” and “output” aspects of scaling up – that is, on the one hand to 
organisational size or type of activity engaged in, and on the other to “outputs” 
such as scale of coverage of people or geographic area (Figure 1). Even within 
the concept of coverage there is a difference between coverage of absolute 
numbers of people, and coverage as expressing a percentage of a total 
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Figure 1 - Various Definitions of Scaling Up Used in the Development Literature 







Looking at the range of processes that are relevant to HIV/AIDS, it is clear that 
scaling up may entail simply increasing the size or level of activity of a particular 
organisation.  As used in the development literature (e.g. Edwards and Hulme 
1992) the term has also been used to imply enlarging the scope of the activities 
of an organisation in order to reach more people.  For example, an organisation 
focusing on HIV/AIDS prevention and awareness raising, may move into support 
and care for people with HIV/AIDS as the epidemic progresses and prevalence 
rises. A distinction has been made by Edwards and Hulme (1992) between 
integrating other horizontal activities – that is unrelated activities, as opposed to 
vertical activities that deal with the same problem. For example, an organisation 
providing micro-credit might diversify horizontally to provide health services, or 
vertically to develop programmes addressing high default rates on repayment. An 
example of horizontal integration of HIV/AIDS work into income-generation work 
can be found in Morocco, where the Association Marocaine de Soldarité et 
Devéloppement (AMSED) has scaled up its work on HIV/AIDS by reaching out to 
the micro-credit community which, in Morocco, is already considerably mobilised 
(Issam Moussaoui, PASA/IST-SIDA Horizons/Alliance Seminar).  
 
On the “output” side, scaling up may entail increasing the absolute numbers of 
people reached, or it could include expansion to other geographic areas (regions 
or countries), whether through opening new branches or linking with other 
           
 
• Expanding organisational size 
• Increasing the scale of activity 
engaged in 
• Integrating other activities 
(horizontal intergratinon: 
addresing unrelated activities; 
vertical integration: addressing 
different levels of related 




• Reaching more people 
• Expanding geographic area(s) 
reached 
• Reaching other “target groups” 
• Increasing the volume of outputs 
(e.g. number of condoms 
distributed) 
• Increasing intensity of impact 
within given geographic 
area/social group 
“Input” “Output” 
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organisations. An organisation may diversify the range of social groups with 
which it interacts.  Economists in particular may measure “scaling up” simply by 
the volume of outputs of activities, such as the number of condoms provided or 
distributed (Kumaranayake 2000).  Less frequently, scaling up in the 
development literature has been used to mean intensifying effort within a 
particular social group, population or geographic area in order to increase impact. 
 
Drawing on the above definitions of “scaling up” as applied within the 
development literature more broadly, this publication discusses a number of 
strategies used by NGOs to scale up their HIV/AIDS efforts.  These encompass 
both the “input” and “output” aspects of scaling up, and denote the process of 
expanding the scale of activities with the ultimate objective of increasing the 
numbers of people reached and the impact (a term which will be discussed 
further below) on the problem at hand. As Myers (1992) reminds us, a 
preoccupation with increasing scale can distract us from the actual objective of 
scaling up, which in this case is to reduce the spread or to alleviate the effects of 
the epidemic. A programme that increases its scale may well lose in terms of its 
impact (Edwards and Hulme 1992) as the intensity of effort is necessarily 
reduced. In HIV/AIDS for instance, a larger organisation may no longer be able to 
provide the personalised education and care of a small organisation and thus be 
less effective.  Thus the goal of increasing coverage is clearly insufficient in and 
of itself.  The relationships between coverage, impact, cost and quality are 
dynamic, and change according to both the level of the epidemic and the 
objectives of the scaling up.  These dimensions of scaling up will be addressed in 
the context of HIV/AIDS in the following section. 
 
 
5. Defining Scaling Up in the Context of HIV/AIDS: 
Different Perspectives 
 
As was evident at the seminar on scaling up convened by Horizons/Alliance 
however, reaching a consensus definition of “scaling up” is particularly difficult in 
HIV/AIDS given the sensitive nature of HIV/AIDS and the variety of perspectives 
engaged in HIV/AIDS efforts.   
 
Perhaps more than most development matters, debates over the appropriate 
approach to the epidemic are heated.  In most developing countries HIV/AIDS is 
fatal because of the non-availability or non-affordability of anti-retroviral therapies; 
prevention of HIV/AIDS requires behavioural change in the most intimate aspects 
of human experience and adequate care and support is premised on breaking 
down entrenched social prejudices. While in some quarters, the devastation 
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brought by the rapidly spreading epidemic calls for strong, centralised measures, 
others argue that many HIV/AIDS interventions run a high risk of creating ethical 
and human rights violations, as programmes in both developed and developing 
countries have shown.3  Both sides of this debate agree that high level political 
commitment to addressing HIV/AIDS is critical, but differences emerge in 
approach in that the latter would attach more importance than the former to 
equipping individuals and communities with the information, tools and ultimately 
power to reduce vulnerability.   
 
This somewhat exaggerated dichotomy also reflects differences in the broader 
health arena as to whether one adopts a medical or social model of health 
(Evans 1999).  A medical model would assume that programmes should focus on 
particular interventions or technologies that are known to affect the limited range 
of specific behaviours that have an impact on the evolution of the epidemic.  By 
contrast, the social model of health would focus more on the broader social 
determinants of the health problems concerned.  In the case of HIV/AIDS, 
therefore, this would entail addressing the social processes and inequalities 
driving the epidemic and intensifying its effects.  For example, structural changes 
in gender inequalities and in the differential power in sexual negotiation between 
men and women, and the elimination of sexual coercion are considered by many 
to be critical to reducing vulnerability to HIV transmission. This approach would 
argue that without greater control by people over the circumstances governing 
their health behaviour, long-term vulnerability to the epidemic would not be 
addressed.  In practice, many non-governmental organisations active in 
HIV/AIDS may derive elements of their programmes from both perspectives, but 
in general the social model is likely to predominate.4     
 
Following from these debates, definitions of objectives of scaling up and the 
question of impact depend on whether one adopts a national or community 
perspective, a public health/epidemiological or development approach, or 
whether one is referring to prevention or caring for, supporting and improving the 
quality of life of those infected by HIV.  National governmental authorities 
generally want to reach a scale that represents a significant proportion of that 
country’s population.  They would share with those supporting a public 
health/epidemiological perspective a major concern in preventing the epidemic, 
and therefore reaching a sufficient scale to have an impact on the evolution of the 
                                                          
3  For an argument that HIV/AIDS should not be granted special status and should be confronted with more of the 
   “traditional tools of public health” in the context of the US, see Chandler Burr’s “The AIDS Exception:  Privacy vs. 
   Public Health”, Atlantic Monthly, June 1997. 
4  This debate echoes that about child health in the 1980s when there were calls in some quarters for the  
    implementation of selective technical interventions known to be effective in combating childhood diarrhoeal   
   disease, for example.  These were countered by others who argued that the social factors leading to disease such  
   as poverty and poor sanitation must be addressed – see Rifkin and Walt 1988.  
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epidemic. While care and support of those infected or those affected by it may 
also be a national priority, it is typically not given as much priority by governments 
as prevention until a relatively high level of prevalence is reached.  Similarly, 
economists (whose perspective is presented more on pages 20-21) would 
analyse scale in terms of the coverage reached or impact attained in relation to a 
finite level of resources5 - a concern about resource allocation shared by 
governments and international donors. To those subscribing to the above 
perspectives, therefore, “scale” is likely to denote an absolute level of coverage 
(usually of services, or interventions) in order to have impact (usually defined in 
terms of spread of the epidemic).   
 
By contrast, a community-based or non-governmental organisation, however, 
might share the above long-term goals but be more immediately concerned about 
changing the underlying social parameters in which HIV/AIDS activities are 
carried out, such as reducing stigma, passing legislation which makes 
discrimination in HIV/AIDS less likely or helping households and communities to 
cope when their members are hit by HIV/AIDS.  Impact in these cases is clearly 
difficult – although not impossible -- to measure.   Their notion of “scaling up” is 
likely to be a more relative one, evaluated in relation to the capacity of their own 
organisation, the need in the particular population group they aim to reach or the 
social trends they are confronting.  While many may focus on services or 
interventions, their emphasis lies more on the process of engaging their 
respective constituents and eliciting a response, a component of which is likely to 
be greater demand for services.   
 
According to a social model of health, the need to scale up may focus on 
inducing long-term social change that would enable societies or particular 
communities to come to terms with the HIV/AIDS epidemic.6 An individual is more 
likely to change behaviour if those around him or her – and particularly peers in 
similar social contexts - are also changing (Hughes 1993), and thus change on a 
collective level acts to reduce the risk factors conducive to the spread of HIV 
between individuals. The heart of behavioural change, however, lies deeper 
within the norms and values perpetuated by society across generations.  
Modifying expectations, beliefs and attitudes at a societal level is necessary in 
the long-term for sustained behavioural change to become the norm.  
 
Such changes, however, are only likely to come about and be sustained when 
there is corresponding progress in the policy and legislative context underpinning 
                                                          
5  As a recent World Bank paper on costing HIV/AIDS scaling up states this concern:  “How can we reach the  
   greatest number in the cheapest manner?” AIDS Campaign Team for Africa, World Bank, “The Costs of Scaling HIV  
   Program Activities to a National Level in Sub-Saharan Africa” p. 2. 
6  Or, in the words of the local response team at UNAIDS, making “AIDS-competent societies”. 
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HIV/AIDS efforts. This, in turn, is most often induced when there is sufficient 
public debate and civic engagement concerning HIV/AIDS to demand it. Thus the 
issue of scale becomes a prerequisite to broader change.  In many cases, such 
pressures have been brought about through community organising at a local level 
by groups disproportionately affected by the epidemic, who individually often lack 
political power but collectively are able to have an impact.  The organisation of 
gay groups in the United States is of course a classic example.  Yet at the same 
time, activism based on identity politics can also have its dangers in impeding 
efforts to expand interventions more broadly so that they permeate the whole 
society.  As Richard Parker has expressed:  “The very effectiveness of local-level 
politics has made it difficult to build a broader coalition to address HIV/AIDS as a 
global issue and the kinds of social movements that have emerged around other 
(similarly global) issues such as environment, or reproductive health and rights.” 
(Parker 1998).  
 
Disparities of definitions of scaling up, therefore, reflect more than semantics but 
rather underlying differences in philosophy, approach and objectives.  To clarify 
from the outset, the focus of this publication, and the workshop on which it draws, 
is on increasing the scale of NGOs which, although they themselves vary 
enormously in initial scale, largely share the second perspective outlined above.  
That is, the process of scaling up at the micro or community level is given more 
attention than reaching a specific level of scale in terms of the epidemiological 
picture at the national level.7  Emphasis is placed on the social change needed to 
both prevent HIV/AIDS and improve the lives of those affected by it. 
 
It should be noted, however, that not all NGOs start from a similar initial scale of 
activity or the same micro level frame of reference.  Indeed, examples in this 
publication range from small community-based operations (such as that by 
Family AIDS Caring Trust/Family, Orphans and Children Under Stress 
(FACT/FOCUS)), to national (such as Kenya AIDS NGO Consortium (KANCO)), 
to regional (such as the Programme Support Group (PSG)) and even to 
international initiatives led by NGOs (such as Private Agencies Co-operating 
Together (PACT) or the International HIV/AIDS Alliance).  Moreover, many 
NGOs, particularly those that assume a “catalysing role” in supporting other 
smaller organisations both technically and financially (see Strategy 2 in the 
section on Strategies) may begin with a national frame of reference.  And NGOs 
acting together can clearly combine to create a national force, as is the case with 
the national coalition of HIV/AIDS organisations comprised by KANCO, which 
                                                          
7  For this reason, preference is shown here for “scaling up” rather than “going to scale” because of the implication in the   
    latter expression that scale is a particular size and that the diverse perspectives on scaling-up could agree on the  
    optimal  absolute level of scale. 
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does not operate local field-offices.  Indeed, Myers’ term association described 
below, which he argued might be particularly useful in the field of early childhood 
education, may similarly be an effective strategy in HIV/AIDS.  As noted below, 
he uses the term to mean expanding programme size through common efforts 
and alliances among a group of organisations, each of whom develop similar 
programmes but tailor them to the needs of specific communities or populations.  
 
Whatever the discrepancies in starting points and definitions of scaling up, 
however, there is a consensus and a shared concern that the ultimate objective 
of scaling up initiatives is to have greater impact on preventing the epidemic and 
mitigating its effects.  Moreover, all perspectives recognise that scaling up needs 
to be sustainable, not only in financial terms but according to a number of other 
criteria (discussed below).  Again, there may be differences in how both these 
dimensions of scaling up are expressed and measured, as is addressed in the 





To categorise the concerns of non-governmental organisations in scaling up as 
being more relevant to a relative notion of scaling up rather than an absolute level 
or scale, however, is not to release NGOs from the need to demonstrate impact.  
As is noted in the case study on the Programme Support Group, which began as 
a university research department and pays careful attention to monitoring the 
impact of their programmes on measurable outcomes such as condom use  
“Process cannot be a substitute for structure or results.” 
 
HIV/AIDS in this respect is more challenging than many other health problems in 
terms of measuring the impact of interventions.  Perhaps most strikingly, for 
example, HIV/AIDS is distinctive in its mutually reinforcing relationship between 
prevention and care.  As the UNAIDS (2000) report on the global AIDS epidemic 
states, not only do sick individuals benefit from care and support, but prevention 
efforts will only be credible and effective if they are matched by humane and 
high-quality care and support services.  It is important, for example, that 
discrimination and stigma directed at those suffering from HIV/AIDS is reduced at 
a social level so that people with HIV/AIDS will not be fearful of disclosing their 
status, but will seek care and support and will be assured of full information and 
the means to prevent transmission of HIV/AIDS to others.  Thus impact in this 
sense cannot solely be measured by a reduced incidence of HIV/AIDS.   
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HIV/AIDS differs from many other health problems for which intervention efforts 
have been scaled up, such as disability or diarrhoeal disease.  Efforts to increase 
the use of oral rehydration therapies for the treatment of diarrhoea, for example, 
have succeeded in reaching a large scale in many developing countries; yet the 
behavioural change implied, though affected by socio-economic context, is not as 
conditioned by social and gender power relations as is condom use, for example. 
And, unlike the area of early childhood care, where Myers recommends focusing 
the scaling up effort on those “at risk” – defining such a population in HIV/AIDS 
may be difficult given the lack of knowledge about sexual behaviour, and there is 
a danger that it may lead to stigmatising that group and in the worst case, abuse 
of ethical and human rights principles.  Thus while targeted interventions are 
critical to limit the spread of the epidemic, sensitivity to stigma needs to be 
foremost among those engaged in planning the intervention concerned. As Jeff 
O’Malley of the International HIV/AIDS Alliance stated:  “A key lesson from the 
Alliance’s programming experience has been the importance of paying attention 
to key populations that affect epidemic dynamics, especially in low prevalence 
countries with concentrated epidemics.  However, this does not mean ignoring 
other populations, since one community affects another’s choices and options.  
Scaling up involves providing both intensive services and programmes for key 
populations, while working more cheaply with broader communities to raise 
awareness, challenge stigma and to ensure referrals when appropriate to more 
intensive efforts.”  (International HIV/AIDS Alliance 2001) 
 
One example of a sensitive public health issue that has been scaled up in a 
number of contexts was presented at the Horizons/Alliance Seminar on scaling 
up – namely that of post-abortion care.8  It represents a similar challenge to 
scaling up HIV/AIDS in its sensitivity and the need to address cultural norms and 
attitudes in order to expand the scale of this service.  In this presentation, scaling 
up was defined as reaching a greater number of people and increasing the 
impact of the intervention with a specific objective of regularising it into routine 
public sector health services.  A comparative analysis of the successes and 
failures of such scaling up efforts was made across four countries (Kenya, 
Ghana, Mexico and Columbia) and it was found that where efforts over-focused 
on the technology rather than on changing attitudes, the scaling up was less 
successful.  Scaling up was most successful where there was an understanding 
of the implications for essential systems and standards, such as supervision, and 
where there was both committed leadership and sufficient support for the 
intervention among the general public rather than with health personnel 
                                                          
8  Presentation by Julie Solo of the Reproductive Health Alliance (London) on scaling up post-abortion care.   “Post- 
    abortion care” was defined to include treatment or complications resulting from the abortion, provision of family  
    planning services and linkages to other reproductive health services. 
        Section: i 
  
   
13
exclusively.  Thus many interesting and relevant lessons emerged from this case 
study for HIV/AIDS.  
 
There are a number of specific challenges in finding measures of evaluating the 
impact of scaling up in HIV/AIDS.  As elaborated above, the objective of 
organisations in scaling up their programmes may not only be an epidemiological 
one, as measured in incidence of new cases of HIV/AIDS.  Rather, they may 
seek social change – such as affecting social norms or reducing prejudice and 
stigma associated with HIV/AIDS -- which is very difficult to measure and of 
which assessments of quality tend to be highly subjective.  Quantitative indicators 
may not reflect the quality of effort the organisation undertakes, particularly at the 
level of person-to-person contact, nor be sufficient to assess how well objectives 
of reducing stigma and discrimination are met, or how humane the care and 
support services are.  
 
Many NGOs addressing HIV/AIDS lack baseline data on which to evaluate the 
effectiveness of their scaling up.  This may be at least partly due to a lack of 
research capacity or institutional culture favouring the collection and analysis of 
data (Shyamala Nataraj, SIAAP, Horizons/Alliance Seminar).  Or, as Margarita 
Quevedo noted about Ecuador, for example, while epidemiological information on 
HIV/AIDS is available on the Internet, most of the small community-based 
organisations with which her organisation, KIMIRINA, works lack computers.  
Even where epidemiological information is available, for example, reliable and 
valid sexual behaviour data is often extremely difficult to obtain or collect for both 
cultural and political reasons.  Where sexual behaviour studies have been 
conducted, such data – and particularly projections based on them -- have to be 
scrutinised carefully for potential bias in such a sensitive aspect of behaviour.   
 
In reality, then, NGOs often make programmatic choices without being fully 
informed by empirical data about impact.  Participants at the Horizons/Alliance 
Seminar agreed on the importance of evaluating interventions before scaling 





A central dimension of scaling up is sustainability, whether in terms of people, 
geographic area, social group or activity. A program must be built with sufficient 
financial, technical, social and political support so that it lasts over time.  
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The most frequent use of the term sustainability refers to whether or not there are 
sufficiently strong economic bases to keep a given programme effective over a 
period of time.  The issue of limited resources and the need to contain costs and 
improve efficiency through achieving economies of scale is perhaps the most 
widely heard justification – beyond the humanitarian rationale -- for expanding 
HIV/AIDS efforts. HIV/AIDS related organisations, as is the case in many other 
areas of development, are often deficient in not fully taking into consideration the 
cost implications of alternative strategies. There is an urgent need for more 
information on costing HIV/AIDS programmes (Kumaranayake and Watts 
2000b).9  
 
A broader understanding of sustainability embraces a much fuller range of 
dimensions.  Avina, in an article on the evolutionary cycles of NGOs, defines 
sustainability as follows: “An expansion is successful if the organisation has 
evolved institutionally to the point where it can manage the augmented level of 
activities effectively, can finance itself into the foreseeable future, has retained 
the necessary level of programme autonomy from external actors and is 
providing desired and sustainable services to its target beneficiaries” (Avina 
1993: 465-66). Both the programmatic and the organisational sustainability need 
to be considered.  That is, has the organisation accumulated sufficient 
programme experience and momentum to operate at a larger scale?  And does 
the organisation have in place the requisite trained staff, processes and 
structures to sustain a greater level of activity to meet the objectives of a scaled 
up programme?  Indeed, the process of increasing the scale of activity may in 
itself reduce sustainability as the organisation becomes over-stretched10 and 
programme effectiveness is diluted.  Thus it is critical that a thorough assessment 
of the capacity of the organisation to scale up is made prior to engaging in the 
exercise. 
 
The above dimensions of sustainability focus more on the organisation itself and 
its supply, or delivery of services.  But the objectives of scaling up may be more 
than sustaining any particular programme or intervention in delivery terms, and 
relate more to sustaining the response of communities and the relevant 
constituencies of the organisation to the epidemic, particularly in terms of 
sustained behavioural change.  According to Geoff Foster, one of the key lessons 
emerging from FACT/FOCUS support to community-led orphan support 
programmes in Zimbabwe was the degree to which community ownership made 
                                                          
 
9  Of the fourteen case-studies of scaling up NGO activities presented at the Horizons/Alliance Scaling Up Seminar, only 3 
explicitly addressed costs – the Program Support Group in Zimbabwe, the NGO-Government collaboration for Home Care 
in Cambodia and the International HIV/AIDS Alliance (see appendices A and C). 
10  Sue Lucas, personal communication 
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the project more sustainable.  Foster argues convincingly that African countries 
affected by HIV/AIDS have responded on their own terms in a number of ways to 
the epidemic, yet initiatives of external agencies – whether NGOs, governments 
or donors, often fail to recognise these community initiatives or in the worst 
cases, disregard or undermine them.11   
 
Thus sustainability in this sense focuses on strengthening local initiatives and 
sustaining community ownership of programmes.   The social context in which 
the programme expands its scale of activities is therefore critical to sustainability 
in that it is a predictor of the demand for it.  The challenge for external agencies 
seeking to act as a catalyst to these efforts – whether NGOs, governments or 
donors – is to build on these initiatives.  At the same time, they may need to 
encourage communities to recognise issues that are hidden or controversial, or to 
address social groups at the margins of society.  It is possible, however, that 
increasing supply of HIV/AIDS programmes generates its own demand by 
breaking down social barriers and reducing stigma.  In this sense a “virtuous 
cycle” could be created where increased coverage generates more demand and 
thus the programme in question becomes more effective (Paurvi Bhatt, 
USAID/DC, Horizons/Alliance Seminar).   
 
 
6. Scaling Up as a Process 
 
As important as it is to be clear about the end objectives of scaling up, the 
process of reaching these aims is significant both programmatically and for the 
organisation involved. The great strengths of NGO activity to date in HIV/AIDS 
prevention have been the relationships of trust they have inspired among their 
constituencies and the processes of participatory decision-making they 
encourage, both of which have enabled them to address sensitive issues. As 
Fowler (1991) has written of development NGOs in general, their comparative 
advantage lies more in the quality of their relationships than in the size of 
resources they command.  
 
Approaches to scaling up expounded by the private sector, such as franchising 
and developing particular pilot models of which exact replicas are planted in 
starkly different contexts, have been very influential in development circles (Wazir 
and van Odenhoven 1998). Yet they may not be appropriate strategies for the 
field of HIV/AIDS, where the importance of factoring in local specificities, and the 
need for attention to processes and values is pre-eminent. As Myers notes, the 
                                                          
11  Foster and others note that these community initiatives are more likely to emerge in care and support, than  
     prevention, as will be discussed below. 
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challenge is to think about scale in a way that “allows a qualitative, decentralised 
and participatory approach to that goal, as contrasted with the more quantitative, 
centralised and imposed approach that seems to predominate” (Myers 1992). 
Nonetheless, the opposite extreme of arguing that programmes are so context-
specific as to make lessons or replication to other areas impossible, an approach 
that Wazir and van Odenhoven (1998) refer to as “contextualist”, is also 
unhelpful. There is much that can be learned from small-scale efforts that is of 
larger relevance and applicability.   
 
Examples of successful scaling up efforts of NGOs with clear impact suggest that 
some degree of distinctiveness and integrity of process needs to be sacrificed in 
the interest of reaching a greater scale.  Both the Programme Support Group in 
Zimbabwe and the AIDS Support Organisation (TASO) in Uganda, for instance, 
illustrate that the development of standardised approaches with enough flexibility 
to allow for diversity among different communities can be highly effective.  The 
prevention and mitigation efforts of the Programme Support Group share a 
common approach by training community volunteers through the use of modules, 
manuals and structured participatory approaches. As they describe it:  “[Both 
prevention and mitigation] work with community volunteers to deliver large-scale, 
economical, locally relevant services that increase community response capacity 
(Appendix A, p. 44 PSG case study).”  The organisation is exceptional in its 
rigorous attention to results.  In one area, for example, they were able to 
demonstrate that Bulawayo condom use in sex work rose from 18% at outset to 
72% within 2 years (p. 49 case study).  While, particularly at the beginning, early 
partnerships “resent the loss of attention and uniqueness as scaling up proceeds” 
this resistance seems to wane as clear indications of the success of this 
approach emerges.  PSG has grown from a small-scale effort based on a 
research project to a regional organisation operating in three Southern African 
countries.   
 
Similarly, TASO helps local community-based organisations to develop 
counselling and clinical services for those with HIV/AIDS, thus leading to a 
proliferation of “TASO-like” services each of which are tailored to specific 
communities. (see TASO report on page 39, Section ii).  
 
If scaling up, then, is conceived as a process occurring over time, objectives of 
the exercise may vary according to, for example, the different stages or level of 
the epidemic.  At low levels of epidemic, when infection may be more restricted to 
certain social groups, different strategies may be called for than when the 
epidemic is more generalised within the population at large.  For example, more 
“targeted” interventions can prevent the spread of HIV into the “general” 
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population.  Where HIV/AIDS is widespread, however, there needs to be a 
relatively high level of coverage within the general population in order to have the 
same degree of impact (although an incremental increase in coverage may have 
a significant relative impact).12 This is illustrated further in a diagram drawn by a 
small group at the Horizons/Alliance Seminar and replicated below in Figure 2.  
Thus, as discussed further in section ii below, the target groups of programmes 
are likely to change over time. 
 
Figure 2 -  The Relationship Between Coverage and Impact According to Level  
       of HIV Prevalence 















Modifying the objectives of programmes as scaling up proceeds may also be 
necessitated by changes in the political context. Two case studies presented at 
the Horizons/Alliance Seminar emphasised the importance of being able to 
respond to unanticipated changes in the policy environment during the scaling up 
process.  For example, changes in the donor landscape in HIV/AIDS conditioned 
the strategy adopted by the International HIV/AIDS Alliance (Alliance case-study, 
appendix c).  And in India, the course of scaling up the Healthy Highways project 
to reduce transmission among truck workers and their sexual partners was 
affected by both policy changes within the main funding organisation, the UK 
Department for International Development (DFID), as well as the desire of the 
Government of India to command greater direction over HIV/AIDS activities 
(Robert Grose, DFID, Horizons/Alliance Seminar).   
 
                                                          
12  I am grateful to Helen Parry of the International HIV/AIDS Alliance for clarifying this point in her comments on this  
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Objectives of scaling up may also change over time due to the internal situation 
of the organisation.  One participant at the Horizons/Alliance Seminar noted that 
at some stages in the scaling up process there was actually a cutting back in 
order to strengthen programmes and prepare for expansion – thus an 
organisation may initially need to scale down in order to scale up (Shyamala 
Nataraj, SIAAP).13  It is not clear, however, whether this example is 
representative of other NGO experiences of scaling up.   
 
 
A Dynamic Relationship Between Prevention,  
Care and Mitigation 
 
As noted above, HIV/AIDS is distinctive among health problems in its dynamic 
relationship between preventing its incidence, and supporting, caring for and 
treating those infected and affected by it.   If the premise of scaling up initiatives 
is to build the capacity of individuals and communities to respond to the epidemic, 
many would argue that the starting point should be problems identified by the 
constituencies that NGOs work with.  In many contexts, such community 
initiatives are more likely to emerge to care for and support those affected by 
HIV/AIDS such as in the area of orphan support.  Children may often represent 
the most visible victims of the epidemic to whom humanitarian efforts are readily 
addressed.  There is often more resistance to working with marginalised social 
groups who may be subject to prejudiced views that they are somehow “morally 
responsible” for the epidemic.  Thus – although care may provide the catalyst for 
a broader approach to HIV/AIDS, scaling up prevention programmes may require 
more external motivation than that of care programmes.  For example, church-
based programmes across Africa have emerged to care for orphans and support 
families affected by the epidemic (Foster n.d.), but many find prevention 
messages addressing condoms and sexual behaviour more sensitive.   
 
In some cases, however, community initiatives have emerged in the area of 
prevention and have subsequently moved into care.  For example, the Anti-AIDS 
Clubs that the Family Health Trust has supported in Zambia moved from 
awareness raising and prevention in schools to working with orphans.  According 
to Dixter Kaluba, this has helped to familiarise youth with problems associated 
with the epidemic and thus “young people don’t feel the epidemic is so distant”.  
Elsewhere, in low prevalence settings, where HIV/AIDS is not visible to the 
majority of community members, it may be easier to stimulate community 
                                                          
13  At this stage, SIAAP – which was operating with 40 employees, cut their staff down to only 6, prior to a subsequent  
“re-scaling” (Shyamala Nataraj, SIAAP, Horizons/Alliance Seminar). 
 
        Section: i 
  
   
19
participation in prevention rather than care.  This is the case in Ecuador, for 
example, according to the director of KIMIRINA.   
 
In Cambodia, a home-based care programme has provided a critical link between 
care, prevention and mitigation.  Cambodia has one of the fastest growing 
epidemics in the world, yet faces a severe shortage of hospital beds, a poor 
population only a minority of whom can pay for prophylactic drug therapies and a 
high incidence of people living with HIV/AIDS (PLHA) having opportunistic 
infections (Wilkinson et al. 2000).  Community leaders in Phnom Penh mentioned 
to an evaluation team, for example, that until the Home Care Team started 
visiting, people did not believe there was AIDS in their areas.  The visits helped to 
increase knowledge about HIV/AIDS and understanding of preventive measures 
(Wilkinson et al. 2000).   
 
Identifying and building on the appropriate strategy, however, may take a “trial 
and error” period of learning.  As the founder of the South India AIDS Action 
Programme (SIAAP) aptly described:  “It took SIAAP four years of sustained 
community-based interventions with women in prostitution, truckers, blind people 
and people with HIV/AIDS to understand the need to include community 
organisation, counselling and care as critical processes, perhaps even the first 
ones, in any community-based intervention that aimed at empowerment as a 
fundamental outcome.” (SIAAP case study Appendix A, p. 10)  She drew a 
broader lesson of the importance of not singling out individual interventions for 
scaling up, without seeing the synergies between them.  She illustrated her vision 
of these synergies and the importance of community organisation in figure 3.  
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Despite the evident synergies in scaling up prevention, care and mitigation 
efforts, in many contexts interventions in these areas may compete for resources.  
A recent World Bank report on costing the expansion of HIV/AIDS programmes in 
Africa notes, for example, that as HIV prevalence rises there are increasing costs 
associated with the burden of care.  Therefore there will be greater tensions in 




Scaling up From an Economist’s Perspective 
 
Much of the economic analysis that has been applied to scaling up within the 
context of HIV/AIDS is premised on a public health perspective as outlined above 
and tends to focus on the large-scale delivery of services usually by governments 
or the private sector.  As noted above, there is a dearth of costing analysis of 
NGO programmes and NGOs themselves often neglect to consider the cost 
Figure 3 - A Vision of the Shift from Linear to Integrated Programming 
Source - Presentation by Shyamala Nataraj at the Horizons/Alliance Seminar
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implications of alternative strategies.  Cost is defined as the value of resources 
used to provide a service, and the total cost of an intervention represents the cost 
of all inputs used, and varies with the number of people reached.  The assumed 
impact on HIV/AIDS from an economist’s perspective is the output of an 
intervention, usually in terms of the number of people reached with a specific 
intervention.  This makes it difficult to apply costing in areas where impact is 
defined more broadly and in more qualitative terms, and where the definition of 
scaling up is not solely based on increasing coverage, as outlined above.  
 
Nevertheless, the concepts economists apply to assessing costs of scaling up 
can be applied in a variety of ways and thus are essential for those engaged in 
scaling up to understand.  The following therefore presents a description from an 
economist’s point of view of the main questions relating to a determination of 
costs.14   
 
There are a number of issues that come to the forefront when thinking about 
scaling up and costs from an institutional perspective.  The organisational 
approach to increasing the number of people being reached will affect the 
consideration of costs. Increased coverage might be the result of expanding 
existing interventions to reach more people or it might mean creating similar new 
interventions, and then is referred to as replication of an intervention 
(Kumaranayake 2000).  While both could increase coverage, the implications for 
costs are quite different.   
 
A basic diagram of these relationships is provided in Fig. 4.  The underlying 
notion behind the expansion of activities is that an organisation which is 
expanding its scale of activities will likely initially have decreasing average costs 
(or the cost per person reached).  Beyond a certain point, continued expansion 
due both to organisational characteristics (e.g. need for more coordination etc) 
and characteristics of the groups being reached (e.g. less accessible) will mean 
increasing cost per person reached.  Thus expansion of activities has been 
encouraged as a means of achieving economies of scale (and so improving the 
efficiency of delivering services).  However, beyond a certain level of activity, 
continued expansion will lead to diseconomies of scale, and an increase in the 
average cost per person.  
 
                                                          
14  We are grateful to Lilani Kumaranayake of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine for providing the  
     material for this section.  
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The curve below illustrates a typical short-run relationship between average cost 
(AC, or the total cost per person reached) and marginal costs (MC, or the change 
in total cost of reaching an additional person), hypothesised by economic theory.  
The AC curve refers to average costs and MC refers to marginal costs. The 
average cost is often thought to have a U-shaped relationship with respect to the 
level of output.  This reflects the fact that at relatively low levels of activity (or 
scale), as the number of people being reached increases, average costs or the 
cost per person being reached decreases.  However, at higher levels of activity 
(or scale) average costs are thought to increase reflecting the fact that one might 
need to add substantially more inputs in order to increase the number of people 
being reached.  We see that marginal costs start to increase at lower levels of 
activity relative to average costs, reflecting that marginal costs will start to 
increase before average costs.   
 
When diseconomies of scale occur, that is when the cost per person reached 
actually increases as the project is expanded, cost reductions can be made by 
both reducing the scale of activity or replicating the project (on the more efficient 
       Figure 4 -  Introduction to Economic Concepts of Cost and Scale adapted from  
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smaller scale) in another location.  Thus, from a cost perspective, both expanding 
current activities or replicating projects may be desirable, and is dependent on 
the actual cost-structure of the project, the location where it is operating, and the 
nature of the target population that it is trying to reach.   
 
There is a dearth of evidence about the nature of costs as projects are replicated 
or expanded. This is particularly unfortunate given the degree to which costs vary 
according to a wide range of criteria related to motivation, organisational 
characteristics and geography among others.  For example, a study looking at 
the replication of peer education interventions for HIV prevention among sex 
workers in Cameroon found that, even within the same country, there was a two 
to three-fold difference in average costs across different cities, and that the cost-
effectiveness varied substantially. This reflected differences in project 
implementation, motivation of project staff, capacity of staff to reach target 
populations and differences in the sex worker populations across cities 
(Kumaranayake, Pepperall Goodman, et al 2000). 
 
A second issue related to costs of scaling up activities lies in the nature of 
resources which are used in a project and which are directly paid for by an NGO. 
Financial costs represent actual expenditure on goods and services purchased.  
In a financial costing, costs are described in terms of how much money has been 
paid for the resources used.  In order to ascertain the financial costs of a project 
we need to know the price and quantity of all the resources used, or alternatively 
the level of expenditure on these goods and services. In contrast, economic or 
opportunity costs recognise the cost of using resources that could have been 
productively used elsewhere. Thus, economic costs include the estimated value 
of goods or services for which there were no financial transactions (such as 
unpaid volunteer time), or when the price of the good did not reflect the cost of 
using it productively elsewhere (such as donated radio time) (Kumaranayake, 
Pepperall, Goodman et al 2000). 
 
Financial costs are important when considering budgeting or cost-recovery within 
a project.  However, they may not give a full picture of the overall resources used 
for an activity.  Economic costs are particularly useful when considering the 
resources needed to replicate or to scale up existing activities, when it may not 
be possible to utilise similar donated or subsidised inputs.  In this case, simply 
using financial costs as a guide to resource requirements for scaling up may 
seriously underestimate the resources required if a large proportion of inputs are 
provided for free, and if this proportion declines as activities are expanded or 
replicated. 
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Where activities have been delivered on a pilot or small scale, which is of 
particular relevance to NGOs, expansion or replication of activities may require 
significantly more resources than previously.  This is both  because of the ways in 
which additional services are delivered and the nature of what now has to be paid 
for (for example employing paid staff rather than enlisting volunteers).   
 
 
7 Is there Necessarily a Trade-Off Between Expansion   
    and Maintaining Quality?  
 
In analysing the impact of NGO activities in HIV/AIDS on approaches within the 
sector more generally, it becomes clear that the small-scale nature of many NGO 
activities has in many ways been their strength. A range of NGOs is active in 
HIV/AIDS, varying from very small organisations to those operating at the 
national level.  Developing typologies of NGOs active in HIV/AIDS is problematic, 
but one useful categorisation made is:  1) indigenous NGOs established and 
managed by community “outsiders”; 2) indigenous community-based NGOs 
originated and managed by members of the community (also called community-
based organisations or CBOs); 3) organisations of people living with HIV/AIDS; 4) 
foreign NGOs (Sittitrai 1994).  Perhaps the most effective, however, have been 
those which have emerged within particular communities. The larger, more 
professional AIDS organisations certainly have a critical role to play, such as in 
providing information, influencing government policy and providing support to 
other organisations. However, their ability to inspire behavioural change is often 
more limited. As O’Malley and co-authors say of these larger, more professional 
groups:  
 
“Such groups tend to be technically stronger, have more effective access to 
decision-makers, and despite higher costs, can often be very cost-efficient because 
of the scale of their operations…but very few such large groups can actually 
convince a young man to use condoms if he has not tried them before.” (O’Malley et 
al 1996). 
 
There are a number of positive features that represent a comparative advantage 
for NGOs in working on HIV/AIDS, as compared to other types of organisation, 
although these characteristics are by no means shared by all NGOs.  The 
commitment of the truly constituency-based organisations to being rooted within 
their communities, which they often know intimately, for example, enables them 
to work in a personalised manner and ethically with the sensitive and stigmatising 
issues raised by HIV/AIDS. In turn, they are able to come to understand the 
specific local risk factors for HIV transmission. Without the impediments faced by 
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larger and more visible organisations, they can work with marginalised groups 
such as sex workers, drug users and illegal immigrants. Their small size enables 
them to respond flexibly to the rapidly evolving nature of the epidemic, and they 
can change directions quickly as they adapt to lessons learned. Less weighed 
down by bureaucracy than their larger or governmental counterparts, they can 
more easily integrate work across functions, rather than being restricted to single 
types of activity. Finally, their commitment to their communities means that they 
provide often the only sustained response to the epidemic, and are more likely to 
offer care and support as well as engage in preventive activities.  
 
Therefore the challenge of scaling up activities in HIV/AIDS must address the 
question of whether such values of characteristics should and can be preserved 
as the programme or institution expands. This means not only extending the 
technical aspects of HIV/AIDS work, but also maintaining the integrity of the 
processes and values that have been the hallmark of NGO approaches to the 
epidemic.  
 
At the Horizons/Alliance Seminar, it was not the consensus among organisations 
present that such aspects of quality are necessarily jeopardised with expansion.  
Indeed, several cited cases where the aspects of the original model were not lost 
or diluted in the process of scaling up (e.g. Foster re FACT/FOCUS;  ASI).  Some 
argued that a slight drop off in quality may be an inevitable stage of the process 
of scaling up (Geoff Foster, Family AIDS Caring Trust, Horizons/Alliance 
Seminar) – that is, that in the interest of reaching a greater number of people, 
some sacrifice of quality is acceptable.  This may be particularly the case if many 
elements or programmes are scaled up simultaneously (International HIV/AIDS 
Alliance 2000b), although ensuring proper planning of the scaling up may limit 
this risk.  The question then becomes whether the quality drops below an 
“acceptable” level and indeed whether such a level can be specified (International 
HIV/AIDS Alliance 2000b).  Yet, as noted above, many NGOs lack sufficient 
monitoring capacity or data to assess changes in quality as the scaling up 
proceeds.   
 
One example of an organisation that did pay careful attention to monitoring 
quality during the process of expansion is that of the Asociation de Salud Integral 
(ASI) in Guatemala.  By enlisting volunteer medical students to collect data, they 
were able to track changes in quality as a rapid expansion of the counselling and 
clinical service coverage took place.  Analysis of that data indicated that while an 
increasing number of people were coming to their services for voluntary testing, 
they were often not returning for their results.  Further investigation into the 
reasons for this revealed that the time between test and results had increased 
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due to the increase in numbers.  Thus data was helpful in guiding a redirection of 
strategy.   
 
There have, however, been documented cases in which a rapid increase of 
coverage has led to a decline in quality.  Anti-AIDS Clubs in Zambia began in the 
1980s as a result of a presentation by a doctor on sex education in high schools.  
Students sold the idea to their friends during the holidays, and the clubs 
continued to multiply across the nation.  Over time, the activities of the Anti-AIDS 
Clubs in Zambia, for example, had proliferated rapidly and for a number of 
reasons they were no longer particularly effective and the clubs starting dying 
out.  Thus the scaling up efforts of the Family Health Trust aimed initially to 
rethink and boost the quality of an initiative that was already operating at national 
level.   The experience reinforces the view that during a scaling up process, one 
may need to concentrate on one dimension – such as quality or coverage – 
possibly at the expense of the other (Horizons/Alliance Seminar).   
 
The struggle to maintain quality while the organisation expands may pose a strain 
on staff.  As Naomi Gonahasa of TASO stated at the Horizons/Alliance Seminar:  
“It began so well but things got tough when it turned to scaling up.”   In some 
cases, NGOs have realised that a key challenge in scaling up is knowing when to 
stop.  As Dr. Suniti Solomon of YRG Care in India has stated  “One of the most 
important things for YRG Care is the quality of services we provide.  As a result, 
we chose to stop expanding our in-patient care when we reached 24 beds so that 
the quality we provided remains at a high level.”  (International HIV/AIDS Alliance 
2001) 
 
This understanding of dynamic relationships between quality and coverage has 
also been examined within the broader development arena by David Korten, who 
attempted to draw commonalities among five community-based projects in Asia 
which successfully expanded the scale of their operations.15  He concludes that 
there is no single blueprint for scaling up, but organisations go through a number 
of stages during expansion (figure 5) each of which entails a learning process. 
The first is ‘learning to be effective’, when the organisation learns what strategies 
are effective among particular populations. At this stage, errors are made, but 
effectiveness steadily increases; efficiency has not yet been achieved and 
coverage is likely to be relatively low. At the next stage, the organisation is 
‘learning to be efficient’, and unit costs tend to fall. Only in the third and final 
stage does the organisation move into expansion, and there is likely to be some 
loss of effectiveness and efficiency as the expansion occurs.  As the process of 
expansion continues, it is likely that average costs will tend to rise, and so raising 
                                                          
15  This discussion draws on Korten 1980 and Myers 1992 
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the issue of when it is optimal to continue to expand rather than replicating the 
project at a smaller scale.  The extent to which this “trial and error” process is 
permitted and learning is encouraged depends on both the external environment 
– in terms of finance and political commitment – and the internal characteristics of 
the organisation.  This is addressed in the final section of this publication. 
 
 
Figure 5 - Programme Learning Curves (as defined by Korten)  







Note:  There are likely to be trade-offs between
effectiveness, efficiency, and expansion which will lead
to some loss of effectiveness as efficiency increases,
and to losses in both effectiveness and efficiency
during expansion. 
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8 The Development Literature on Scaling Up:  
Relevance to HIV/AIDS 
 
In describing the mechanisms or pathways through which development NGOs 
can have broader impact, Robert Chambers, a pioneer in applying participatory 
approaches to development, states that:  
 
“An NGO can achieve wider impacts in many ways including expanding its operations; 
introducing or developing technologies which spread; developing and using 
approaches which are then adopted by other NGOs and/or by government; 
influencing changes in government and donor policies and actions; and gaining and 
disseminating understanding about development.” 16 
 
In looking at the HIV/AIDS epidemic specifically, it is evident that NGOs have 
operated in each of the above pathways to exert influence over the general 
thinking about and approaches to HIV/AIDS. The emphasis on and need for 
home care, for example, was initiated by NGOs, as was the emphasis on the 
ethical need to combine counselling with voluntary testing, and indeed the whole 
notion and promotion of ‘safe sex’ (O’Malley et al 1996). Similarly, it is largely due 
to successful NGO advocacy that an increasing number of donors now recognise 
the need to support and finance AIDS care and treatment, as well as prevention, 
which they were previously reluctant to do. It is also thanks to the efforts of NGOs 
that policy-makers have a greater understanding of the social determinants of the 
epidemic and its effects on communities and individuals. Yet, as stated above, 
much of this impact has been spontaneous, rather than a reflection of deliberate 
strategy.  
 
Within the context of development thinking generally, a number of authors have 
recently addressed the question of deliberate strategies to increase scale and 
widen the impact of NGO activities. John Clark, for example, formerly of OXFAM 
but now working at the World Bank on NGOs, argues that there are essentially 
three pathways available to NGOs: project replication, building grassroots 
movements and influencing policy (Clark 1991; Clark in Edwards and Hulme 
1992). Howes and Sattar (in Edwards and Hulme 1992) make the useful 
distinction between organisational or programme growth as opposed to achieving 
impact by means of transferring programmes to, or supporting other 
                                                          
16 Drabek 1987 quoting from Robert Chambers, “Thinking about NGO Priorities” IDS Mimeo, 2 May 1987, p. 1 
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organisations. Myers, in an analysis of scaling up early childhood development 
programmes, develops a terminology characterising the pace and nature of 
expansion; he uses the term planned expansion to refer to the process of 
implementing a particular model in a number of geographic areas once it has 
been pilot tested; explosion to denote the sudden initiation of a large-scale 
programme or intervention without any policy or organisation preparation 
beforehand, and association to mean expanding programme size through 
common efforts and alliances among a group of organisations, each of whom 
develop similar programmes but tailor them to the needs of specific communities 
or populations.  
 
Other authors have pointed out that it is not the content of services alone that can 
be replicated or expanded, but underlying approaches or ideas, and this is 
particularly relevant to work on HIV/AIDS. Robert Chambers, for example (in 
Edwards and Hulme 1992) refers to what he calls “self-spreading and self-
improving strategies” whereby good practice (such as participatory approaches) 
is gradually extended through other organisations, in effect transforming their 
approach.17 Van Odenhoven and Wazir (1998) use the term “concept replication” 
to denote a similar process.  
 
In the early 1990s, Edwards and Hulme, noting the lack of analyses of NGO 
efforts to scale up in developing countries, convened a number of workshops 
under the auspices of the University of Manchester and the Save the Children 
Fund.  These brought together a diverse range of case studies of scaling up by 
both Northern and Southern NGOs, and include the presentation of a number of 
think-pieces on scaling up strategies more generally.18 In their efforts to 
synthesise the findings from these studies, they developed a three-fold 
conceptual framework: namely additive strategies which imply an increase in the 
size of a programme or organisation; multiplicative strategies – which do not 
necessarily imply growth but achieve impact through influence, networking, policy 
and legal reform or training; and diffusive approaches where spread tends to be 








                                                          
17 The book Who Changes? by Blackburn and Holland, inspired by Robert Chambers’ work, entails a series of case 
studies of increasing the scale of the practice of participatory rapid assessment precisely through this approach.  
18 See Edwards and Hulme 1992; 1996; 1997 
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9 A Proposed Typology of Scaling Up with  
Application to HIV/AIDS 
 
To our knowledge, however, there has been no such analysis of approaches or 
philosophies to scaling up specific to the HIV/AIDS sector. In an effort to distil the 
findings from the above analyses of scaling up development NGOs more 
generally to processes relevant to HIV/AIDS, the following framework has been 
developed (summarised below in Figure 6). Five different types of strategies are 
envisioned, which can be represented on a continuum along which the original 
organisation that initiates the scaling up effort becomes less and less involved. 
The continuum also presents a gradation of strategies that become increasingly 
abstract in nature, and it is thus difficult to measure their impact.  
 
This typology does not represent evolution of organisations, and indeed they may 
employ several of these strategies simultaneously with different types of 
HIV/AIDS programmes as appropriate to particular time-periods, geographic 
areas or social groups.  
 
 
Figure 6 -  A Proposed Typology of Scaling Up in HIV/AIDS 
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9.1  Strategy 1: Organisational Expansion 
 
This category refers to the simplest form of scaling up activities, which reflects 
the effort of one organisation, rather than attempts to work with others. It entails 
increasing scale either by reaching a greater number of people, social groups or 
geographic areas, or expanding the functions or activity of the organisation. This 
may include, for example, developing a pilot project that is then expanded to a 
greater geographic area, or the opening of branches of the same organisation in 
different places.   
 
Among the most famous examples of this first strategy is the Bangladesh Rural 
Advancement Committee (BRAC), which began in 1972 and is now one of the 
largest Southern NGOs with a staff of over 12,000, a budget of close to $23 
million and reaching over 3 million people. BRAC has achieved this scale through 
careful expansion of both the types of activities it undertakes (diversifying from 
economic activity into child survival and women’s health for example) and by 
moving into different geographic regions of Bangladesh. According to one 
analysis of this scaling up process, quality was not sacrificed (Howes and Sattar 
in Edwards and Hulme 1992) perhaps owing to its careful process of 
experimenting through pilot projects, learning from them and then replicating 
them on a greater scale (Uvin 1995). 
 
Extending to other population groups has been an explicit orientation of the 
scaling up objectives of a number of HIV/AIDS organisations.  For example, 
Colectivo Sol, an NGO based in Mexico City, started by focusing its efforts 
towards self-identified gay men, but initiated educational programmes and other 
services for a wider group, including young people and other NGOs.19  Similarly, 
staff at ASI felt the need to extend their clinical services to children and babies.  
Their expansion of the programme was driven by increased demand for their 
services, projections of an impending rapid increase in the epidemic, and their 
perception that they either had to close or expand to cope with their rising case 
load.  Similarly, the Family Health Trust has successfully reached out-of-school 
youth through its scaling up process, although it is much more costly and difficult 






                                                          
19  Chris Castle, personal communication.  
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9.2 Strategy 2: Catalysing Other Organisations  
a) Technically and b) Financially 
 
This strategy refers to efforts on the part of one organisation to work deliberately 
with other organisations either within the same sector or different sectors to 
influence the nature or scope of their service provision. This could entail 
developing relationships with government (particularly in terms of their service 
provision, not policy), the private sector20 or perhaps most usually, with other 
NGOs. For example, an organisation may develop a model, which the 
government is then persuaded to take over.  
 
One successful example of this strategy is the strengthening of counselling 
capacity in government services with the involvement of SIAAP.  Existing 
government STD facilities were not attracting patients – particularly women -- due 
to lack of a receptive atmosphere.  SIAAP saw an opportunity to introduce 
counselling to break communication barriers between doctors and patients.  In 
this case, government clearly saw the advantage of potentially increasing 
demand for their services.  An arrangement was agreed whereby the government 
pays the salaries of counsellors who are trained and supervised by SIAAP.  In the 
latter’s judgement, the effort has been successful, and they have received 
requests from governments in neighbouring states for similar assistance.   
 
Alternatively, an NGO may persuade another NGO to adopt an HIV/AIDS 
programme within its health or developmental activities.21 This category would 
encompass the work of NGO support organisations, which see their main 
contribution as offering technical, financial and social support to smaller 
organisations.  This may entail providing expertise or guidance based on greater 
experience in HIV/AIDS, or may be of a more organisational development nature. 
An explicit part of KANCO’s mandate, for example, is to assist member 
organisations in strategic planning, organisational development and financial 
accounting.   
 
In some cases, such organisations may begin as direct service providers but 
either begin by or move subsequently into supporting other organisations 
financially.22   Such efforts can be hampered by unequal power relations between 
the more professional-oriented NGOs offering assistance in capacity-building and 
                                                          
20 For example, the Thai Business Coalition, an NGO, aims to increase the scale of impact by increasing the involvement 
of business leaders in workplace AIDS programmes and to guide the development of AIDS policies in business settings 
(Sittitrai 1994).  
21 This has also been referred to as “grafting” whereby, for example, a programme for adolescents is added to existing 
services which failed to reach adolescents (Smith and Colvin 2000) and could also apply to links with governmental 
services 
22 Other examples of such types of organisations include TASO and SIAAP.   
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programme design and the organisations receiving such support, in terms of 
access to finance, information and differential input into setting the agenda for the 
programme.  SIAAP in South India, for example, at one stage began to support 
other NGOs financially but found it changed the nature of the relationship 
between the respective organisations and then restricted its support to technical 
issues.  Nonetheless, where careful attention is paid to redressing such 
imbalances and where credit for success is fairly given, the results can be 
extremely positive.    
 
The experience of KIMIRINA was almost the opposite to that of SIAAP in that 
when they only provided technical support the commitment to HIV/AIDS was 
relatively weak (Margarita Quevedo, personal communication).  They found that 
even with large organisations with significant budgets, having an earmarked 
budget for HIV/AIDS, even if modest, generates a higher level of commitment.  In 
their view, only once an organisation has a high level of awareness and strong 
commitment will technical support be enough. 
 
The International HIV/AIDS Alliance employs this strategy at an international 
level.  It sees its broad mandate as scaling up community response to HIV/AIDS 
internationally - working through “linking organisations” which it supports both 
financially and technically.  These organisations in turn reach out and support 
local NGOs in their settings technically, organisationally and through exchange of 
information and sharing experience within and between countries.   
 
A number of organisations provide technical support to other organisations by 
arranging for exchange visits, both within a country or internationally.  This 
approach is critical to the Program Support Group’s training to community 
volunteers in Southern Africa, for example.  
 
HIV/AIDS prevention efforts may be most effective if integrated into existing 
infrastructures which already operate at a large scale across a range of sectors 
and thus NGOs may seek to “catalyse” those existing services to address 
HIV/AIDS. Indeed, seeking ways of combining HIV/AIDS interventions with 
delivery in other sectors, rather than focusing on scaling up individual HIV/AIDS 
interventions independently, may yield “economies of scope” whereby lower 
costs and greater efficiency are achieved than through separate delivery 
(Kumaranayake 2000).  Yet, as Watts and Kumaranayake (1999) argue the 
potential for integrating HIV/AIDS programmes into other services, whether in 
education, reproductive health, family planning or sex education is often not fully 
exploited.   They argue that in the short term, effective activities that can be 
scaled up quickly need to be identified, including using private sector (work 
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places, unions) and informal networks involving religious and community groups.  
This could help increase the access of different social and geographical groups to 
specific activities (Watts and Kumaranayake 1999). 
 
 
9.3 Strategy 3: Diffusion 
 
The third type of strategy represents the effort to broaden impact by encouraging 
other organisations to adopt a particular concept, approach or technology. 
Diffusion is explicitly more abstract than previous strategies because it does not 
entail expanding one’s own or influencing others’ specific programmes or 
activities but rather spreading ideas or methodologies.  Included among this set 
of strategies would be, for example, spreading the concept of peer education or 
community counselling or the promotion of male and female condoms (as 
technologies). This can entail either planned or spontaneous effort but by and 
large the initiating organisation is less directly involved in the implementation of 
the programme and works instead through influencing others.  Outside the field of 
HIV/AIDS, this strategy has been very effective in promoting, for example, 
community-based rehabilitation approaches or reproductive health (particularly in 
influencing family planning organisations that previously provided highly vertical 
programmes). 
 
The notion of community counselling in HIV/AIDS was foreign to India, for 
example, before SIAAP initiated a diffusion strategy to spread and legitimise the 
concept.   Lacking expertise in India, they initially sought technical input from a 
number of international institutions. As a result of their efforts “SIAAP’s 
counselling programme has been acknowledged and appreciated by the 
established medical system and endorsed by the Indian government.” (Case 
study, p. 12). 
 
At the international level, the Salvation Army’s HIV/AIDS programme seeks to 
help communities to cope with the epidemic, and facilitates exchange visits 
across regions and countries to share experience and in which “facilitation teams” 
explore key concepts related to the epidemic with local stakeholders. In so doing, 
the organisation has endeavoured to diffuse the concept of communities 
measuring their own change in terms of having greater willingness and capacity 
to address HIV/AIDS (Case study, p. 16).  
 
The Family Health Trust has also used this strategy to diffuse the model of the 
Anti-AIDS clubs to other schools in other locations.  And ASI, which was the only 
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clinical service in Guatemala providing integrated services to PLHA, made an 
explicit part of their strategy for scaling up to influence other clinical services to 
incorporate a similar approach.  
 
 
9.4 Strategy 4: Influencing Policy/Legislation 
 
At a yet larger scale, organisations may seek to engage deliberately the policies 
or legislation of government or of influential donor organisations. They may do so 
via efforts to shape the public debate on a particular issue, such as for example 
through outreach to the media so as to increase the understanding of the social 
determinants of HIV/AIDS or its impact. Or, they may seek influence via coalition-
building and knowledge exchange to increase the collective demands of civil 
society on the state within the arena of HIV/AIDS. For example, KANCO – a 
national network of NGOs, CBOs and religious organisations concerned about 
HIV/AIDS in Kenya, − aims both to complement government responses and to 
push for a more conducive policy environment.  It provides capacity building to 
member organisations and operates as a clearing-house to provide accurate and 
up-to-date information on HIV/AIDS. Similarly, ASI and members of a co-
ordinating body of 28 organisations in Guatemala have been lobbying for a more 
humane HIV/AIDS law, and their efforts bore fruit with the passing of that law in 
February 2000.  And in the Philippines, an NGO coalition has lobbied for the full 
implementation of the existing HIV/AIDS law (Ruthie Libatique, PHANSuP, 
Horizons/Alliance Seminar). NGOs have also used this strategy in influencing 
governments and pharmaceutical companies by creating national, regional and 
international alliances or coalitions to lobby for price concessions and greater 
access to treatment.  
 
Among the strategies thus far, this is the most explicitly political. Moreover, trying 
to influence policy or legislation may necessarily require a confrontational 
approach.  For example, the organisation SIAAP began through efforts to obtain 
the release of HIV-positive women illegally imprisoned in South India, and it did 
so through legal challenges in the courts, as well as by raising awareness among 
the public at large (Shyamala Nataraj, SIAAP, Horizons/Alliance Seminar).  
Similarly, the fact that the social security system in Guatemala now offers care 
and treatment was achieved through lawsuits (Annie Hirschmann, ASI (AGPCS), 
Horizons/Alliance Seminar).  A number of initiatives of scaling up harm reduction 
have also relied on legal strategies and efforts to keep the police at bay (Jeff 
O’Malley, HIV/AIDS Alliance, Horizons/Alliance Seminar).  
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Some organisations may not initially engage in advocacy activities when they 
start work, but advocacy may become an explicit part of the scaling up process 
over time as they encounter obstacles or particular opportunities or needs.  For 
example, the International HIV/AIDS Alliance based in the UK began to find ways 
to influence donor policies.  And KIMIRINA, after several years of existence 
focusing primarily on catalysing small community-based organisations, began to 
initiate some advocacy activities as it increased its scale of operations and 
established a more solid institutional base (Horizons/Alliance Seminar).   
 
 
9.5 Strategy 5: Mainstreaming in Development  
 
Related to yet going beyond the fourth set of strategies, is the effort to permeate 
all development sectors with concern for and attention to HIV/AIDS and its 
implications. The explicit objective of such strategies is to widen the narrowly 
sectoral approach to HIV/AIDS by engaging the decision-making bodies and 
organisations across relevant sectors as well as seeking channels of 
implementation beyond the health sector alone. More of a development focus to 
AIDS efforts may also encourage a greater public understanding of the social 
context that puts individuals at risk of HIV/AIDS, including poverty, lack of 
education, ill health and the less tangible and more hidden problems such as 
inequitable gender relations, including women’s economic dependence on men, 
poor self-esteem or lack of control over how and when sex (and conception) take 
place.  For although one needs to change social norms more broadly to slow the 
spread of the disease, often the poorest communities are most affected by it.23  
 
NGOs focusing on AIDS often find themselves ill equipped to deal with this 
broader development context of the pandemic.24 Conversely, development NGOs 
often do not take on HIV/AIDS efforts because they see it as a health problem 
outside their own area of expertise, a problem affecting only particular individuals 
rather than communities as a whole, or they may lack the financial and technical 
resources to do so (Sittitrai 1994).  This is not to say, however, that HIV/AIDS 
specific NGOs should be advised to take on development activities previously not 
in their mandate.  A more effective strategy is likely to be influencing non-
HIV/AIDS specific NGOs to address HIV/AIDS so that, in the words of Kevin Orr 
of the Alliance “they don’t make the same mistakes we did.”   
 
                                                          
23 This was one of the conclusions of the UK NGO AIDS Consortium report 1996 
24 The HIV/AIDS Alliance conducted participatory assessments in 1994-5 on the needs of local AIDS service NGOs in 12 
developing countries, and found that: “The NGOs surveyed in most of the countries also cited the need for more action on 
the contextual (societal) factors which increase vulnerability to HIV, such as gender inequality.” (O’Malley et al 1996: 346). 
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The International HIV/AIDS Alliance has implicitly adopted this strategy in the 
majority of countries in which it works by choosing broad development 
organisations, rather than AIDS-specific organisations as linking organisations.  
Out of the 220 organisations the Alliance had supported by 1996, for example, 
200 were general health or development organisations (Alliance Case study, 
Appendix C).  However, although the Alliance found this strategy more effective, 
it notes that the associated costs of working with organisations not specialised in 
HIV/AIDS is often higher, at least initially.  AMSED in Morocco, a development 
NGO, is an example of an Alliance linking organisation.  It is in turn collaborating 
with income generating organisations because they are already mobilised and 
Morocco lacks organisations working in communities across the country which 
have expertise in HIV/AIDS.  Finally, PACT (in collaboration with the Alliance) 
specifically helps NGOs involved neither in health nor HIV/AIDS to address AIDS 
in Ethiopia. 
 
Such a strategy is not without criticism, however.  Ainsworth and Teokul (2000) 
argue, for example, that in poor developing countries with high prevalence of 
HIV/AIDS, where resource constraints are most evident and state capacity weak, 
encouraging non-health ministries to address HIV/AIDS may be spreading 
resources too thinly and may not be cost-effective.  “AIDS mortality may strike 
every sector of the economy; however, this does not necessarily imply that 
adding AIDS prevention and mitigation to every ministry’s programme will be a 
cost-effective way of reducing the epidemic.” They argue instead that a selective 
number of interventions should be scaled up to national level by governments 
and pursued vigorously for achievable outcomes.  However, their argument 
emphasises governmental strategies and is not specifically applied to NGOs.25  
Moreover, they do stress the importance of integrating HIV/AIDS into poverty 
reduction strategies.  
 
It should be noted that any one organisation may engage in a number of the 
above strategies simultaneously, and there may be overlap between the various 
categories. Moreover, the staging of the continuum is not intended to imply a 
chronological progression, as individual organisations may, after assessing their 
own comparative advantage and their environment, decide that any one of these 





                                                          
25 Interestingly, the same article notes that:  “In many instances, the tendency of international agencies to work through   
NGOs has the effect of marginalizing the government” (Ainsworth and Teokul, The Lancet, 2000 – p. 58). 
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9.6 TASO: An Example of The Evolution of  


































The efforts of staff of The AIDS Support Organisation (TASO) in Uganda
to increase the scale of its activities and to widen its impact could be
represented as an evolution of scaling-up strategies as presented in this
publication.  Their changing strategies reflected their response to the
rapidly expanding epidemic and evolving policy context, and therefore
emerging needs in the external environment, as well as their own
institutional learning of what strategies were effective and manageable.   
 
TASO began in the late 1980s as a support group of people infected and
affected by HIV/AIDS in Uganda which started meeting informally in 1987
(Kaleeba et al. 1997).  It then grew into a formal voluntary organisation
with a mission of “restoring hope and improving the quality of life of
persons and community affected by HIV infection and disease.”  
At its inception, TASO focused on sensitising health care personnel to the
needs of people with HIV/AIDS and providing clinical services to those
suffering from HIV/AIDS and counselling for HIV/AIDS clients and their
families.  Initial approaches to scaling up focused on strategy 1 above,
organisational expansion, or what they refer to as “purposive duplication”
(Case Study p. 3).  By 1990, TASO had opened 7 centres in 7 out of 45
districts (Case Study).  
 
Shortly after its inception, TASO staff realised that clinic services were
insufficient and that they were incapable of responding to increased
demand and were indeed risking creating a dependency on TASO services
(Antivelink et al).  In the early 1990s, the TASO Community Initiatives
(TCI) were established after recognition of the need to help communities
address HIV/AIDS at the local level.  Initially piloted in a few places near
Kampala, they were replicated to other sites including Entebbe, Jinja and
Mbale (Antivelink et al. 1996).   
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By the end of 1993, TASO was operational in seven districts in Uganda and
was providing counselling, medical care and social support to a cumulative
number of over 22,000 people with HIV/AIDS and their families (Kaleeba
et al. 1997).  Nonetheless, despite this substantial expansion within 6
years, there was still continued demand for services and in 1996, TASO
revised its scaling up strategy.  TASO then assumed a catalyst role
(strategy 2 above) in moving from direct service provision to facilitating
capacity building of other organisations.  Thus a network of “TASO-like”
services were created after 1996, while TASO centres continued to run as
“model HIV/AIDS care centres”  The aim of the strategy was to develop
local capacity in existing health centres to provide AIDS services medical
care, counselling, FP/STD services, managerial capacity etc.  Because TASO
worked through local district committees, it was able to ensure that there
was local commitment to the objectives of their organisation.   This
strategy meant that the effective impact of TASO extended well beyond
those districts where TASO services were physically located and priority
could be given to districts which lacked any type of HIV/AIDS related
services. 
TASO provided limited resources to “TASO like services” although their
own costs were more than expected because of the unanticipated need for
supervision on the part of TASO staff  
An extensive participatory evaluation in 1996 prompted a revising of
several of their strategies for scaling up (see Antivelink et al. 1996 and
Kaleeba et al 1997).  Of the many lessons the organisation took from the
participatory review was the fact that “HIV/AIDS is not the only issue or
need in the community” (Antivelink et al 1996) and the importance of TASO
linking with organisations addressing other development needs such as
famine, the social and legal vulnerability of women – particularly widows --
and orphans, and income generation (strategy 5 above). 
 
By 1998, TASO had worked in 66 communities and trained over 2,500
community volunteers.  Significantly, by this time TASO was working with
41 organisations in partnerships (2 hospitals, 7 health centres, 32 CBOs). 
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10. Partnerships/Alliances  
 
Since all of the above strategies with the possible exception of the first, 
organisational expansion, involve some sort of relationship with other 
organisations, key questions that must be addressed would include: What 
incentives are there for the other organisations to take over or adopt the new 
activities? Is there compatibility between the two types of organisations? Are 
there salary differences between the different types of organisation that could 
affect the expansion from pilot to programmes of greater scale?  For example, if 
the initial effort is established by an NGO and then transferred to government 
services where civil servant salaries are lower in relation to the NGO, how can 
sustainability be achieved? Will the initiating organisation eventually withdraw or 
transfer the programme to the other organisation and if so, when and how?  In 
what follows, some aspects of these questions in light of the specific relationships 
involved will be examined.  
Despite the tremendous success of this innovative approach, however,
TASO staff recognise that it encountered a number of challenges in
scaling up its activities many of which have been observed among other
NGOs during scaling up.  These include the difficulty of monitoring quality
and quantity due to lack of complete or reliable data at least partly due to
inadequate record keeping by volunteers and health workers.  Their efforts
were also constrained by the problem of volunteer drop out and irregular
supplies of condoms and drugs.  They also acknowledge the problems of
having only a few trained counsellors covering a large geographic area.   As
with other efforts involving collaboration with public sector staff, there
were also specific challenges, such as the additional work and
responsibilities placed on the staff of district health facilities when there
were no financial incentives attached.  Moreover, high staff turnover rate
at the local health units meant that there was a continual need for training
of new staff. 
 
This case study illustrates that at different points of the epidemic, and on
the basis of experience accumulated by individual organisations, strategies
for scaling up are likely to evolve significantly over time. 
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Co-operation between government and NGOs in HIV/AIDS depends both on the 
political context and the degree to which governments are open to such input, 
and whether NGOs perceive the benefit of interacting more closely with 
government.  As HIV/AIDS prevalence rises rapidly, governments often look to 
NGOs for expertise in addressing the epidemic, and therefore may be more open 
to collaboration.  But high prevalence is not a necessary condition for successful 
partnerships.  Often, however, governments and NGOs tend to regard each other 
with mutual suspicion (see cartoon below), rather than seek channels of 
collaboration.  NGOs are often frustrated with the inability of public sector delivery 
mechanisms to be flexible or innovative, or to respond to changing community 
needs.  They may inevitably feel – depending on political context -- that unequal 
power relations between government and NGOs means that the NGO is 
inevitably the junior partner and government “calls the shots.” (Geoff Foster, 
Family AIDS Trust, Horizons/Alliance Seminar).  Similarly, governmental staff 
may be wary of involvement with NGOs whom they may regard as opportunistic 
and donor-driven, or representing the interests of particular social groups and not 
addressing the wider national picture.  In many cases, mutual competition over 
resources and particularly donor funding can inhibit co-operation.  
 
Figure 7 - Government – NGO Relations 
Source - Illustration used in Cambodia presenting the challenges of starting up a 
joint Ministry of Health / NGO home care programme for local NGOs/CBOs 
involved in HIV/AIDS. 
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There are a number of clear advantages for both governments and NGOs to 
foster partnerships to increase the scale of HIV/AIDS activities. Government 
services have the advantage of greater coverage at relatively low cost (given low 
civil service salaries in most countries) but often lack the understanding of 
community dynamics and process approaches and risk being overly intrusive or 
directive. Here, NGOs can have a key role in encouraging more participatory 
methods as well as influencing the content of HIV/AIDS programmes.  
 
Governments and NGOs may complement each other in terms of access to 
different social groups. On the one hand, governments may have sole or better 
access to groups such as the military or the police, both of whom are highly 
relevant to HIV/AIDS, and be able to reach them on a much larger scale than 
non-governmental organisations, such as through the public education system.  
Yet on the other hand, governments may be restricted in access to population 
groups engaged in illegal or stigmatised activities and have little political interest 
in working with the socially marginalised.  One of the NGOs’ comparative 
advantages lies in their ability and willingness to work with such groups.  
 
NGOs may also have a particular contribution in broaching sensitive issues and 
then increasing the legitimacy of addressing this social problem, thus opening the 
door for government involvement. In other contexts, however, the fact that NGOs 
are active in some areas of HIV/AIDS may deter governments or let them off the 
hook from addressing these issues.  It should be noted, moreover, that this is far 
from a one-way process in that not only might strategies described here influence 
government policy regarding the provision of public AIDS programmes, but 
policies can in turn have an impact on the environment in which NGOs operate 
as well.  
 
Successful examples of NGO-governmental collaboration in development more 
broadly illustrate that strong relationships between individuals are critical 
(Edwards and Hulme 1992), even though political exigencies may bring 
unanticipated changes in personnel within governmental institutions, and staff 
turnover is often high in NGOs. 
 
Within the field of HIV/AIDS a number of instances of successful collaboration 
were discussed at the Horizons/Alliance Seminar.  In Cambodia, for example, the 
governmental HIV/AIDS programme has greater fears of cultural resistance and 
is more risk averse in trying new models, but once NGOs start and show a 
particular model can work, then the government may be more prepared to 
replicate it (Cambodia presentation and small group discussion, 
Horizons/Alliance Seminar).  Participants in the Government-NGO collaboration 
        Section: ii 
  
   
44 
for home-based care, described above, note that critical ingredients of its relative 
success is that both parties are aware of the benefits of partnership and respect 
and understand each other’s systems and structures.  In this case, the groups 
involved developed a joint mission statement and they operate as much as 
possible with full transparency (of funding and programme direction). 
 
The government-NGO collaboration in Cambodia also successfully avoided a 
problem characterising many other community-initiated home-care programmes 
in their failure to institutionalise connections or referrals to existing governmental 
health services.  As Wilkinson and co-authors note: “a home care programme 
which, at the onset, links grassroots organisations with existing public health 
services, and encourages shared ownership is more likely to achieve 
sustainability, impact and cost-effectiveness.” (2000).  This ingredient of a 
particularly successful collaboration illustrates a broader theme, which is the 
importance of NGO programmes being linked into existing HIV/AIDS related 
services and the dangers of NGOs assuming they can “go it alone.” 
 
In the Philippines there has been relatively smooth NGO-government co-
operation in HIV/AIDS partly because the government recognises that it cannot 
do everything – that although there is a National AIDS Plan it would take a long 
time to implement it fully.  One example is that NGOs initiated an effort to train 
public school teachers in HIV/AIDS, a model which the government subsequently 
adopted  (Ruthie Libatique, PHANSuP, Horizons/Alliance Seminar).   
A number of key lessons for fostering dialogue between NGOs and government 
emerge from the case study of KANCO.  Allan Ragi noted that governments find 
collective networking threatening and therefore one has to actively look for 
opportunities to encourage the participation of government representatives. At 
the same time, governments will only respect the viewpoints and arguments of 
NGO coalitions if they authentically represent the views of grassroots 
organisations (Allan Ragi, KANCO, Horizons/Alliance Seminar).  
 
NGOs note, however, that relationships or collaborations with government are not 
always sustainable.  ASI found, for example, that having sought and developed a 
fruitful collaboration with government, with the change of government they had to 
start again and agreements made with previous administration were not upheld.  
Moreover, in Cambodia – where the government finances NGOs in home-based 
care, financial sustainability was not necessarily assured. 
  
Surmounting these attitudinal and procedural barriers to greater co-operation 
between government and NGOs in HIV/AIDS is critical and has a potential for 
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high returns.  For ultimately, governmental services are unique in their national 
scope, and only governments possess full information of the situation at the 
national level as well as being accountable to the general public to a degree most 





A number of successful efforts to scale up HIV/AIDS programmes have worked 
through collaborations between professional NGOs and small, community-based 
organisations (CBOs).  The experience of FACT/FOCUS illustrates that it is 
feasible to build on existing community initiatives by volunteer and community-
based organisations.  Their first pilot was established in 1993 in a particular 
region of Zimbabwe where communities were already addressing HIV/AIDS 
through a church.  At its inception, 19 volunteers working in 19 villages led this 
effort.  After 1 year FOCUS did an evaluation and found that the programme 
identified most orphans and targeted the neediest and most vulnerable in 
material terms.  FACT/FOCUS then played a catalyst role to replicate the 
initiative to 9 sites (with the number of families reached increasing from 798 to 
2764). In this case, the role of the NGO FACT/FOCUS was to supervise the 
existing programme, by providing both technical and organisational development 
assistance, assisting in the replications by the same CBO (strategy 1, 
organisational expansion) and by other CBOs (strategy 2, catalyst).   
 
As noted above, however, the risk in relying solely on community initiatives is that 
there may be reluctance to address marginal social groups, or sensitive issues.  
In this case, the external agency may need to intervene to counter this 
resistance, while at the same time not undermining existing momentum.  A 
similar dilemma was faced by the Family Health Trust when it found that the Anti-
AIDS Clubs tended to exclude young girls.   
 
Another potential drawback of many such partnerships is the failure to ensure 
that the community initiatives are sufficiently linked into health and other service 
structures, whether public, private or charity-based.  There is a danger that the 
effort may stimulate demand for services on a scale to which the supply of 
services (or commodities) is insufficient to respond.  If a continuum of 
interventions – from prevention to care and support – is to be provided, fostering 
these links in advance of expansion is particularly critical.   
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A number of examples of successful scaling up efforts by NGOs emerged out of 
collaborations with research institutions.  The added benefit of this type of 
partnership is the opportunity to build into the NGO effort research and evaluation 
capacity that is rigorous.  For example, the Program Support Group in Zimbabwe 
evolved from the University of Zimbabwe from a research project into a service-
delivery organisation.  Staff at the university had been conducting an 
ethnographic study of HIV-vulnerable low income women in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe 
and the women who participated in the study requested STD/HIV/AIDS education 
and services (PSG Case study, p. 35).   Research continues to inform the PSG 
programmes, although as their activities have expanded in three Southern 
African countries, they note a continual challenge entailed in maintaining the 
quality of their research.   
 
In some cases, organisations found that there was particular value in affiliations 
to outside training and research institutions if national capacity in that particular 
area did not exist.  For example, SIAAP, in its diffusion of the concept of 
community counselling, co-operated with a number of European institutions with 
expertise in that area since the concept was not known in India.  This helped to 
increase the legitimacy of this field.  And as noted earlier, ASI enlists medical 
students to assess the quality of its interventions. 
 
As the above examples of successful collaboration in HIV/AIDS make clear, NGO 
partnerships may be essential in whichever scaling up strategy NGOs adopt.   
There is now increasing recognition – on the part of both NGOs and donors – that 
NGOs acting alone are not likely to make a dent in the epidemic, either in terms 
of preventing it or mitigating its effects, particularly in high-prevalence countries.    
Moreover, partnerships are often essential if a continuum of interventions from 
prevention to care and support is to be available.  But such collaborations 
necessarily require time to develop, and each partner has to establish their 
reputation and legitimacy in the eyes of the other.  As Annie Hirschmann of ASI 
notes, this inevitably means that NGOs need to anticipate slower processes.  The 
rewards, as the Cambodian example described above illustrates, are potentially 
high.  
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11. The Importance of Context  
 
All of the above strategies are necessarily contingent on the context in which the 
organisation finds itself operating – such as the policy context and where the 
official government position on the HIV/AIDS epidemic lies on a continuum from 
complete denial to mainstreaming HIV/AIDS across all areas of development. 
The general political context will also play a determining role, whether in terms of 
the extent of state capacity, its accountability to public demands or the degree of 
transparency with which it governs. Political considerations would reflect the 
degree to which NGOs are given some autonomy within which to operate and the 
scope available for community organising without fear of repression. Many have 
argued, however, that even adverse political contexts do not necessarily mitigate 
against scaling up efforts (Myers 1992; Sittitrai 1994; Smith and Colvin 2000). 
Indeed, where governments are incapacitated for various political reasons – such 
as in complex emergencies – NGOs may find valuable opportunities for initiating 
activities at a greater scale.  In these contexts, however, the most likely strategy 
is neither strategy 4 nor 5 above, but rather careful and low-key efforts to 
catalyse other organisations (strategy 2) and to diffuse community-based 
approaches to HIV/AIDS prevention, voluntary counselling and testing as well as 
care and support for those affected (strategy 3).   
 
Capacity would also include the availability of government infrastructure and the 
degree to which government provides a minimum safety net for its citizens. This, 
of course, will in turn be affected by the economic situation prevailing in the 
country, and the adoption of macro-economic policies such as structural 
adjustment, which may severely constrain budgetary resources.  Where 
economic or logistical constraints interrupt the supply of commodities – such as 
treatment for opportunistic infections or condoms, for example -- this can hamper 
the most successful models of scaling up as both the Program Support Group in 
Zimbabwe and TASO in Uganda have noted (Case study presentations).  If 
capacity is very low, it is likely that there will be a ceiling to efficiency gains 
through expansion and at a certain scale of delivery, further investment in 
capacity and infrastructure will be necessary in order to be able to expand 
activities and exploit potential economies of scale (Kumaranayake 2000). Where 
state capacity and willingness to address HIV/AIDS are both low, for example, 
strategies of scaling up may focus on the NGO sector alone, rather than building 
bridges with government services.  
 
The epidemiological context is also a key factor – including the stage and 
dynamics of the epidemic. Where, for example, governments are still in denial 
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and the epidemic is still not significantly advanced into the general population, 
there are not likely to be many NGOs active in HIV/AIDS either on the prevention 
side or in care and support.  Those that do exist are likely to be impeded in their 
access to communities and to the mass media.26 Thus, partnerships may need to 
be sought with organisations active in development to a broader degree, or 
through other entry-points such as reproductive health or gender issues.  In some 
contexts, however, the fact of government denial may provide a window of 
opportunity for NGOs; for example, in Ecuador, precisely because the 
government does so little in HIV/AIDS many NGOs were created to respond to 
some of the needs of PLHA (Margarita Quevedo, personal communication).   
Nevertheless, despite the importance of the level of the epidemic, NGOs do not 
always articulate different strategies whether their countries or areas have high or 
low prevalence of HIV/AIDS.27 
 
The feasibility of delivering scaled up interventions will also be conditioned by the 
intervention context and how difficult it is to reach population groups, both in 
terms of social and physical access.  Thus, for example in contexts which have a 
relatively low level of urbanisation and in which populations are dispersed in 
remote rural areas, or among migrant communities scaling up is likely to be both 
resource- and time-intensive.  Cultural considerations will dictate the degree of 
taboo surrounding the discussion of sex generally and the stigma associated with 
particular sexual orientations (such as homosexuality) or sexual activity (such as 




12. Decisions as to Whether or Not to Scale Up 
 
As the foregoing makes clear, the arguments for scaling up HIV/AIDS activities 
are strong on moral, epidemiological and cost-effectiveness grounds. 
Nonetheless, this should not be interpreted to mean that all institutions should 
scale up their activities or that all activities should be scaled up. The impact of 
many excellent small-scale programmes has been through the dissemination of 
their project experiences rather than scaling up itself (Boyce et al. 1997). Most 
countries have and need a diversity of types and sizes of organisations active in 
HIV/AIDS, which are complementary to each other. Thus both NGOs and 
government need to recognise their own comparative advantage within this larger 
                                                          
26 This is the case in Egypt, for example, where despite significant capacity and a relatively good health infrastructure, 
there are few NGOs active in HIV/AIDS (professional experience of the author from working in Egypt 1992-99). 
27 Indeed, discussion of how the level of epidemic affects strategy was notably missing from the Horizons/Alliance 
Seminar. 
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national picture. Moreover, not all organisations or activities are ready for scaling 
up, either in terms of financial capacity, internal organisational characteristics or 
programme maturity. Boyce and co-authors, in reviewing the scaling up of 
rehabilitation programmes, found, for example that it is often older organisations 
which are best prepared to scale up, given that they have established reputations 
and have the requisite community links (Boyce et al. 1997).  Nonetheless, in the 
relatively new field of HIV/AIDS, “programme maturity” needs to be seen in 
relative terms. 
 
At the Horizons/Alliance Seminar, a set of preconditions (see Figure 8 - below) to 




Figure 8 - Six Preconditions for Scaling up   






















While each of these preconditions was discussed extensively at the seminar, and 
is open to debate, consensus emerged that scaling up in HIV/AIDS need not 
always proceed at the “rhythm” of the community for many issues or groups may 
be disregarded or ignored if left only to the choice of communities themselves.  
Thus there may be an inherent conflict between the “rhythm” of the NGO and that 
of the community or communities concerned, and there is often a necessary role, 
it was argued, for outside agencies to stimulate action related to these sensitive 
concerns or marginalised social groups. 
 
• Evaluation is necessary before expansion. 
• The desire and willingness to do more and better must come from
inside the NGO and not be imposed from outside. 
• The NGO must have the resources and capacity appropriate to
the scaling up. 
• The scaling up should be initiated at the NGO’s own rhythm and
at the rhythm of the community. 
• The NGO must control the know-how and direction of the scaling
up transition process. 
• The population(s) who will be reached must be the most 
appropriate regarding their vulnerability and their potential to 
act as vectors of social change. 
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If NGOs do decide to initiate scaling up processes, three elements become 
extremely important to contemplate in ensuring that the organisation is sufficiently 
prepared. The first is that time and resources are devoted to planning for the 
scaling up process. The second is that organisations analyse their own 
comparative advantage within the larger picture of activities within the HIV/AIDS 
sector. Thirdly, the institution must consider the internal implications of scaling up 
for leadership, management, staffing, structure and costs. The later internal 
dimensions will be further addressed in the final section of this publication, 
whereas the focus here is on questions of strategy and effectiveness.  
 
A number of programmatic questions must be addressed before the scaling up 
exercise begins. These include the question of who to focus on, both in terms of 
the beneficiaries of interventions, as well as whether the scaling up exercise 
would be confined to the original organisation (strategy one above) or work with 
other institutions - NGO, private or governmental (strategies 2 – 5 above). In 
terms of the beneficiaries, for example, should the scaling up focus on increasing 
the numbers of people reached in absolute terms, or concentrate on those most 
likely to affect the dynamics of the epidemic, or perhaps most likely to adopt 
behavioural changes?28  
 
In some cases, NGOs that successfully scaled up their programmes present at 
the Horizons/Alliance Seminar did focus on the groups most vulnerable to 
HIV/AIDS.  PSG for example, explicitly targets HIV/AIDS vulnerable and low-
income communities.  Similarly, the Healthy Highways Project in India – an 
initiative of the UK Department for International Development and the 
Government of India including a number of NGO partners such as the Naz 
Foundation – specifically targets truck drivers (and their partners) as being most 
vulnerable to HIV/AIDS because of their mobility. 
  
Such an approach based on epidemiological notions of risk is often highly 
effective but may tend to narrow emphasis on the target groups without looking 
sufficiently at their partners or the circumstances governing their sexual 
behaviour.  For example, Allan Ragi of KANCO notes that neglected groups have 
been the wives of truck-drivers or secretaries in the companies for which they 
work.  
 
If one follows a social model of health, and endeavours to understand the social 
processes driving the epidemic, then one may emphasise groups more likely to 
bring social change – that is, “vectors of social change” rather than the “vectors of 
                                                          
28 Questions posed by Jeff O’Malley, email of 13 June 2000 
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the epidemic” (the former term was favoured at the Horizons/Alliance Seminar).  
For example, SIAAP chose to work with an innovative target group of blind 
people.  On epidemiological criteria alone, this may not seem an effective group 
to focus on given their relatively small population size.29  However, the fact that 
the blind are particularly disadvantaged in gaining access to HIV/AIDS material 
(most of which is written) or may be more stigmatised than most when 
purchasing condoms, for example, make this an important group to focus on in 
social terms, if one’s objective is to counter stigma associated with HIV/AIDS.  
 
Moreover, if one’s objective in scaling up is to build on indigenous community 
initiatives, then of interest is how one can stimulate spontaneous links between 
and among communities.  For example, the orphan support programmes that 
FACT/FOCUS has supported expanded through links between church groups to 
other communities.   
 
The second key question is what to focus on in scaling up in terms of particular 
HIV/AIDS activities.30 This in turn will depend on a number of dimensions, 
including the feasibility of particular strategies – including technical aspects and 
questions of access to necessary resources (such as condoms or 
pharmaceuticals), costs as well as political considerations.   
 
The second dimension would be the effectiveness of scaling up particular 
strategies, which points to the need for research to inform the strategies chosen. 
Yet NGOs often do not have the requisite information to assess effectiveness, 
either because they lack exposure to technical innovations or new findings or 
results of interventions tested elsewhere, or do not have the resources or 
orientation to undertake research themselves (Sittitrai 1994).  
 
Finally, the strategy chosen would need to be based on assessment of the 
capacity of the organisation (or partner organisations) to undertake the scaling 
up. Questions of capacity should be assessed in relation to existing capacity 
within both the non-governmental and governmental sectors.  The internal 







                                                          
29 Their actual epidemiological risk has not been studied.  C. Ramachandran of SIAAP notes that they may be at high risk 
because they tend to marry later, and often live in hostels or institutions for the blind (personal communication). 
30  See appendix B for a list of HIV/AIDS interventions from a public health perspective and Appendix: C for a description 
of the evolving focus of the HIV/AIDS alliance on different types of HIV/AIDS interventions in its support of community 
action in the field of HIV/AIDS.  
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13.  What is the Motivation for Scaling Up? 
 
Within the literature on scaling up NGO efforts, there has been remarkably little 
attention paid to the motivation behind scaling up,31 with the lion’s share of 
emphasis on the circumstances in which NGOs are pushed to increasing the 
scale of their efforts by donors making funding available deliberately for this 
purpose. While this clearly is a dominant model, in practice, however, there is a 
range of reasons that might motivate an NGO to undertake a scaling up effort of 
all or some of their programmes.  
 
Expansion may be externally induced if the overall context in which NGOs 
operate changes, either because of the evolution of the HIV/AIDS epidemic itself 
(as it expands rapidly, and/or extends into other social groups or geographic 
areas, for example) or the natural history of the disease (with increasing 
proportions of the beneficiary community becoming symptomatic). The overall 
policy climate may change, either in a negative or positive direction due to 
changes in government stances regarding HIV/AIDS, or the activities of other 
organisations. Alternatively, the beneficiaries of an organisation may be the 
driving force behind expansion in that they may demand a greater scale in terms 
of the numbers of persons reached, geographic areas covered or the type of 
activities undertaken. In many cases increasing the scale of activities is part of a 
deliberately conceived research process, beginning with a pilot study and 
involving a staged programme of expansion.  As noted above, the Program 
Support Group, for example, began as an ethnographic study in the University of 
Zimbabwe, and subsequently moved into service delivery.  Research continues 
to inform their on-going programme. 
 
 In other instances, the introduction of new technologies – for example the female 
condom or microbicides - may drive efforts to expand the scale of activities. 
International pressure and advocacy or the evolution of ideas at the international 
level often play a key role in inspiring certain forms of expansion. As was evident 
at the International Conference on Population and Development for example, 
when a particular approach – such as integrating HIV/AIDS within reproductive 
health care – is endorsed at the international level, this can play a very influential 
role in the design of local programmes.  The extent to which such integration is 
indeed desirable and is actually happening, however, remains debated (Mayhew 
1996). 
                                                          
31 Uvin and Miller (1996) refer to “push” factors for scaling up which are largely supply-driven - that is, where the impetus 
for scaling up comes from the programme providers themselves, usually NGOs or government; and “pull” factors where 
demands for scaling up emerge from the recipients or participants of the intervention programme. Nonetheless, there is a 
need to further disaggregate these categories. Moreover, in practice expansion is likely to result from a combination of 
motivations. 
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The desire for expansion may have little to do with external factors but rather be 
entirely internally motivated, either at the initiative of a visionary and charismatic 
leader or through staff consensus. Funding is then sought to finance the planned 
expansion. Expansion may stem from observed success in smaller-scale 
activities and the desire to expand this effort. Alternatively, it may be driven 
internally by discovery of obstacles to successful programmes. For example, the 
Self Employed Women’s Association, in Ahmedabad, India – a trade union with a 
membership of over 200,000 women - developed to represent the economic 
interests of disadvantaged women but expanded into health when staff found that 
the main reasons for defaults on loans were maternal mortality and health 
problems.  
 
There may be personal motivation such as a desire for professional 
advancement, social recognition or prestige that provide the underlying impetus 
to programme expansion.  In many cases, leaders of organisations stake their 
careers on the visibility, influence and indeed size (as measured in numbers of 
employees or in overall budgets) of the organisations they direct.  The notion that 
NGOs need to increase in size in order to compete with other organisations for 
donor funding or influence is widely held according to participants in the 
Horizons/Alliance Seminar.  As Jeff O’Malley notes in the case study on the 
HIV/AIDS Alliance:  “It is rare indeed for an NGO of any size to conclude that it is 
doing enough, or that it has enough resources.” 
 
The degree to which the initiating organisation perceives itself to be in control of 
the process of expansion in large part reflects the nature of this motivation. In a 
workshop convened by the UK NGO AIDS Consortium, for example, many 
participants spoke of the involuntary nature of scaling up, in that they felt they 
were obliged to take on other activities because of overwhelming poverty and the 
lack of services in the face of a devastatingly rapid spread of the epidemic. In 
these circumstances, the lack of time, opportunity or resources to prepare for 
scaling up can have a detrimental effect on its ultimate effectiveness. In other 
situations where control is equally lacking – where expansion is induced by the 
exigencies of foreign funding, for example, scaling up may actually dilute 
effectiveness.   
 
Similarly, selecting among strategies as defined above in the typology may not be 
a result of free choice, and indeed organisations may resort to certain strategies 
rather than others as a compromise.  Where funding is not available to catalyse 
other organisations (strategy 2), for example, some might engage in policy 
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advocacy with both government and donors in order to encourage them to 
provide the necessary funds to support grassroots activities.32   
 
 
14.  Risks Entailed in Scaling Up NGO Efforts  
 
Over the last several decades, as the role of NGOs in social development has 
expanded considerably, there have been a number of criticisms of NGOs 
emerging.  Among these are arguments that their impact would be greater if they 
looked self-critically at both their internal structures and processes as well as 
their comparative advantage relative to government in particular. These criticisms 
are instructive in thinking about a process of scaling up which would expand the 
role of NGOs even further. Some have criticised NGOs for increasingly taking on 
tasks more appropriate to the state, although they have recognised that this has 
often been prompted by the prevailing context of structural adjustment and 
indebtedness in many countries. Ironically, NGOs themselves are often critical of 
these macro-economic policies yet find themselves increasingly pushed into the 
role of large-scale service-providers, effectively substituting for the public sector 
(Edwards and Hulme 1992). Part of this may be attributed to the preference of 
donors to fund service provision that has concrete and visible outcomes, as 
opposed to the more political advocacy efforts whose impact is difficult to 
measure. Yet not only does this shift have a major impact on the institutional 
culture of the NGO, but it can put them in a very different political role nationally 
as well as divert the original aims of the organisation. 
 
Perhaps more serious concern has been expressed about what many have 
observed to be a prevailing tendency for NGOs to become more accountable to 
their external funders than to their declared constituency. In their book entitled 
NGOs, States and Donors: Too Close for Comfort? Edwards and Hulme (1997) 
point to evidence that NGOs are “losing their roots” as they increasingly serve the 
interests of donors, and to a lesser degree governments, rather than the poor and 
disempowered whom they set out to help. And this tendency might only be 
exacerbated by scaling up. Pearce voices a widely held view that: “Without 
meaningful accountability to their “beneficiaries,” scaling them up could seriously 
distance them from the poor and their own social structures.” (Pearce 1993). 
Indeed, despite the rhetoric of NGOs that they represent the interests of their 
beneficiaries and respond to their needs, there are often few mechanisms to 
ensure that this is the case. For the most participatory oriented organisations, 
such needs make themselves felt precisely because the NGO faces the 
                                                          
32  Sue Lucas, International HIV/AIDS alliance, personal communication 
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community daily, but as the scale at which NGOs operate increases, such close 
interaction, and consequently the scope for participation, may be reduced.  
 
Several authors have pointed to the fact that this increasingly influential 
relationship between donors and NGOs often creates processes whereby the 
structures and values of the NGO come to mirror those of the funding 
organisation (Charlton 1995; Fowler 1991; Edwards and Hulme 1997). For 
example, complicated reporting procedures may stimulate the expansion of 
departments within the NGO to respond to such demands, thus increasing the 
bureaucratisation of the organisation. Moreover, a premium may be placed on the 
employment of English-speaking graduates who are able to prepare polished 
proposals for donor consumption and this may distort the interaction with local 
communities, as well as the salary structure of the organisation. White33 observes 
that increased size of NGOs serving the poor in Bangladesh has “inevitably 
meant increased distance from the grassroots and the early pioneering vision has 
been replaced by an ethic of efficiency and professionalism.”  
 
 




Many of the above critiques have also been levelled at NGOs active within 
HIV/AIDS. Although it is recognised, for example, that an increased level of donor 
support is necessary to increase the scale of operations, many have pointed to 
the damage created by a sudden influx of large amounts of donor funding.34 If 
sufficient reflection has not taken place internally regarding the strategic use of 
the funds - such as in a thoughtful process of preparing for scaling up – the influx 
of money is likely to diminish creative effort within the organisation and may 
jeopardise the effectiveness of its programmes. Moreover, as organisations 
increasingly compete in chasing donor funds, this is likely to create jealousies 
and rivalries with other organisations that should be natural allies in efforts to 
increase the impact on HIV/AIDS.  
 
Some have noted that receiving an increasing scale of funds – particularly if 
available through official channels negotiated with the state - may make NGOs 
less critical of government policy, and inclined to shift away from an advocacy 
                                                          
33 S. White (1999) “NGOs, Civil Society and the State in Bangladesh: the politics of representing the poor” Development   
    and Change, Vol. 30, No. 2. 
34 The dynamics created in PWHA organisations by greater donor funds being made available are particularly complex 
    given the fact of the intrinsic conflict of interest where staff and beneficiaries belong to the same group (O’Malley et al  
    1996).  
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role (Sittitrai 1994). This has been observed in Australia, for example, where the 
increasing official recognition of AIDS councils has prompted their expansion into 
large service-delivery organisations whose autonomy from the state is 
increasingly questioned.35  
 
A less analysed feature of increased levels of donor support is how it may affect 
the local reputation of the organisation and community perceptions of its 
activities.  Hyden and Lanegran (1991), in a “political mapping” of the AIDS 
epidemic in East Africa, argue that HIV/AIDS agenda setting within Africa has 
been overly dominated by international donors and Northern NGOs.  According to 
them, this reinforces the perception among Africans of AIDS as foreign and 
reflecting outsider determination to prove that AIDS originated in Africa. Others 
within the HIV/AIDS sector, such as Decosas36 have argued that donor agencies 
have played too prominent a role in influencing HIV management in southern 
Africa. 
 
A more recent concern has emerged that with increased commitment for donor 
organisations to work on HIV/AIDS and to increase their budgetary allocations to 
it, particularly since the Durban conference, there is a growing competition 
among donors for NGOs to support.37  There is also concern that in the desire to 
spend these larger budgets, donors seek to commit larger amounts of money at 
one time to non-governmental organisations.  This has thereby increased 
attention to issues of NGO absorptive capacity. There is a risk that donor funding 
may proceed at levels beyond the existing absorptive capacity of NGOs, and thus 
stifle their existing good efforts.  To avoid such problems, clearly NGOs 
themselves need to refine tools for assessing their own capacity. 38  The ultimate 
risk is that the need of donor agencies to disburse larger amounts of money to 
local organisations may distort their original objectives or capacities.  As 
Decosas, who has voiced this fear and is critical of the preoccupation of 
international organisations with scaling up, notes:  “A scaled up local response is 
no longer a local response, it becomes something else.” (Decosas 2000). 
 
                                                          
35 Geoffrey Woolcock and Dennis Altman cited in O’Malley et al 1996.  This has also been found in Brazil where the fact 
that a World Bank project brought an increasing scale of funding to NGOs made them less critical of government policy 
(according to Richard Parker and Jane Galvao as cited by Chris Castle, personal communication).  
36 J. Decosas (1994) “The answer to AIDS lies in united commitment” AIDS Analysis Africa 5,1,3-4 quoted in Campbell 
and Williams 1999 
37 Chris Castle, personal communication 
38 A report commissioned by USAID on measuring absorptive capacity within the population and health field (Brown, 
Lafond and Macintyre 2000) notes that the available literature suggests that efforts to measure the outcomes of capacity 
building are at a very early stages of development, although there is a wealth of experience described in the grey 
literature.   The availability to developing country organisations of the latter literature, which documents, for example, a 
range of measures for self-assessment of organisational capacity, is however unclear.    
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Cultural and Political Resistance  
 
One of the greatest obstacles to HIV/AIDS prevention is the extent of stigma 
surrounding the disease, with its attendant association with “illicit” or “immoral” 
sex, fatal disease and death (Herek 1999; Gilmore and Somerville1994). While 
cultural perceptions of the origin of the disease vary, such stigma has been 
identified across cultures (Goldin 1994).39 Stigma itself creates resistance to 
people in the general population recognising their own high personal levels of risk 
behaviour, since they feel the fact that they do not belong to a stigmatised “high 
risk group” makes them safe.  
 
Given the sensitivity and stigma surrounding HIV/AIDS it is not amenable to the 
simpler strategies of scaling up, such as the process which Myers refers to as 
explosion, which is more characteristic of, for example, immunisation or literacy 
campaigns. While in some relatively non-controversial areas such as blood 
safety, “explosion” may be possible as an approach, in most aspects a slower 
pace and less visible nature of expansion may be more appropriate in HIV/AIDS. 
The stigma surrounding HIV/AIDS may make it difficult, moreover, to mobilise 
sufficient demand for scaled up services, rendering it particularly important to 
communicate the aims of the intervention as scaling up proceeds.  In some cases 
where stigma is particularly strong, NGOs have learned that it may be more 
appropriate to promote services for the general population, rather than making it 
explicit that it is for people with HIV/AIDS – such as, for example, expanding 
access to care for the chronically ill.40  Similarly, peer educators working in 
HIV/AIDS may prefer to be seen as community health educators because of the 
stigma associated with HIV/AIDS (Horizons 2000b).  
 
As stated above, while NGOs are able to deal with stigmatised groups, often they 
are able to do so because they operate on a small enough scale to be non-
threatening on religious, cultural or political grounds. Yet if they choose to expand 
their activities with such groups (strategy 1), they may perversely increase the 
latter’s vulnerability to state repression or social prejudice. If their scaling up 
strategy aims to catalyse other organisations (strategy 2) and they choose 
deliberately to work with government, they may well confront political and legal 
restrictions in working with these groups. In Egypt, for example, the National 
AIDS Programme cannot work with sex workers, since commercial sex work is 
illegal there.41  Similarly, in Pakistan, homosexuality is against the law.  
 
                                                          
39 See for example Nnko ’98 on Tanzania  
40 Chris Castle, personal communication 
41 Professional experience of the author in Egypt, 1992-99 
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At a political level, governments may be reluctant to draw national or international 
attention to HIV/AIDS because of the fear of tarnishing their national image or a 
detrimental effect on crucial economic sectors such as tourism. Moreover, they 
may be averse to the kinds of alliances and networking among NGOs which 
scaling up necessitates. This depends on the degree to which the political climate 
is one that discourages or encourages the role of NGOs generally, and what 





In many respects, increasing the scale of HIV/AIDS activities may bring greater 
visibility or prominence to specific organisations but perhaps more importantly to 
their constituencies.  Depending on the political and social context in which 
NGOs operate, this may be beneficial or detrimental.   In cases where it 
increases stigma associated with HIV/AIDS or risks increasing discrimination 
against marginal social groups – such as sex workers or drug-users, this visibility 
may have very negative effects.  By contrast, in the case of some low-prevalence 
settings, such as Ecuador and the Philippines, this may be a necessary step to 
increase public awareness and give groups involve greater negotiating power 
(Margarita Quevedo, KIMIRINA and Ruthie Libatique, PHANSuP, 
Horizons/Alliance Seminar).   
 
 
Promoting “Community Participation”/Facilitating  
Community Response 
 
The foregoing has argued for the need for careful attention to be paid to 
participatory processes which give beneficiaries a clear voice in defining 
directions and activities of HIV/AIDS organisations, and involving affected 
communities and individuals in the design of interventions.  These needs are 
made all the more acute by the scaling up process. Yet, those who are members 
of the “community” of interest in HIV/AIDS may well be diffuse, not organised 
along geographic or social lines, and may themselves resist efforts to promote 
their “participation.” Asthana and Oostvogels (1996), in a cogent analysis of the 
obstacles to community participation in HIV prevention among female sex 
workers in Chennai (formerly Madras), India, for example, found that sex workers 
there came from diverse social backgrounds, worked in a range of 
establishments and had varied access to support structures. Their ability to 
organise is therefore “limited by the fact that they are locked into unequal power 
relationships with brothel-owners, madams and pimps and often too isolated and 
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powerless to act individually or collectively” (ibid.: 133). Yet, in the end the 
women prefer to rely on such patrons – no matter how unequal the relationship – 






Scaling up HIV/AIDS programmes beyond the borders of particular communities 
inevitably brings organisations into contact with a greater diversity of 
“beneficiaries” whether in terms of social class or background, educational levels 
or income (Smith and Colvin 2000). Given how social attitudes about HIV/AIDS 
are often closely tied to such background variables,42 developing messages and 
approaches that are suitable to this new diversity is challenging. Where initial 
activities against HIV/AIDS began in primarily urban, middle-class movements, 
for example, efforts need to be made to transcend this narrow focus. This 
constraint would argue for a phased programme of implementation, rather than a 
sudden expansion or explosion, to give the organisation time to adapt to and 
learn from the diverse settings and how best to work with constituencies from a 
wider range of socio-economic backgrounds.  
 
 
The Pace of Scaling Up 
 
The rapid spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemic calls for urgent measures to expand 
the scale of all activities to stem the progress of the epidemic.  It is clear that the 
challenge for NGOs in HIV/AIDS is to find a balance between moving at an 
appropriate pace to mobilise demand and adapt the intervention to local social 
contexts and often highly stigmatised groups, while at the same time generating 
enough momentum and sufficient political commitment to sustain the effort.  The 
pace of expansion, however, is not usually set by internal or micro-level concerns 
alone, but rather by the overall context in which NGOs operate.  For example, as 
argued in the discussion of motivations, often the rapid spread of the epidemic, or 
economic and political factors can play a key role in calling for a more rapid 
response in face of growing need.  On a positive note, however, where there is a 
surge in political commitment at the national level, or internationally, as was the 
case following the International Conference on AIDS in Durban in July 2000, the 
pace of scaling up is likely to quicken.  As will be discussed below, however, 
                                                          
42 For example, Klouda (1995) cites a study in Abidjan which found that 26% of patients from the lowest socio-economic 
group reported having been rejected, blamed or isolated by their families as opposed to none in the highest socio-
economic group (Ingegno, A. et al  “AIDS patients in Abidjan: social dynamics and care process” Int. Conf. AIDS 6-11 
June, 1993 Abstract No. PO-D20-4014). 
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there are dangers that higher levels of international funding for HIV/AIDS may 
dictate the pace of expansion at a rate faster than the capacity of NGOs to 
sustain that activity. 
 
 
Risk of Failure 
 
Perhaps the most poignant risk in scaling up HIV/AIDS programmes is that of 
failure, with disappointed expectations on the part of beneficiaries, NGO staff and 
funding institutions.  As Avina notes, failed expansion has been the reason for the 
demise of many NGOs (Avina 1993). It is with this risk in mind that sound choices 
need to be made by organisations deciding to scale up whether they have the 
capacity to do so, the programmatic maturity and sufficient funding to sustain a 
greater scale of intervention.   Some of these internal dimensions will now be 
addressed. 
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iii. Institutional Implications  
of Scaling Up 
 
16. Internal Dimensions of Scaling Up 
 
Preparing for Scaling Up 
 
In most analyses of scaling up processes, emphasis is placed on the external, 
programmatic dimensions with much less attention paid to the internal, 
organisational questions which are perhaps equally important. Indeed, the 
reasons behind failure to scale up may lie more within the organisation, in terms 
of inappropriate leadership, management or structures, than outside. The little 
published literature there is on these concerns focuses on the experience of 
Northern, rather than Southern NGOs (see for example Hodson; Billis and 
MacKeith in Edwards and Hulme 1992).   
 
This deficiency applies equally to analysis of the internal implications of scaling 
up for NGOs active in HIV/AIDS.  Evidence from case studies presented at the 
Horizons/Alliance Seminar on scaling up indicates that very few organisations 
actually prepare their staff or internal processes for the demands of scaling up.  
The experience of KANCO is exceptional and instructive in this regard.  Having 
made the shift from a voluntary to professional organisation, and having 
established an office in 1993-4, they rapidly expanded and successfully received 
a higher level of funds.  However, they began to see some of the bigger 
programmes collapse, and therefore went through a period of institutional 
reflection to analyse what was happening within the institution.  They developed a 
questionnaire for staff concerning the goals of the organisation, achievements 
and what people enjoyed in working for the organisation.  This process informed 
a thorough strategic plan that laid the basis for a re-organisation.  Among the new 
procedures introduced were job analysis and evaluation, new financial and 
personnel procedures, a staff appraisal system and more attention to 
sustainability.  
 
Bob Grose, a representative of DFID at the time of the inception of the Healthy 
Highways Project in India targeting truck drivers and their partners, noted at the 
Horizons/Alliance seminar that scaling up is a type of transition and as such 
should be considered a project.  Like any project, he argued, scaling up needs a 
clear plan, with objectives, indicators for achieving objectives and a plan of 
activities.  Indeed, several participants in the Horizons/Alliance Seminar noted 
that because they did not consider the scaling up process as that, they lacked 
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indicators for evaluating it.  But Grose and other participants agreed that not all 
aspects can be planned in the real world, where one often has to respond to the 
sudden emergence of opportunities, needs or even threats. 
 
Whether an organisation has the time to reflect on internal and external 
prerequisites for scaling up, however, partly depends on the nature of its funding.  
If the entire scaling up process is financed from a single donor, often its pace 
may be dictated by that particular donor’s demands. PSG in Zimbabwe has a 
policy of maintaining funding from five diverse donors, partly in order to ensure 
the requisite programme and institutional autonomy.   
 
 
Changes in Institutional Culture and Processes 
 
Institutional culture and structures are inevitably affected as organisations 
expand the scale of their activities.  Changing roles of staff and board in the 
process of scaling up can be very threatening, and may lead to loss of staff.  
Decisions formerly made on the basis of trust and informality may give way to 
more formal structures and increased hierarchy (Hodson 1992) and involve 
different people (Horizons/Alliance Seminar).  How managers help staff of their 
organisations to weather these dramatic changes is critical to the success of the 
scaling up. Staff may be used to a process of ownership and participation that is 
possible in a smaller organisation but may not be sustained as scaling up 
proceeds (Billis and MacKeith 1992).  Expansion may also require an increased 
functional specialisation between parts of the organisation, increased capacity to 
raise resources (Edwards and Hulme 1992) and standardised delivery 
mechanisms to reduce unit costs (Edwards and Hulme 1996). Increased 
emphasis on professionalism and efficiency may come to replace the “value 
consensus” and mission goals that motivated the establishment of the NGO in 
the first place (Hodson 1992).  
 
These processes may be particularly true of organisations addressing HIV/AIDS 
where staff’s personal commitment to the aims and particular approaches to 
HIV/AIDS which they feel are rare may inspire a particularly strong sense of staff 
ownership, and thus resistance to change.  The greater diversity within the 
organisation and the increased proportion of professional staff as opposed to 
volunteers, as organisations expand into service-delivery organisations, for 
example, can sometimes limit the ability to work with affected communities.43 
                                                          
43 This risk has been cited by Woolcock and Altman in the case of Australia (O’Malley et al 1996).  
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Both of these trends may jeopardise the former commitment of the organisation 
to providing labour-intensive personalised care.  
 
When, as is often the case, only certain programmes of an organisation are 
scaled up, there may be a sense of resentment and competition over resources 
from staff of other programmes.  This was true of the experience of both SIAAP 
and Naz, for example.  In the former case, the counselling programme expanded 
much more rapidly than the others did, and in the latter, the Healthy Highways 




Involvement of Volunteers  
 
Many of the organisations that expanded their HIV/AIDS activities did so 
through the explicit recruitment or increased involvement of volunteers.  AMSED, 
for example, in Morocco saw this as a key strategy for reaching more people.    
Since volunteers usually come from the communities with which NGO are 
working, are aware of existing services and often know the community-members 
well, the clear benefit is the increased sense of community ownership over the 
project the involvement of volunteers brings.  This was also the case for ASI, 
where volunteers with HIV/AIDS contributed both time and materials towards the 
building of a new clinic – a step that ASI sees as critical to the legitimacy of the 
effort.  Similarly, PSG describes its programmes as almost entirely based on 
volunteers:  “PSG’s prevention and mitigation activities share a common 
approach.  They both work with community volunteers to deliver large-scale, 
economical, locally relevant services that increase community response 
capacity”. (Appendix A, Case study page 46).  In Cambodia, volunteers in the 
Home-Care programme described above are “well-placed to facilitate links with 
other community activities, to ensure access and accessibility of Home Care 
Teams, and are a major source of referral of new patients to the Home Care 
Teams”. (Wilkinson et al 2000).   
 
Often volunteers work as peer educators, who have been shown to be highly 
effective in a variety of settings in terms of fostering behavioural change, and also 
in generating demand for HIV related services such as voluntary counselling and 
HIV testing and management of sexually transmitted infections (Horizons 2000b).  
 
Nevertheless, the contribution of volunteers may need to be formalised as the 
scaling up proceeds.  ASI found that a critical step that improved their 
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effectiveness was the recruitment of a manager to whom the volunteers report. 
The formalisation of the contributions of volunteers or donated commodities will 
mean that the costs associated with scaling up may be significantly different (and 
substantially larger) than the costs of running projects at current scales of activity.  
The costs, for example, of peer education programmes are often much higher 
than expected given the need for training, support, supervision and to provide 
them with resource material and compensation (Horizons 2000b).  
 
Several organisations present at the Horizons/Alliance Seminar note that 
volunteers play a key role in collecting data useful for monitoring projects.  
However, the same organisations have also noted the problem of quality entailed 
in relying solely on volunteers to collect data.  Clearly, also, the frequently high 





Many innovative NGO efforts are led by charismatic, visionary leaders who pay 
relatively less attention to the establishment of participatory internal structures of 
governance (Edwards and Hulme 1992; Fowler 1991) and this has also been true 
of those active in HIV/AIDS (Sittitrai 1994). Yet the demands on leadership 
necessarily change as the organisation enlarges its scale of activity.  The 
question is then raised as to whether the leader who pioneered the scaling up 
process is appropriate to lead the organisation through the next stage (question 
from Horizons/Alliance Seminar).   
 
In order to sustain expansion of the organisation, it is imperative that consensus 
among staff is reached about the objectives and approaches to scaling up. 
Moreover, in order to scale up operations, managers increasingly have to 
delegate to lower levels of staff and to leaders within the beneficiary community. 
Are they willing to give a prominent role to subordinate staff members and for 
example, sex workers, in directing activities and will due credit be given to them? 
And is attention being paid to the need to develop a second generation of 
leadership given that the scaling up process is likely to take a long time? The 
leadership of any organisation undertaking scaling up is likely to feel tension 
between the often conflicting processes of achieving efficiency for operating at a 
larger scale, encouraging participatory processes within the beneficiary 
                                                          
44 Although, as noted by Jeff O’Malley at the Horizons/Alliance Seminar, turnover of volunteers is not necessarily a bad 
thing, particularly given the high risk of “burn-out” associated with such stressful work.   
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community and sustaining employee aspirations and motivations as the 





Scaling up may necessitate the hiring of new categories of staff or enlisting new 
board members with diverse skills, or the retraining of existing personnel, which 
may be very costly. One key area that needs to be addressed is the avoidance of 
high staff turnover, given the need for institutional continuity during what is often 
a time-consuming scaling up process. This may be a particular problem for 
organisations that have relied on volunteers, or where salary levels are not 
sufficient to keep talented staff.  While NGOs in most fields face difficulties in 
maintaining continuity and retaining skilled and experienced staff, those in 
HIV/AIDS face particular constraints since  “the epidemic is so close to the 
people who are working in the epidemic” (Loughran 1995: 6) This has been the 
experience, for example, of the Cambodia home-care programme which has lost 
a number of key staff to HIV (Horizons/Alliance Seminar).  Where an NGO loses 
key staff to HIV, it may take a long time for the programme to regain momentum.  
 
There is also a need for staff to maintain good working relations with the often 
diverse organisations with which they will come into contact in the scaling up 
process, whether other NGOs or governmental bodies. Staff will need to 
document the processes and obstacles to scaling up and be able to communicate 
these lessons more broadly to stakeholders.  
 
Once agreement has been reached on the objectives of scaling up, there needs 
to be careful attention paid to creating appropriate incentives for staff - or 
personnel of the organisations one is trying to influence (strategy 2) - to meet 
them. This is a particularly challenging task in sensitive areas such as HIV/AIDS 
where, because of the deep stigma associated with it, there is a need to instil 
changes in attitude and approach.45 An example of the difficulty of inspiring such 
attitudinal change is provided by the case of reproductive health in India. 
Following the International Conference on Population and Development the 
Indian government undertook a strong commitment to shifting the orientation of 
their population programmes from a vertical orientation to family planning to the 
wider and more comprehensive concept of reproductive health. Yet one of the 
main constraints to implementing this strategy is the difficulty of changing the 
approach of family planning cadres who are entrenched in ways of working that 
                                                          
45 Smith and Colvin 1999 has extensive analysis of this point as well in relation to adolescent services. 
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stress the goal of increasing contraceptive prevalence rates, rather than the 
process-oriented approach of eliciting and addressing often sensitive 
reproductive health problems (Health Watch 1998).  
As several participants in the Horizons/Alliance Seminar noted, however, the 
process itself of expansion - although it may require change in attitude and in 
ways of working - can be a morale boost for staff, in conferring a sense of greater 
visibility, prominence and effectiveness (PSG, ASI, KANCO).   
 
 
Documentation and Evaluation  
 
Often overlooked in the haste to expand the scale of activities is the importance 
of building capacity to collect data as well as to document the experience of 
scaling up or the indicators used to evaluate it.  Greater attention to 
documentation of the process of scaling up is important not only as a motivating 
factor for staff, but also provides the opportunity to share success with others, 
thereby widening perception of need, widening constituencies involved and even 
stimulating new action.  
 
To be meaningful, however, the data collected must inform the scaling up 
process and not be collected for its own sake.  As noted above, PSG is 
exemplary in analysing the impact of each intervention in terms of behavioural 
change and cost to draw lessons for application elsewhere.  And ASI uses 
volunteers to collect data that have – as shown above – identified dips in quality 
and prompted a revision of strategy.  Much more can be done in general by 
NGOs to collect routine information on their activities and their impact to inform 
assessment of effectiveness.46   
 
In some cases, even where there is desire to collect such information, it is not 
available because the programme approach is so new.  Geoff Foster  
(FACT/FOCUS case study, p. 24) noted about the experience of establishing a 
community support programme for children affected by AIDS in Zimbabwe that 
when it began, there were no known models of community support to children 
affected by AIDS.  Therefore staff had no information on which to set targets for 
coverage, impact and sustainability.  Similarly, Margarita Quevedo noted about 
the organisations Kimirina supports in Ecuador that most tend to lack access to 
data, and are weak in documenting their own programmes or conducting 
evaluations, and therefore scaling up tends to be a trial and error process.   
                                                          
46 Lilani Kumanarayake (personal communication) notes from her experience with colleagues trying to estimate the impact 
of NGO prevention activities in a number of countries that even routine monitoring on measures such as the number of 
people being reached may not always occur.   
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It is evident, however, that much more effort and time could be invested by NGOs 
themselves in developing criteria for assessing their own programmes.  In 
evaluating the effects of scaling up, it is important that one relies on a range of 
indicators to give a fuller picture of change.  Since reported sexual behaviour 
change is so subject to bias, use of other criteria of change may be particularly 
necessary.  For example, the Family Health Trust’s initiative in supporting Anti-
AIDS Clubs in Zambia has found that there was no change in reported sexual 
behaviour among club members (Dixter Kaluba, Family Health Trust, 
Horizons/Alliance Seminar).  However, there has been an increase in young 
people reporting to health centres for screening and treatment of STDs (Case 
study). 
 
Moreover, soliciting the views of beneficiaries in the evaluation of scale up is 
essential.  For example, the FACT/FOCUS programme found that the initial 
efforts of communities to respond to the problem of orphans was successful in 
that:  “Community-based organisations were able to identify a high proportion of 
orphans living in their area, target those most in need, and provide regular visits 
and material support.”  But when the orphans’ own views were asked, they stated 
that they had understood that their guardians, rather than themselves, were being 
visited and assisted through the programme.  
 
 
17. Implications for Donors and NGO-Support 
Organisations 
 
The above discussion suggests that it is not only organisations that are 
interested in scaling up who need to reconsider the nature of their operations and 
internal management structures. Donors and AIDS-support organisations also 
need to adapt to be able to support the complex demands that the process of 
scaling up places on the institutions they support.  
 
The level of funding needed to enable a process of scaling up to occur is perhaps 
the most obvious prerequisite. Yet few donors are willing to sustain commitment 
to an organisation as they undergo the “trial and error” process of expanding their 
operations, and these challenges are arguably more arduous in the field of 
HIV/AIDS. Indeed, the proliferation of highly visible pilot projects that the World 
Bank (1999) among others criticises, is at least partly due to the lack of available 
funding to replicate these on a larger scale. But equally important as the level of 
funding is the time-scale of support, if one considers the time needed to prepare 
for scaling up, including conceiving and communicating ideas, encouraging 
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participation of beneficiaries, adapting to diverse contexts and preparing the 
organisation for change. Given the time demands and major institutional change 
scaling up requires, there is a need for donors to shift from short-term project 
finance to more longer term institutional support.47 Uvin refers to the 
simultaneous need to “scale up the grassroots and scale down the summit” (by 
which he means international organisations) – that is, that they should “adopt 
structures and modes of operation that allow local communities and NGOs to 
build their conceptual, operational and institutional capacities” (Uvin 1995). This 
suggests the importance of providing sufficient resources and time to encourage 
reflection and learning, even when these do not necessarily translate into short-
term, demonstrable outputs.  Funding for expansion should take into 
consideration not only the external, programme context but also the institutional 
prerequisites to scaling up, and the kind of intensive internal work required, such 
as conducted by KANCO, for example. 
 
In many cases, the nature of donor funding may even complicate and undermine 
the scaling up process of NGOs.  For example, it may contribute to the lack of 
planning of scaling up by making a sudden rash of funds available that has to be 
spent in a finite period.  As the director of ASI put it: funders caused “chaos” with 
the rapid pace of expansion they imposed on that organisation.  The experience 
of ASI suggests that donors did not envision the scaling up process as such, 
leading to a “feast and famine” financial situation at ASI.  As they put it:  “There 
were periods of rapid growth and periods of no growth due to erratic funding…A 
more comprehensive evaluation of the scaling up process was difficult because 
no funding was available for the process itself.  This made it difficult to assess the 
overall progress at the early stages.” 
 
In some cases, where organisations receive funds from more than one donor, 
which may be the best way of reducing the risk of relying on a sole source, there 
may be competing objectives of programming imposed on the organisation.  This 
was noted, for example, in the case study of the International HIV/AIDS Alliance.   
 
A more fundamental critique of donors – and indeed other external agencies – is 
that they may ignore existing community initiatives to address HIV/AIDS and 
even – unknowingly or not – undermine them (Foster papers).  The risk of such a 
trend is, if anything, greater with the increased influx of resources devoted to 
HIV/AIDS.   
                                                          
47 This view is endorsed by the latest World Bank report on HIV/AIDS in Africa which states that:  “Sporadic or isolated 
activities are ineffective unless they are evaluated as pilot activities and revised and expanded based on what has been 
learned.  To maximise their impact, programmes should be implemented for long periods based on need rather than on 
funding cycles.”  (World Bank 1999: 24) 
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At the same time, the pressure to scale up should not be applied indiscriminately 
across the board. As mentioned earlier, not all organisations or aspects of 
programmes are amenable to scaling up. Donors and NGO-support organisations 
should not necessarily focus on selecting the most professional organisations for 
support, but should recognise that a range of types and sizes of organisations are 
complementary to one another and thus a portfolio of different types of 
investments at varying levels may be more effective.48  Similarly, within individual 
organisations it is conceivable that certain activities are more amenable than 
others to scaling up or require different time-frames for scaling up.  Instead of 
concentrating all its resources and staff time on scaling up all interventions, an 
organisation could, for example, scale up a particular intervention while leaving 
time, energy and creativity to experiment at a pilot-level with other activities.  
Thus, while there are synergies to be gained in scaling up several HIV/AIDS 
programmes together (UNAIDS 2000), which may also yield greater economies 
of scope, these may be better gained through complementarities among 
organisations rather than single organisations scaling up several demanding 
activities simultaneously.49    
 
That said, however, there are risks that donors may also fragment an 
organisation’s integrity by only emphasising scaling up of individual strategies or 
interventions, and not recognising the synergies between them.  This suggests 
that more flexible funding that allows organisations to allocate resources across 





As the HIV/AIDS epidemic continues its rapid spread bringing individual 
tragedies and social upheaval, the inadequacy of existing programmes is 
increasingly a subject of debate.  This publication has asked the question 
whether organisations active in the HIV/AIDS arena, and perhaps most 
particularly NGOs, have done enough in thinking about scaling up their activities.  
It explains, however, that scaling up in the context of HIV/AIDS is a challenging 
and complicated process. 
 
The extent to which NGOs can be proactive in scaling up, with sufficient time for 
reflection and planning in order to maximise impact and safeguard their 
organisational mission is critical. Not all NGOs should scale up and nor should 
NGOs scale up all of their activities simultaneously, and thus choices as to which 
                                                          
48 I am grateful to David Hulme for suggesting this “portfolio” approach. 
49 This discussion draws on comments on this publication by Chris Castle. 
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aspects of NGOs work to scale up with maximum impact have to be considered 
carefully.  To the extent that it is possible, organisations need to prepare their 
own structures and staff for the scaling up process.  If they are merely responding 
to donor demands or the evolution of the epidemic, they will command little 
control over the scaling up process and ultimately perhaps have less effect.  At 
the same time, however, NGOs may need to sacrifice some elements of the 
quality of the programmes they run for the sake of broader coverage.  This in turn 
points to the need for more information on the quality and impact of NGO 
programmes.  
 
While definitions of scaling up vary according to the perspective of the individual 
and organisation, consensus exists over the need to define objectives in terms of 
impact on either preventing the epidemic or mitigating its effects.  A narrow 
understanding of impact, however, based only on reducing the number of new 
infections, without looking at the synergies between prevention, care and support 
and the broader social change needed to address HIV/AIDS, is misleading.  
NGOs - based on the many successful but often undocumented experiences of 
scaling up - need to express their own notions of the impact of their efforts, and to 
communicate these to a broader audience.  
 
In both effectiveness and efficiency terms, integrating HIV/AIDS efforts into 
development processes and institutions more broadly is desirable to address the 
structural and social determinants of the epidemic and take advantage of existing 
infrastructure. Yet such efforts should not lose sight of the experience 
accumulated by specialised AIDS-service organisations (O’Malley et al 1996).  
 
Scaling up the programmes of NGOs in HIV/AIDS entails much more, however, 
than finding avenues for reaching wider coverage.  If scaling up is seen as a 
process, as described here, the dynamic relationships between impact, coverage 
and quality of programmes mean that at different stages of the process, different 
objectives become paramount.  Moreover, scaling up that is sustainable in social, 
as well as financial and programmatic terms necessitates understanding, 
strengthening and catalysing the existing response of individuals and 
communities to the complexities of the epidemic.   
 
Finally, truly scaling up will require that NGOs do not work in isolation but forge 
much stronger and workable alliances with other NGOs, research institutions and 
with government. To do so will inevitably require compromises and conflicts of 
institutional culture, but will be well worth the effort in the broader aim of 
stemming the epidemic and mitigating its devastating effects. 
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Appendix Section 
Appendix A: 
Case Studies from Scaling Up Seminar Sponsored by 
HORIZONS and the International HIV/AIDS Alliance 
 
[Note:  The following case studies of NGOs which have scaled up aspects of their 
programmes in HIV/AIDS were written by authors from the institutions concerned 
and edited by HORIZONS staff.  All edited versions were then checked for 
accuracy and content by the authors of the case studies and their organisations]  
 
 




The Asociacion de Salud Integral (ASI) is a local non-governmental organisation 
(NGO) established in Guatemala City, Guatemala in 1987.  Originally known as 
Asociacion Guatemalteca para la Prevencion y Control de SIDA (AGPCS), the 
organisation was founded by a group of physicians and other health care 
personnel who were concerned about the lack of information on HIV/AIDS 
available to health care workers.    
 
ASI seeks to reduce the impact of HIV/AIDS in Guatemala through education, 
research and treatment.  
 
The organisation has grown from a staff of six, running one programme in a 
single public hospital, to a staff of 40 running seven projects, aided by a large 





The decision to scale up was based on the dramatic increase in need for the 
services provided at the ASI clinic, and the expectation that the peak of the AIDS 
epidemic was still to come.   By 1996 the organisation had grown and expanded 
its projects, but had no formal direction or strategic plan.  There was at this stage 
a staff of 20, but the growth in demand for services was already taxing.  
 
ASI decided to focus its efforts to scaling up counselling and treatment.  Neither 
   Appendix: A    Page 2 of 53 
  
   
the government nor other NGOs were providing this sort of comprehensive 
approach in a clinical and community setting.  But in order to ensure that the level 
of care would be sustained and expanded to meet the rising need, it would be 
important to establish alliances with other groups.  
 
Scaling up would require additional trained staff to counsel and treat patients and 
expanded physical space for the clinic itself.    
 
 
Objectives and activities 
 




















Resources and timeframe 
 
ASI had grown dramatically in both size and number of projects since it began in 
1987, but had not developed a formal direction or strategic plan to guide future 
growth.  With assistance from the Dutch government, ASI hired an external 
consultant to help develop the five-year plan for restructuring and expansion.     
 
The Dutch government offered funding for the first three years to support core 
staff in this time of strategic planning.  This money was not intended to fund any 
of the specific scaling up efforts, but to allow ASI time to search for sources of 
• Expand and improve the physical space and increase the staff
available for treatment and counselling 
• Extend services to children and babies 
• Improve monitoring and evaluation of the various areas within the
programme 
• Establish alliances with other organisations to ensure uniform
quality of treatment and service. 
• Develop stronger relationships with the community and people
living with AIDS 
• Establish alliances with the government to ensure funding and
sustainability of the project 
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long term, sustainable revenue.  
 
The process of obtaining funding has been very difficult.  While there is strong 
national support for the programme, there is not always money available.  
Because of this, the process has been slow, and often stalled.  Local donations 
did enable ASI to open a new and larger clinic in July 1997, but there was no 
money to hire additional staff to handle the increase in patients until January 
1998.  During this lapse, the staff was overworked and stressed.  
 
Community support is essential to the programme.  When a local family that was 
respected in the community lost a son to AIDS, they contributed financially to the 
programme, but more importantly, their support helped remove barriers within the 





Initially, the clinic expected to see an average 15% yearly increase in-patients.  
This was the case for the first two years, but the year 2000 has already produced 
an increase of over 100%.  The huge increase is partly due to expanded 
availability of services at the new clinic, including a new counselling programme, 
but probably more a result of an accelerated phase of the epidemic in 
Guatemala.  The anticipation of a dramatic increase in affected populations was a 
key reason for the scaling up.  
 
Since the strategic plan is still underway, evaluation is limited.  There is an 
important initiative just beginning to form a strategic alliance with the Ministry of 
Health to establish a national AIDS unit to treat people from all over the country.  
There is also a movement to pass a national AIDS law. 
 
 
Internal organisational implications 
 
The primary difficulty in the scaling up process was the need to balance the 
limited funds and resources between existing programmes and developmental 
projects.  The scaling up process required more technological equipment, 
specialised staff for evaluation, and other specialised staff not contemplated in 
the original plan.  Although some funding was provided, there was still a drain on 
resources.  ASI absorbed these additional costs, but it caused some tension 
within the organisation.   
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While the staff understood the need to expand the programme and was 
supportive of the effort, it also felt that resources were being diverted from 
existing programmes.  Directors held several sessions with the entire staff to 
keep the line of communication open.   
 
Volunteers were very supportive of the expansion.  A special research 
programme was established within the clinic, recruiting university students to 
assist professional staff while working on their medical studies.  These volunteers 
were especially valuable in collecting data for monitoring and evaluation. 
 
The effort to form strategic alliances with other groups, particularly organisations 





The monitoring of the scaling up process was not a formal process, although 
reviews were conducted twice a year to evaluate the progress.  Before the 
scaling up process, the clinic recorded basic demographic information as well as 
medical records on treatment.  
 
A more comprehensive evaluation of the scaling up process was difficult because 
no funding was available for the process itself.  As previously mentioned, there 
were periods of rapid growth and periods of no growth due to erratic funding.  
This made it difficult to assess the overall progress at the early stages.  
 





The scaling up process for ASI was essential.  The caseload was increasing so 
rapidly that either the capacity grew or the programme would have no longer 
been functional.  
 
It was clear from the beginning that forming strategic alliances with other NGOs 
and government organisations was essential to the success of the expansion.  
 
The initial process of scaling up, in which the clinic space was physically 
expanded, went well because ASI already had a good relationship with the 
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hospital where the clinic was located.  
 
Community support was invaluable.  The acceptance of the programme by 
prominent families and community leaders greatly increased general support.  
 
The strategic alliances with NGOs have worked well, but the process has been 
slow.  The division of labour and the shared search for funding from a limited pool 
of resources will always be a strain on NGO alliance relationships.  Initially, some 
organisations saw no need for working together, but as the scope of the epidemic 
has increased, the importance of alliances has become clearer.  
 
In countries with limited resources, strategic alliances are a key factor in the 
success of scaling up any programme.  The search for funding placed an ongoing 
burden on administrative staff.  An alliance with the government is expected to 
allow for a steady income and the survival of the programme.   
 
The involvement of government has been slow, but as the number of people 
affected continues to increase sharply, the Ministry of Health has begun to look 
for organisations with experience for help.  
 
Organisations of people living with HIV/AIDS must be involved in any scaling up 
programme from the beginning.  This generates trust and a sense of 
empowerment within the community and makes people more willing to participate 
in education and prevention programmes, and to accept treatment.  
 
This small, ongoing scaling up process in the ASI treatment and counselling 
programme has allowed the organisation to gain experience and plan more 
effectively for the future. 
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The Family Health Trust (FHT) is a Zambian NGO dedicated to preventing the 
spread of HIV/AIDS while offering care and support to those already affected.  
The group was formed in 1987 and focuses most of its efforts on programmes for 
young people. 
 
The Anti-AIDS Project was established in 1987 as a one-person operation and 
has since expanded to include 9 full-time staff and 77 part-time community-based 
peer educators.  Students themselves at David Kaunda Secondary School 
generated the idea of an Anti-AIDS club after hearing a talk by a doctor about 
HIV/AIDS. 
 
Students who are trained as peer-educators lead the Anti-AIDS clubs and are 






The HIV/AIDS epidemic has had a particularly devastating effect on children 
living in Africa. Many have been left orphans. They are especially vulnerable 
since the communities that traditionally provided support have also been 
weakened.  There is also an alarming increase of new infections among young 
people. 
 
The decision to scale up the Anti-AIDS Club programme was based on the need 
to educate young people about the spread of HIV/AIDS and empower them to 
take control of their own lives.  The success of the original programme and the 
growing desire among young people to take positive action prompted FHT co-
ordinators to expand the project. 
 
The specific objectives were to reach more young people by building Anti-AIDS 
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Objectives and main activities 
 
The clubs rely on peer-educators to promote interactive learning through the use 
of role-playing, focus group discussions, games and individual discussions.  The 












Resources and timeframe 
 
The peer education approach has proved the most effective way of reaching 
young people.  The adult facilitators are volunteers, either teachers or leaders of 
church, youth or community groups.  They co-ordinate club activities with the 
Anti-AIDS Project and ensure that the clubs are registered.  They act as a link 
between the school administrations and the clubs and help club members 
develop action plans.   They may also help develop links between the clubs and 
other local or government organisations. 
 
The FHT central office provides training to Regional Co-ordinators at least twice a 
year.  It also encourages participation in workshops organised by collaborating 
organisations. 
 
FHT receives funding and other resources for all its programmes from NORAD, 
CIDA-SAT, UNICEF and Christian Aid, HIVOS, and the World Food Programme. 
Funding is given on a three year contract for NORAD and a one year contract for 
CIDA-SAT and UNICEF.  These contracts are renewable depending on 
satisfactory performance of the projects.  The Peer Education Programme 
receives funding mainly from UNICEF and CIDA-SAT.  Christian Aid funds the 
production of IEC materials. 
 
• To intensify outreach to non-members and to retain interest
among existing members. 
• To develop effective new educational materials 
• To consolidate the field support to the clubs through a programme 
of training and supervision based on the development of Regional 
Co-ordination and Zonal Leaders. 
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Outputs/outcomes 
 
There are now 2,561 clubs registered with the Anti-AIDS Project. 45% of the 
clubs are in Primary/Basic and Secondary /High Schools, 43% are serving out of 
school youth and young adults and 12% are in community schools. 
 
 
Internal organisational implications 
 
An increase in community participation has strengthened the sense of 
community ownership. 
 
Since peer-educators are paid per diem, the budget has been stretched to supply 
educators to all the new clubs. 
 
New clubs are often widespread within zones, especially in rural areas, so Zonal 
Co-ordinators find it difficult to reach them all, as they travel primarily on bicycles. 
 
The growth of the Peer Education Programme has always depended on the 
willingness of the donors to increase the funding to enable increased coverage.  
However, there has been an extension each year since 1995 when the 
programme was initiated.  The number of active clubs has increased from 251 in 
1995 to 717 in the year 2000.  The programme has also grown from one to three 





Because the Anti-AIDS clubs were a new programme, there was little upon 
which to base an initial evaluation.  Since the scaling up began, FHT has seen an 
increase in community participation.  More young people are involved in the 
initiation and formation of new clubs.  There has been in increase in the variety of 
educational activities, and in youth participation of the club newsletter.  More 
young people now report to health centres for screening and treatment of STDs.  
There is more direct support given to orphans and other vulnerable children by 
Anti-AIDS clubs.  For instance, in Kasusu, 22 orphans are being supported by 
income generated through club activities.  It is difficult to determine how much 
funding the clubs generate because they are not accountable to the project for 
this activity.  The project only monitors the performance of these programmes 
and ensures that they are running effectively and at an acceptable standard. 
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• Peer education is an extremely effective way to educate young people
about ways to prevent HIV/AIDS. 
• Continued support is needed after clubs are formed, to maintain activities
and prevent boredom. 
• It is difficult to organise out of school youths because there are no
monetary rewards. 
• There are other clubs that offer material incentives that lure young
people away. 
• Gender imbalance remains high in the clubs, with more boys than girls on
average. 
• Community involvement is essential. 
   Appendix: A    Page 10 of 53 
  
   
South India AIDS Action Programme (SIAAP):  
It’s Role, Growth and Development in Meeting the  




The South India AIDS Action Programme (SIAAP) was formed in 1991 with the 
goal of involving existing NGOs in South India in an effort to increase AIDS 
awareness in the region and to help develop and implement effective education 
and prevention programmes. 
  
The creation of SIAAP began in 1988, when 30 HIV positive female sex workers 
in the city of Chennai were jailed.  By the time their case went to trial, nearly 900 
women were imprisoned in the state of Tamil Nadu.  In July 1990, the court 
ordered all the women released and recommended that no person should be 
detained on the basis of HIV infection.  Shyamala Nataraj, a journalist covering 
the trial and other AIDS issues in India, discovered there were no support 
services available for people with HIV/AIDS.  Using personal contacts, she 
established a link with Voluntary Health Services in 1991 to bring existing NGOs 
together and help them develop strategies for dealing with the epidemic.  This led 





In the early 1980s India was beginning to see the results of a long struggle to 
provide better health care for its people.  Infant mortality rates were decreasing 
and average life spans were increasing. Indian citizens in both urban and rural 
areas had better access to health care in district hospitals and public health 
centres.  When HIV began to emerge as a national health problem in 1986, 
however, government and health care agencies, like those in most other parts of 
the world, were unprepared to deal with it.  Prejudice and misinformation 
contributed to a sense of panic. 
 
It was clear that HIV interventions had to include education on safer sex practices 
including condom use and improved treatment access for sexually transmitted 
diseases. But it was also important to reduce prejudice and empower people. 
Counselling had to be understood as fundamentally different from simply giving 
out information.  In India, counselling and therapy were generally conducted in an 
official medical setting and considered limited to psychiatry.  There was little 
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experience in providing counselling at the community level, especially with issues 
of sexual behaviour. 
 
Through experience with various projects, it became clear that a primary need in 
the region was to develop full-time trainers and counsellors outside the 
established medical system who could deal effectively on a community level with 
issues of sexual behaviour, empowerment and HIV education. 
 
 
Objectives and main activities 
  
SIAAP recognised the need for trained non-medical counsellors who could work 
outside the large institutional frameworks on a community level. 
  
The objective of the scaling up was therefore to train full-time counsellors to be 
placed in government health clinics throughout the region. 
  
 
Resources and timeframe 
  
SIAAP's first project, funded by the local NGO Madras Christian Council of 
Social Services (MCCSS), was designing an AIDS education programme in the 
slums where MCCSS was already working.  In 1992, SIAAP launched an 
education project directed at truckers. They opened a booth at Puzhal, one of the 
busiest check posts near Chennai, where they distributed information, free 
condoms and lists of referral centres for the treatment of STDs. These early 
projects led to the development of a comprehensive three-year action plan that 
would expand educational programmes, particularly those dealing with truckers 
and women in prostitution (WIPS).  HIVOS and the Ford Foundation funded this 
proposal. 
  
Having largely succeeded in its attempts to get NGOs and governments to 
address HIV issues, the SIAAP management began to consider the future 
direction of their organisation.  In the fall of 1996 HIVOS invited the SIAAP 
director to visit the Gestalt Foundation in the Netherlands where they consulted 
with Harm Siemans, a trainer and therapist.  Siemans visited the region in 
November 1996 and issued a report supporting SIAAP's proposal for increased 
counselling services and recommending that SIAAP take primary responsibility 
during the initiation phase.  The Gestalt Institute offered training and supervisory 
support for the first two years. 
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Outputs/outcomes 
  
By the end of the project period in 1996, SIAAP had fulfilled many of its 
objectives.  A total of 42 NGOs throughout the region were incorporating AIDS 
education and prevention into their existing programmes, as well as developing 
specifically targeted new projects. The NGOs were funded by a variety of 
agencies including USAID in Tamil Nadu, and HIVOS in Karnataka and Andhra 
Pradesh.  The Department for International Development (DFID) UK supported 
a7national trucking programme, which absorbed many of the existing 
interventions in Tamil Nadu. 
 
Despite the problems in scaling up, the results were still positive.  By June 1999, 
forty-five community groups were meeting sporadically and by January 2000 
these had stabilised at 18 sangams (those in the villages with whom SIAAP was 
working).  Of these, two have been running intensive HIV intervention 
programmes for 4 years.   In February 2000 a combined community meeting for 
solidarity brought together 700 people from across the state and culminated in a 
resolution demanding protection of human rights. 
 
 
Internal organisational implications 
  
From the beginning of the first training session in April 1997, organisational 
resources remained minimal and were stretched far too thin.  There was no start-
up period, no pre-planning and few people available to take responsibility for the 
details of what was becoming a huge and complex enterprise that had to provide 
counselling, training and service in the states of Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and 
Andhra Pradesh. 
  
In April 1998, the Dutch trainer responsible for the Tamil Nadu programme left 
without warning and was not replaced by the Gestalt Institute.  Two Indian 
trainers stepped in on a part-time basis but the remaining trainer found it difficult 
to meet all the demands. 
 
The first group of counsellors graduated in September 1998 and a second group 
followed in June 1999.   When the arrangement with the Gestalt Institute came to 
an end in August 1999, a full time Indian supervisor took over.  
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Lessons learned 
  
The process of scaling up showed that while SIAAP's technical skills were 
considerable, its organisational and administrative capacity were inadequate.  
Staffing, organisational structure, training and supervision needed to improve as 
well. 
  
















SIAAP's community counselling programme has been acknowledged and 
appreciated by the established medical system and embraced by the Indian 
government.  SIAAP has decided to focus on evolving as a training institution and 
transfer programme implementation and responsibilities to the sangams. 
• Community organisations require a great deal of support. 
• Setting up advocacy structures and recruiting adequate personnel
needs to be a priority. 
• Appropriate peer training and supervision is essential. 
• Counsellors recruited from affected communities perform
significantly better than those not from these communities, even
when they enter the programme with less education or experience. 
• Client centred counselling, as a specific process of individual
empowerment, is a relatively new discipline in India. 
• Community based counselling along with hospital-based counselling 
provides a good balance.  
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In 1998 as part of the response to the growing HIV/AIDS epidemic, the Cambodian 
Ministry of Health (MoH) established a partnership with a group of NGOs to develop 
and implement Cambodia's first HIV/AIDS home care programme.  Financial and 
technical support were provided from WHO and the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID) in the pilot phase, and from Khana, World Vision 
and Mary Knoll subsequently. 
  
The Home Care Network Group (HCNG) plays a vital role in the continuum of care 
by providing education and support services, counselling and nursing care to 
people living with HIV/AIDS (PLHA) in their homes and communities. Hospitals 
make and receive referrals, and provide monthly medical supervision in the field.  
The teams (now 10) are co-ordinated by the HCNG, which includes representatives 
from the NGOs and the MoH.  Teams in two areas of Battambang Province are 





Home care is particularly important in Cambodia where a severe shortage of 
hospital beds, general inability to afford current prophylactic drug therapies and 
poor nutrition put PLHA at greater risk of opportunistic infections.  By allowing PLHA 
to remain in the community, it also fosters better understanding of HIV/AIDS, 
correcting misunderstandings about both prevention and care as they arise.  
 
The pilot project launched in February 1998 had a dual purpose; to implement 
home health care programmes and to determine sustainable ways in which NGOs 
and government could act in partnership.  
 
In December 1998, a two-week evaluation of the project was carried out by a WHO 
consultant, who reported that home and community care was essential and 
recommended that the project be strengthened and expanded.  
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Objectives and main activities 
 
While the initial home care programme is successful in the city of Phnom Penh, 
there are many factors to consider in expanding to the more rural provinces.  The 
evaluation of the programme recommended the following objectives for 























Resources and timeframe 
 
Partnerships between MoH and NGOs have enabled scarce resources to be 
shared and contributed to the cost effectiveness of the programme.  The average 
cost of providing urban home-based care services is estimated as $9.28 per home 
care visit and $14.60 per visit for rural services.  This estimate includes all 
administration, personnel and technical support costs, and this compares 
favourably both to other home care programmes and to outpatient service. 
 
• To develop a well-resourced and supportive Home Care Network.  HCN
groups should be established to co-ordinate teams, possibly on a
provincial basis.  The mechanism for national co-ordination has not yet
been discussed 
 
• To establish strong partnerships between MoH and NGOs, and these
partnerships may well include other ministries, pagodas, etc. 
 
• To expand the number of volunteers and providing appropriate training. 
 
• To increase community involvement and ownership 
 
• To provide adequate technical and financial resources and support 
 
• To establish a supportive system of medical and management 
supervision 
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Outputs/outcomes 
 
The review of the pilot phase concluded that the majority of objectives had been 
met within the timeframe.  Patients, NGO and government partners, health staff and 
community leaders all reported a high level of satisfaction with the teams' activities.  
The evaluation conducted in June 2000 showed that this had been built on during 
the post-pilot year. 
 
 
Internal organisational implications 
 
The Home Care Teams (HCTs) rely on a large number of volunteers, many of 
whom are PLHA.  Volunteers play a number of important roles in the home care 
programme and are likely to be a key component in the expansion programme.  
There has been a high turnover of volunteers, sometimes because they take up 
paid employment, but often because of illness or death.   
 
Volunteers generally work more than the 10 days per month for which they receive 
expenses.  Most live in the community in which they work in home care and some 
feel that they are potentially always "on call."  Volunteers receive 60 hours of initial 
training and also on-the-job training.  They expressed the need for more training in 
the areas of stress management and in handling work-related situations that may 
threaten their personal security. 
 
While some HCTs are expanding their links within the community, this will become 
increasingly important during expansion.  It is suggested that the HCNG develop 
itself as a more autonomous institution that can then respond to the changing needs 





Community response to the programme was overwhelmingly positive.  PLHA 
reported that after home care visits they felt better able to look after themselves.  By 
focusing on better nutrition and early treatment of infections, PLHA enjoyed both 
better health and more positive outlooks on the future. Family members had an 
improved sense of confidence. The home care programme has also provided 
households with significant benefits in terms of financial and time savings. 
 
In addition there is a documented cost saving as compared with hospital stays.  
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• Monthly HCNG meetings provide valuable feedback, co-ordination and
support to the HCTs and are an important component of the home care
programme.  
• A competitive selection procedure for HCTs to ensure the right staff
with the right set of attitudes toward PLHA is important to ensure
quality home care provision. 
• A good team requires people with the right balance of skills and
experience, who receive comprehensive training and supportive
supervision. 
• Volunteers play a key role and support from community leaders is critical. 
• Participatory reviews and responsive management have played an
important role in helping to shape and guide the home care programme.  
• Strong NGO/government partnerships are important. 
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The Salvation Army’s “Concept Transfer”  




The Salvation Army provides regionally based support to local field programmes 
in the areas of HIV/AIDS, health, and development.  A key mission has been to 
support and expand local community capacity development for care and 
prevention, while influencing policy at multiple levels through sharing the 
meanings of community capacity and experience.  The focus of this case study is 





Based on an integrated home-based care and community prevention approach 
that started in 1987 at Chikankata Hospital, Zambia, the Salvation Army 
developed a process of “concept transfer” as the foundation for further 
expansion.  This is an approach to promote the response to HIV/AIDS at the local 
community level, and the process lies at the heart of much of the work that the 
Africa Team is conducting throughout the continent. 
 
The concept transfer process breaks new ground in capacity building and scaling 
up for HIV/AIDS programming.  From 1990 to January 2000, this approach has 
been used worldwide by the Salvation Army to develop 88 programmes in 37 
countries, with estimated coverage reaching 3.5 to 4 million people.  
  
The approach is based on the use of international and regional “facilitation 
teams” that work with local stakeholders to explore such key concepts as 
participatory caring, community as “belonging,” change, leadership, and hope. 
Using such concepts rather than a “one size fits all” programme design model, 
the teams work with the local Salvation Army and others in the context of local 
communities, so that responses are based on the community’s capacity for 
addressing HIV/AIDS prevention, care, and support.  The aim is to improve and 
expand the impact both of the response within communities (defined by the 
Salvation Army as scaling out) and within and between organisations (defined as 
scaling up). The approach is non-prescriptive regarding protocols and planning 
tools, yet appropriately supports understanding of development planning cycles 
and processes within each setting. 
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The teams are involved in three “learning pathways”: programme-to-programme 
visits, attachment or “loaning” of team members to organisations, and courses 
focusing on health-related community development. 
 
 
















Major activities include assessment and relationship building, participatory 
programme design and support, participatory evaluation, documentation, co-
ordination of programme-to-programme visits, regional and sub regional 
consultations, inter-organisational sharing for increased capacity development 
and influence on policy development/formation, reflection and application of 
lessons learned from HIV/AIDS to other areas of health and development work, 












The overall goals of the program include: 
• Increased community capacity to cope with and take responsibility for
HIV/AIDS and its impact. 
• Improved quality of life for individuals, family, and community
members affected by HIV/AIDS. 
• Decreased transmission of the virus, measured through behaviour
change at the community level. 
• Capacity development through the sharing of lessons learned and
transfers of ideas and linkages with other organisations. 
• Development of a pool of skilled people from within field programmes 
who can facilitate programme development in other locations.
The process of expanding the African community response has included: 
• Demonstration that local community programmes have the capacity to 
act, to measure their own change, and to transfer concepts to other 
communities. 
• Support from the Salvation Army’s International Headquarters Health 
Services for team formation. 
• A consultation workshop to solicit input on the facilitation team process 
from field people and some leaders, as well as UNICEF. 
• Responding to an increasing volume of requests from the field and from 
national leaders. 
• Appointment of an Africa-based co-ordinator in 1995 and a co-co-
ordinator in 1996. 
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Regional programme activities in Africa for 1999 included development of a 
participatory evaluation process with clinic teams in Ghana, a community 
counselling workshop in Malawi, and health management consultations in 
Zimbabwe and Ghana 
 
 
Resources and timeframe 
 
While the Salvation Army cannot support entire funding of the programme, the 
25 percent component is symbolically significant to signify ownership and to 
motivate external donors. 
 
 
Internal organisational implications 
 
The team facilitation approach has required the Salvation Army to redefine all of 
its core functions in order to become a real and meaningful resource in the 
countries where it works.  It has also meant that there is a constant need to look 
outwardly and develop new perspectives that put local community capacity at the 
moral and spiritual centre of all of the work. Recruiting new people to facilitation 
teams and becoming involved with new partner organisations also expands the 
organisation’s perceptions and functioning.    
 
Staff and volunteers have been energised by the evolution of such new 
approaches, although the experience can sometimes be confusing and even 
threatening because there is some loss of central control. Yet as this form of 
control has diminished, the organisation has gained in influence. Because of the 
clear benefits of this approach, organisational commitment to expansion is strong 
and plays a key role in sustained involvement. 
 
Overall, the Salvation Army has gained important experience in community 
capacity development approaches involving health and other development 
issues, new perspectives on facilitation and local participatory approaches, and 
successful mutual learning pathways. Budgetary concerns have become less 
important as “participation” becomes more important than “provision.”  
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Evaluation 
 
Monitoring activities include on-site visits by the international team to each 
regional team, regional and international consultations, and mutual accountability 
and support. Evaluations are also done on a local basis using a participatory 





Overall, programme experience—affirmed by an external evaluation conducted 
in June 2000—demonstrates that local participatory design and evaluation done 
with the help of a multicultural facilitation team can be very successful. Such 
success has led to growing quality in resource pool development, the greater 
involvement of local and regional leadership, and smoother inter-organisational 
sharing.  
 
Important barriers to progress remain, though. Some resistance to these 
concepts is still evident among leaders and some institutional based 
programmes.  Areas that require improvement include the further development of 
team leadership and “decentralisation” from the two co-ordinators, with even 
greater leadership involvement, and greater understanding of the external 
evaluation process. The team approach needs to involve a highly developed 
sense of collectively shared consciousness and vision, and refers to the 
responsibility and presence of team leadership. 
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Other key lessons learned include the following:  
 
• Successful community-to-community transfer is an incentive to other local 
communities. 
• During the early stage of an activity, it’s important to identify leadership
among team members from the resource pool stage and to commit to
intensive activity. 
• The scaling up process is helped by a shared vision of local community
capacity development and developing complementary ways of working that
serve local responses.  
• It’s critically important to include local implementers in planning cycles and
to involve service beneficiaries. 
• Discussing leadership and personal security issues strengthens teams and
helps bond the team to local stakeholders.  
• Frequent policy discussion based on concept and process analysis is 
necessary and must include field implementers and members of the 
community. 
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Naz Foundation (India) Trust: An Implementer’s Perspective 




The Naz Foundation (India) Trust, based in New Delhi, was established in 1994 
to serve community needs that were not being met by Government or other 
agencies.  Naz India is committed to reducing the spread of HIV/AIDS through 
education and to providing support to those living with the virus, their families and 
communities. There are currently six programmes at Naz India: the Care and 
Support Programme, the Healthy Highways Project, the National Level Master 
Training Programme, the Men Who Have Sex With Men Programme and the 
Women’s Sexual Health Programme.  
 
The organisation consists of teams of programme officers and outreach staff 
headed by co-ordinators.  These co-ordinators report to Programme Managers, 
who are under the supervision of an Executive Director, who is accountable to 





In December 1997 Naz India conducted a study of the risk behaviours and 
spread of HIV and STDs among truck drivers, their crews and their sexual 
partners.  This study found overall lack of knowledge and high level of myths and 
misconceptions surrounding sexual practices and the risk of STDs, which left the 
truckers at a high risk of contracting STDs including HIV.  There was also a lack 
of treatment programmes for STDs, as well as a high social stigma associated 
with these diseases.   
 
In response to the findings, the Healthy Highways Project opened the Top Gear 
Clinic in Azadpur Transport Mandi, one of the largest transportation centres in 
Asia.  This trucking service centre, or “mandi”, houses between 4,500 and 5,000 
trucks at any time.  The adjoining wholesale fruit and vegetable market brings in 
many more thousands of people.  
 
The demand for services at the centre grew so quickly that the programme had to 
be scaled up almost immediately.  This required hiring an additional doctor and 
counsellor and doubling the number of outreach staff.  Outreach staff also 
determined that services should be extended to the nearby village of Bharola, 
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where truckers frequently went for casual/commercial sex.  Project co-ordinators 
requested an additional 2 female outreach workers, one female doctor, and one 
female counsellor for this expansion.  
 
Outreach also expanded to the fruit and vegetable market centres where there 
was a high level of MSM (men who have sex with men) activity.  
 
 
Objectives and main activities 
 
The primary objective of the scaling up was to increase the capacity of the clinic 
and its related outreach programmes so that more people could be served.  
 
On an average day, 30 to 40 people came to the clinic.  This number increased to 
more than 60 on days when staff put on mobile exhibitions.   Even though the 
clinic focused on treatment of STDs, it could not exclude people seeking 
treatment for other medical problems, at the risk of generating resentment and 
further stigmatisation.  
 
 
Resources and timeframe 
 
From the beginning, the Department of International Development (DFID) has 
funded nearly 30 Healthy Highways Projects throughout India.  State AIDS 
Control Societies (SACS) are taking over the projects in phases and DFID will not 
in future have any financial or administrative control. 
 
The primary obstacles in the scaling up process were financial. There was a lack 
of resources to train the additional community outreach workers needed, and lack 
of funding to increase condom distribution outlets.  Some simple but essential 
material goods were lacking, such as boots needed for outreach staff during the 
rainy season.   
 
DFID did not fully understand and agree with the projected budget for the scaling 
up.  The expanded Women’s Sexual Health Programme in Bharola received 
funding for only one female outreach worker and no female doctor or counsellors.  
 
Under the new guidelines of the National AIDS Control Organisation (NACO) and 
State AIDS Control Societies (SACS), doctor’s salaries would be cut in half.   
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Medicines that were initially distributed free of cost are now charged to the 





Truck drivers are a highly mobile population, but also form a fairly close 
community of their own.  Truckers get most of their information, or misinformation 
from other truckers.  Those who have visited clinics or received outreach 
counselling through the Healthy Highways Project are likely to tell their friends.   
The outreach staff at Azadpur regularly encounter men who have come in for the 
first time, often with a vast amount of misinformation.   
 
The programme has been successful in dispelling many myths and providing 
factual information about the transmission of STDs and HIV/AIDS. This change is 
reflected in the information documented by outreach staff in their daily reports.  
 
Because the clinics do not refuse those seeking treatment for general ailments, 
they were not stigmatised.  Truckers may come in with some other medical 
problem, and then feel comfortable requesting STD treatment.  Since the 
beginning of the project there has been a considerable behaviour change about 
condom use as awareness about proper usage has increased.  
 
Another issue with the truckers is the high level of drug and alcohol addiction.  
Most cases of unprotected or risky sex are reported to occur while under the 
influence of alcohol.  Staff now regularly refers cases to the de-addiction centre 
run by the NGO Sharan based in New Delhi. 
 











  Reporting period: July 1999 – March 2000 
  No. of contacts made 
  No. of STD cases treated 
  No. of condoms distributed 
Activity   Target 
    11,880 
    1,000 
    80,000 
   Achieved 
     16,350 
     1,536 
     200,497 
% Achievement 
      137.63% 
      153.6% 
      250.62% 
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Co-operation from secondary stakeholders like truck owners associations and 
police has largely increased as well, but individual truck company owners have 
not been generally co-operative.  They do not consider the health problems of 
their employees as their business or concern.   
 
Sustainability of the project remains a big issue, as the reliance on community 
resources must increase.  
 
 
Internal organisational implications 
 
Staff and peer educators welcomed the scaling up as they could now respond 
adequately to the needs of the community.  The scaling up did, however, strain 






No formal evaluation was done before scaling up, but the Naz Foundation does 
have a very strong ongoing monitoring system within every programme.  All 
outreach and other activities are extensively documented at the end of the day.  
The programme team meets weekly to review the performance of the past week.  
Every month there is general staff meeting to share programme experiences, 
seek input from other teams and discuss future plans.  This system of internal 
monitoring has been functioning effectively for the last five years.  
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• Behaviour change, though often slow, is the only effective way of
reducing the transmission of STDs including HIV/AIDS.  
• Groups at particular risk, such as the women of Bharola village are eager
for education and support.  Women accessed the clinic even without a
female doctor. 
• Behaviour change communication (BCC) materials are an extremely
effective way to reach clients. 
• A successful programme for this particular population must include
treatment for drug and alcohol addiction.  
• Clients who receive effective counselling and treatment encourage their
partners to participate. 
• There must be great care not to stigmatise the treatment of STDs and
HIV/AIDS.  Truckers are feeling increasingly alienated as they are
perceived as a high-risk group. 
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Scaling up the FOCUS Programme of Family  




Family AIDS Caring Trust (FACT) is a Zimbabwean NGO, established in 1988 with 
offices in Mutare and Chiredzi.  FACT works with a variety of NGOs and CBOs to 
promote quality HIV/AIDS interventions. 
 
The Family, Orphans and Children Under Stress (FOCUS) programme, established 
in 1993, works primarily with church-based CBOs to provide support to children 
affected by AIDS.  They identify households where children's basic needs are 





In 1991, FACT Director Dr. Geoff Foster was alarmed at the growing number of 
malnourished orphans he encountered during his work as a paediatrician at a 
government hospital.  FACT then sponsored a research study to count the number 
of orphans, examine how communities and extended families were coping and 
determine how best to support their efforts.  
 
The first FOCUS programme was established with a church group near Mutare in 
1993.  One year later, the group had succeeded in identifying a large population of 
orphans in the target area, prioritising the most needy households and mobilising 
the community to provide regular visits and support to these households.   
 
The process of scaling up might actually be better described in this case as scaling 
out.  As other churches heard about the success of the pilot project they asked 
FACT, the facilitating NGO to help them establish similar programmes.  By 1998 
FACT supervised 9 FOCUS sites with 178 volunteers providing regular visits to 
2,764 orphan households.  
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Objectives and main activities 
 














As the FOCUS programmes expanded so quickly, FACT had to develop a new type 
of support model.  It became necessary to re-evaluate decision-making systems 
and structures within the programme.  There were attempts to enhance collective 
decision-making and encourage site supervisors to become more actively involved 
in planning activities and budgeting.  An annual management meeting was 
introduced so supervisors of different sites could plan activities together with the 
FOCUS staff.   
  
It became clear that: 
 
 
• To identify all orphaned children in each project's area and prioritise those
households with the greatest needs. 
• To visit these households at least twice a month 
• To provide these households with material support. 
• To involve other community groups, leaders and organisations in all aspects of
the operation. 
• To enable these groups to work toward more autonomy and control over their
own local programmes, eventually reducing their dependence on FACT. 
• To identify early new problems affecting orphans.  
 
• The capacity of the FOCUS staff to supervise new sites was limited.  
  
• Identifying emerging problems was better achieved when attention
could be focused more intensely on fewer sites, rather than more
broadly on many.  
 
• Community ownership made a project much more sustainable,  
 
• FOCUS should begin to limit its activities to community mobilisation 
and technical support.  
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Resources and timeframe 
 
The initial funding for baseline research was provided by Plan International 
(Mutare).  A start-up grant for the FOCUS programme was provided in 1993 by 
Save the Children Fund (US).  Since 1993, Plan International has provided most of 
the funds, with some additional support from UNICEF.   
 
No specific budgets were set for the scaling up process in the beginning.  FACT 
administrators believed that the expansion could be carried out using existing 
resources.  When the new sites began to develop rapidly, additional money was 
requested and granted. 
 
Because FOCUS relies so heavily on volunteers from within the community, the 
cost of establishing and maintaining a new site is a fraction of the total cost of 
running the programme.  An assistant co-ordinator was hired at the beginning of the 
first scaling up in 1996, but no additional staff was added after that.  Fixed 
programme costs such as Co-ordinator's salary, office rental and administration 
costs remained basically unchanged as the programme grew. 
 
Additional costs of training, transport and support to communities represented less 
than 20% of total costs.  
 


















• While the amount spent on material support increased with programme
expansion, the actual number of households supported increased at a faster
pace, resulting in reduction of support provided to each household.  
 
• In 1997, due to limited capacity of FOCUS staff, a decision was made to
reduce the frequency of site support visits in established programmes from
monthly to bi-monthly.  In alternate months, FOCUS site supervisors attended
training and support meetings at FACT's offices.  This increased supervisors'
responsibility and provided peer support.  
 
• The reduced availability of FOCUS staff for training of volunteers at sites 
was compensated for by establishing exchange visits for volunteers between 
sites.  These visits proved to be popular and beneficial.  
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Although scaling up was assumed in the original project design, there were no 
specific targets set concerning coverage, impact or sustainability.  Initially, there 
were no known models of community support to children affected by AIDS. Since 
the pilot programme, targets have been developed for new sites.  
 
Few aspects of the original model were lost or diluted in the scaling up process.  
Though FACT was able to provide less material support to the newer FOCUS sites, 
this did not affect the functioning of the programmes and may actually have 
enhanced community ownership, decision-making and contributions.  When 
community groups were challenged to make more decisions about their future 
development, they matured and became more empowered.  
 
The flow of monitoring data to FACT has become less efficient however, as a result 
of reduced supervisory visits to FOCUS sites.  
 
• The reduction in the amount of material support and supervision provided
by FACT to FOCUS sites actually encouraged the CBOs to become more
autonomous.  Some developed additional resources within their own
communities, or independently recruited from outside.  One CBO obtained
external donor funding and was able to employ its own staff, develop a
Board of directors and become an NGO in its own right.  
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Internal organisational implications 
 





















The pilot programme was evaluated in January 1995, one year after 
commencement.  The findings have been published as a peer-reviewed article, 
Supporting children in need through a community-based orphan visiting 













• The additional work for FACT staff in supervising several FOCUS sites
was offset by an increase in mutual support from site supervisors and
volunteers.  
 
• The FACT organisation was able to gain a strategic understanding of the
mechanisms involved in an effective scaling up process. 
 
• Innovations introduced by community-based partner organisations will be 
helpful to FACT in developing future programmes.  
 
• FACT decided in 1999 that they would not directly support any new 
FOCUS sites, but would supply technical support and training without 
formalised monthly visits, allowances or material support. 
 
• Community-based organisations were able to identify a high
proportion of orphans living in their area, target those most in need,
and provide regular visits and material support. 
• These programmes can provide support to large numbers of affected
families. 
• The FOCUS model was targeted, effective and replicable. 
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The most challenging aspect of evaluating the scaling up has been maintaining a 
balance between the requirements for FACT to supervise programme sites, 
obtain monitoring data and understand emerging problems, while also ensuring 





The success of the FOCUS programme is most clearly demonstrated by the 
mechanism by which it proliferated.  Local leaders and pastors saw tangible 
benefits being provided to a community in need and sought, through their own 
initiative, to establish the programme in their own communities.  
 
Despite the acknowledged success, the scaling up process could have been much 
more effective with more outside support.  The FOCUS programme expansion 
received little support from outside agencies, government departments, 
international children's organisations or policy advisory groups.  
• FOCUS programmes enjoyed high levels of volunteer retention and
sense of community ownership.  
• There was a need to diversify the FOCUS model so it could operate 
with lower levels of external support.  
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There are a number of factors that appear to inhibit effective partnerships between 











• Unrealistic reporting requirements 
• Lack of flexibility 
• Lack of trust 
• Partisan agendas 
• Inability or reluctance on the party of large organisations to
embrace the idea of community ownership, empowerment 
and eventual autonomy of a project 
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Pact AIDS Corps 
 
Implementers   
 
Pact is an international NGO with 30 years of experience working with networks 
of NGOs and civil society organizations.  Pact’s AIDS Corps was created to help 
other NGOs and community organizations more effectively battle the spread of 
HIV/AIDS.   
 
Pact’s headquarters are in Washington D.C. and there are country offices 
throughout Africa, Southeast Asia and in Peru and Nepal.  
 
The goal of Pact is to keep international attention focused on the epidemic and 





Pact has had a long history of working with AIDS support organizations, but the 
increasing impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa motivated the organization 
to find a way to escalate their efforts and broaden their approach.  The AIDS 
epidemic is more than just a health crisis.  It affects all aspects of a community.  
Pact believes that a social movement led by those most affected is needed to 
revitalize hope and galvanize cooperation.  
 
Pact is drawing on the expertise of existing staff and has engaged additional full-
time staff and consultants.  
 
 
Objectives and main activities 
 
The Pact model of expansion is based on the complex interdependence of the 
rain forest.  The web is comprised of community and national leaders, NGOs, 
government and private sector organizations.  This model requires participants to 
rethink their ideas of traditional boundaries and eliminate the sense of 
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Pact has convened four AIDS Corps meetings so far, with a network of over 100 
individuals and organizations.  Two meetings in September will include leaders of 
US foreign aid policy, religious leaders and representatives from pharmaceutical 
companies and Johns Hopkins University.  
 
 
Resources and timeframe 
 
The AIDS Corps was inaugurated in January 2000 when Pact provided 
unrestricted funding to establish the movement and develop country strategies in 
Ethiopia, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Madagascar.  
 
From April to October, Pact is working with the Africa Bureau of Democracy and 
Governance Support to develop cross-sectoral approaches to HIV/AIDS, focusing 
on increasing democratic principles and practices in community-led solutions.  In 
the fall of 2000, Pact will be working with NetAID on country programs in 
Ethiopia, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  Plans are now underway to work with UNAIDS 





It is too early to have specific information about targets and goals.  The 
evaluation process is ongoing as the projects continue to develop.  The response 
from participants, both within the various organizations and among the 
populations affected, has been positive.  
 
• Advocating for increased attention and resources. 
• Strengthening the capacities of organizations and communities to focus,
intensify and sustain their efforts. 
• Increasing the diversity of people giving voice to the needs of their
communities. 
• Developing and disseminating cross-sectoral programs that include
aspects of economic and social development. 
• Coordinating diverse networks of organizations for maximum impact. 
   Appendix: A    Page 37 of 53 
  
   
Internal organizational implications 
 
Pact has had to develop a global AIDS Corps Team to deal with the complex 
communications involved in working with diverse organizations, countries and 
international partners.  
 
On of Pact’s three strategic pathways is peer partnership in which AIDS Corps 
can soar internationally and nationally. 
 
Internal support for the AIDS Corps movement is being built.  Pact is a project 
and service oriented organization.  Launching a social movement, no matter how 
compelling, is a different way of doing business at Pact. 
 
Self-fulfilling prophecy- the diverse array of Pact partner NGOs made it a natural 
to respond to the realization that AIDS has crossed all development sectors.   
 
Pact’s culture is rich in pioneer spirit and risk-taking.  The passion of AIDS Corps 











Even though most people now agree that the the HIV/AIDS epidemic involves 
more than just a health care crisis, it was difficult for some in the health-care 
organizations to accept Pact’s interest since it did not have a background in this 
arena.   Several groups were also concerned about replicating existing efforts 
and diverting resources away from projects already underway.   
 
The tradition among NGOs has been to direct resources to specific efforts in one 
sector, and it will take some effort to broaden this view.   Pact would like to see 
funding integrated in support of cross-sectoral approaches.  
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Pact has to build on the already good work being done.  It has to extend the hand 
of connectivity and bridge builder.  It must demonstrate its skills in coordination 
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The Kenya AIDS NGOs Consortium (KANCO) is a coalition of some 600 






KANCO was founded in 1990 by a group of seven health and development 
NGOs that had added an HIV/AIDS component to their existing programs. The 
consortium’s goal is to improve the response to the epidemic by enhancing NGO 
networking and collaboration among NGOs, religious, institutions, and the 
Kenyan government, as well as to promote leadership and solidarity.  
 
In 1997, KANCO identified the need to expand and strengthen services, enhance 
its visibility, and increase capacity on the district level without creating field 
offices. To accomplish this, the consortium developed an implementation plan to 
deliver services in districts where there are many KANCO member organizations. 
This process is described below, under “Internal organizational implications.”  
 
 
Objectives and main activities 
 
KANCO’s efforts are designed to complement the government response to 
HIV/AIDS to ensure a positive policy environment for HIV/AIDS/STI prevention, 
care, and support; promote capacity building; and provide broad access to 
HIV/AIDS/STI information and materials. 
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Resources and timeframe 
 
KANCO has been supported by several donors, including the U.S. Agency for 
International Development, the Department for International Development of the 





KANCO’s commitment to national policy development on HIV/AIDS has led to 
several important initiatives. The consortium has built strong ties with government 
agencies involved in policy formulation and health programming, such as the 
National AIDS and STD Control Programme (NASCOP) and the National AIDS 
Control Council (NACC). The executive director of KANCO sits on the NACC, 
which coordinates HIV/AIDS activities in the country, to promote the perspective 
of Kenya’s NGOs. KANCO’s policy initiations contributed significantly to the 
development of the 1997 Sessional Paper No. 4, “AIDS in Kenya.” KANCO has 
also sponsored several symposia to build the capacity of members of Parliament 
to respond to the epidemic in their constituencies. 
 
 
• Establishing and facilitating a networking system to provide forums for
sharing resources and enhancing collaborative efforts both at the
national and district levels. Maintaining a resource center to collect and
disseminate HIV/AIDS information, education, and communication
materials; the center currently handles a monthly  average of 350
enquiries.  
• Promoting capacity building among members to improve quality of
services and respond to the epidemic more effectively 
• Working to complement the government in developing and articulating 
national policies for HIV/AIDS prevention, care, and support.  
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Internal organizational implications 
 
In late 1997, KANCO invited consultants in organizational development (OD) to 
assist in designing a strategy to better support member organizations and other 
clients, particularly at the district level. Rather than force KANCO to strictly 
adhere to linear planning procedures toward this goal, KANCO leaders saw OD 
as a process that would allow the consortium and the organizations within it to 
consciously manage their growth and development without sacrificing KANCOs’ 
organizational knowledge and culture. OD became a valuable tool that has 
allowed KANCO to identify constraints or crisis points in its structure and to 
decide whether it needs to shift to different ways of organizing itself  to improve 
effectiveness.  
 
The OD intervention helped KANCO examine areas that regular planning rarely 
touches, yet that are extremely crucial for organizational well-being. These 
include such issues as values, identity, image, relationships, and organizational 
culture. In strategy making, for instance, an OD inter-vision will take longer than 
conventional linear planning approaches but will help the organization as a whole 
become more conscious of the values that drive its mission and the norms that 
keep it alive. This also helped to bring values and norms into alignment with 
internal capacity, structure, administration, and communication. The process also 
helped KANCO to acknowledge problem areas, some of which involved deep 
emotions and change. 
 
The first step was a “belief session” designed to introduce staff to OD and answer 
questions about the process. Next came a comprehensive survey to help assess 
existing organizational capacity and infrastructure within KANCO. This two-day 
effort, facilitated by the consultant, focused on interviews with individual 
employees, including the director and all staff working in the administration, policy 
and advocacy, and resource center departments, as well as organizational 
diagnosis questionnaires. These sought to explore why individual staff chose to 
work at KANCO, whether personal objectives are achievable at KANCO, and how 
staff perceive KANCO objectives. They revealed that most staff are confident 
about their skill levels, have high regard for KANCO’s networking orientation, feel 
pride that they work for a high-profile organisation that has enjoyed success in its 
field, and are confident in KANCO’s financial management. The surveys were 
followed by a diagnostic workshop made up of staff, board members, and 
volunteers that focused on analyzing and summarizing the results of the 
diagnosis questionnaire. 
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Next steps included participatory development of a five-year strategic plan, which 
concentrated on five key questions.  Key components of this planning process 
included allowing participants to express expectations and fears; introducing a 
planning framework to enable the entire team to understand the planning 
process; analyzing KANCO stakeholders and prioritizing commitments to them; 
reviewing KANCO’s mission and organizational vision; analyzing the external 
environment of factors likely to influence KANCO in the future and envisioning 
future factors; examining internal competence, strengths, and weaknesses; and 
developing strategic goals in a participatory process. These efforts lead to three 































• Goal 1: A competent secretariat capable of responding to the technical
needs of members and HIV/AIDS issues. 
• Goal 2: Functioning national and district networks capable of providing
regular forums for experience sharing and access to information. 
• Goal 3: Enhanced advocacy capacity for members to respond to
HIV/AIDS policy issues effectively. 
 
• A job analysis and evaluation, involving staff-wide job analysis
questionnaires and a job evaluation exercise, which led to development of
a grade level system based on evaluation results. 
• A salary survey, which provided the basis for recommendations on a
salary structure and prompted creation of a staff pension and medical
scheme. 
• Creation of finance and personnel policy manuals. 
• Development of a sustainability plan, including technical assistance to
improve financial management and staff benefits, and a working
committee on sustainability. 
• A staff appraisal system. 
• More staff training to, among other things, enhance KANCO’s ability to
respond to donor requirements for financial management, analysis, and
reporting. 
• Project management meetings. 
• Joint donors’ meetings to explain KANCO activities, constraints, and
future plans.   
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The benefits to KANCO of the OD process are numerous. The consortium now 
enjoys increasing transparency within the organization, an overall change in 
perspectives and attitudes, new learning processes, internalization of the 
organization’s mission, and a new sense of ownership by staff and members of 
the organization, leading to greater effectiveness. 
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The Project Support Group (PSG) is a regional non-profit organization founded 
in 1986 to provide training and support to community organizations. PSG works 
in eight Southern African countries: Zimbabwe, Zambia, South Africa, Malawi, 
Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho and Mozambique.  It has branches in Zimbabwe, 
Zambia, South Africa and Malawi and a strong academic collaboration with the 
Universities of Zimbabwe, Zambia and Pretoria. These partners share 
responsibility for project management, training and field support. PSG has 
national and regional governing structures. 
 
PSG defines its mission as building bridges between knowledge and application, 
i.e. applying state-of-the-art knowledge to implementation and generating state-
of-the-art knowledge that will improve practice.  It integrates professionalism and 
voluntarism, adding value to altruism. It also develops approaches that link formal 
health systems to informal community-based AIDS prevention and mitigation 
initiatives. 
 
PSG seeks is to develop economical, effective methods that build partners' 
capacity to deliver economical, effective AIDS prevention and mitigation services. 
PSG's approach to capacity building is based on the conviction that effectiveness 
derives from partner ownership, a results orientation, continuous support, rather 
than one-off training, provision of tailored materials and emphasis on how to do 





In 1987, the University of Zimbabwe began an ethnographic study of HIV-
vulnerable, low-income women in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe’s second largest city.  
The women who participated in the study requested STD/HIV/AIDS education 
and services, which the Bulawayo City Council agreed to provide, initiating 
STD/HIV/AIDS project for HIV-vulnerable communities of women and men in 
1989. With the University of Zimbabwe’s support, other health authorities and 
community organizations in Zimbabwe followed the Bulawayo City Council’s lead, 
developing projects for HIV-vulnerable communities of women and men PSG 
evolved from the University of Zimbabwe, as a service delivery arm, to 
complement research activities. As the number of partners seeking its assistance 
grew, PSG became increasingly formalized and structured. To manage its 
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increased responsibilities, in consultation with partners and stakeholders, PSG 
became a regional non-profit organization in Zimbabwe, Zambia, South Africa, 
and Malawi, strengthened its institutional governance structures in each country 
and developed an overall regional governance framework, with equal 
representation from South African, Zimbabwean, Zambian and Malawian 
partners. 
 
PSG recruited additional staff and formed an associate group of 20 experienced 
field coordinators to provide training and support to regional partners. 
 
In order to support its growing network of partners, PSG developed a structured 
training program, based on horizontal training approaches. Partners complete a 
structured training cycle. New partners first attend a skills building workshop, 
which provided an overall conceptual and skills-based framework. This is 
followed by a practical internship, in which new coordinators visit experienced 
coordinators for a practical, field-based orientation. Thereafter, field support visits 
take place, in which experienced coordinators visit new coordinators to provide 
on-site practical assistance. Through these reciprocal visits and interactions, 
coaching and mentoring partnerships evolve, in which new and experienced 
partners form ongoing "parenting" or coaching relationships. 
 
As its number of partnerships has grown, PSG has sought to make its training 
approaches as structured as possible. It has two training suites, a management 
training suite with 10 modules and a coordinators’ training suite with six modules. 
PSG and partners have also developed five core training courses: a project 
managers' course; a prevention coordinators' course; a mitigation coordinators' 
course; a peer educators' course; and a care supporters' course.  Thus, the 
organization has significantly increased its structure and capacity in order to 
manage its increase.    
 
PSG also needed highly structured standardized approaches. We did these 
through modules, manuals and structured participatory approaches.  The World 
Bank and the World Health Organization have commended the PSG approach. 
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Objectives and main activities 
 
PSG’s overall goal statement is: “To assist Southern African government, 
municipal, non-profit and church partners to develop, manage and sustain 
optimally efficient, effective, evidence-based HIV/AIDS prevention and mitigation 
projects”.  Its unifying theme is community-based HIV/AIDS prevention and 
mitigation approaches, utilizing carefully trained and supported community 
volunteers to deliver services. 
 
The organization does not support institutional approaches to HIV/AIDS 
prevention and mitigation, which invest in physical plant or institutional facilities.  
The regional project believes that the scope of HIV/AIDS prevention and 
mitigation needs is too great for formal, institutional approaches and that only 
through the fullest possible involvement of community members can services of 
sufficient scope be introduced. 
 
The Project Support Group has two project areas: STI/HIV prevention and 
HIV/AIDS impact mitigation.  PSG’s prevention and mitigation activities share a 
common approach.  They both work with community volunteers to deliver large-
scale, economical, locally relevant services that increase community response 
capacity. 
 
PSG develop systems to train and support community volunteers effectively.  In 
prevention, volunteers serve as peer educators, providing training, behavior 
change communication and condoms to their communities particularly low 
income, HIV-vulnerable communities.  In mitigation, volunteers work as care 
supporters, training and supporting community members to care effectively for 
family members with HIV and orphans. 
 
Concerning an illustrative example of prevention, in Mutare, Zimbabwe, 
community peer educators, organize thousands of community meetings, reaching 
men in workplaces, bars and nightclubs and women in homes and markets. They 
use participatory approaches to stimulate community debate and to shape safer 
sexual norms. They also distribute condoms through their social networks and at 
hundreds of fixed distribution points throughout Mutare. They give low-income 
women STI treatment cards, to enable them to secure free, high-quality 
treatment. Through participatory dialogue to foster safer sexual norms, large-
scale condom promotion and distribution, and improved STI care, the project has 
sharply reduced STIs, and by implication, HIV. 
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An example of PSG’s work in mitigation can be seen in Masoyi, South Africa, 
where church members have volunteered to serve as care supporters. They are 
trained provide home care and to train family members to offer palliative care. 
Once trained, they visit their neighborhoods to identify families with terminally ill 
patients. They assist the family to gather firewood, sweep their yards and clean 
their houses, bring food and simple medicines, assist the family to care for the 
patient and above all, train the families to provide high quality palliative care. The 
care supporters have trained, equipped and supported hundreds of families in 
Masoyi to care for terminally ill patients. 
 
PSG has three major activities: implementation research, project training and 
field support, and on-grant management. The first stream is implementation 
research, to identify, refine effective prevention and mitigation strategies.  PSG is 
currently involved in five studies in three countries; Zimbabwe, Zambia and South 
Africa.  Two studies are evaluating alternative approaches to reduce STI/HIV 
transmission among HIV-vulnerable adults.  Two studies are evaluating school 
STI/HIV prevention approaches.  One study is evaluating the coverage, economy 
and quality of community AIDS care 
 
The second stream is project training and field support. Through national and 
regional grants, PSG provides training and field support to approximately 130 
projects, including 60 in South Africa, 40 projects in Zimbabwe, 22 in Zambia, 4 in 
Malawi, 1 in Botswana, 1 in Lesotho, 1 in Swaziland and 1 in Mozambique.  An 
estimated 60% are prevention projects and 40% are mitigation projects, but the 
percentage of mitigation projects is growing fast.  Project training and support 
involves site visits, to foster interest, and regular skills building workshops, to 
learn and reinforce concepts.  Each year, PSG co-facilitates 10 skills building 
workshops in South Africa, 6 in Zimbabwe and 4 in Zambia.  It also involves 
internships, with experienced projects, to learn practical skills, mentoring 
partnerships, in which experienced projects coach emerging ones.   
 
The third stream is on-grant management.  PSG currently contributes national 
and regional on-grant funds to 60 partners, including 40 in South Africa, 10 in 
Zimbabwe, 4 in Zambia, 3 in Malawi, 1 in Lesotho, 1 Swaziland, and 1 in 
Mozambique. PSG and its partners have developed comprehensive on-grant 
management systems, including project application packages, review forms and 
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Resources and timeframe 
 
PSG try to have at least five sources of funding in each program for diversity 
and sustainability.  These include private sector contributions in cash or in kind, 
particularly in South Africa, with its large, cash-rich corporations. It also includes 
community contributions, such a community and household training and meeting 
facilities and community members’ volunteer time. It includes government 
contributions, such as personnel, grants, medical supplies and services, 
condoms and IEC materials. It also includes multilateral/bilateral contributors, 
who provide funds. Finally, foundations play an increasingly important role. 
 
The organization’s regional programs have a current time frame of five years.  
 
PSG has adequate resources and staggers its expansions in relation to 
resources available, on a phased, country-by-country approach.  It keeps its per 
project costs low and its administration particularly low, by having a very small 
management nucleus. PSG passes on in direct grants fully 90 to 92.5% of all 
resources received. It believes that the proportion of resources disbursed to 
those retained is the only meaningful measure of administrative costs. All other 
indicators can be embellished, usually by re-profiling administration as capacity 
building or implementation support services. 
 
The efficiency and economy of the PSG is evidenced by the fact that despite this 
sustained growth in activity, full-time program staff now number only five persons, 
supported by a finance manager.  They are assisted by 10 part-time associate 
members (primarily partner project managers and coordinators of excellence), 
who assist in the training and mentoring of new coordinators.  PSG believed in 
the principle of co-funding for sustainability and most funders accepted the 
motion. 
 
The costs of scaling-up during the initial period in new countries are relatively 
high.  They also varied from country to country, in keeping with cost of country 
operations and economies of scale in respective countries. For example, 
operations in Zambia and Mozambique are significantly more expensive and 
project costs in Zimbabwe have grown and infrastructure and productivity have 
declined. 
 
Donors agreed with the organization’s timeframe because they were familiar with 
its budgets. PSG also identified donors with a long-term focus and those who 
were willing to work regionally. PSG then complemented its core donors with 
   Appendix: A    Page 49 of 53 
  
   
additional funds from donors with a shorter-term perspective. However, it was 
careful not to position funds from shorter-term donors at the core of any program 
activity. PSG kept administration both monetary and office staff costs low. 
 
The organization developed project management systems to support its work. In 
particular, project application, management, monitoring and reporting packages 
were developed, to assist projects to prepare applications, monitor progress and 





All 20 Zimbabwean projects held 750,000 meetings, reached 24 million people 
(including repeat attenders) and distributed 100 million condoms.  These outputs 
have been delivered within exacting cost targets. Bulawayo's unit costs 
(excluding opportunity costs and donated condoms) average US$1.2 per 
outreach meeting, US$0.02 per person reached and US$0,01 per donated 
condom distributed. In Lusaka, Zambia, unit costs average US$7.48 per outreach 
meeting, US$0.38 per person reached and US$0,05 per condom distributed. 
These unit costs far surpass economies achieved in other health promotion 
projects. 
 
Through large-scale activities, high coverage has been achieved. Nine projects 
have conducted community coverage surveys. In Bulawayo, 80% of 705 sex 
workers have attended peer education meetings and 91% of these had received 
condoms during meetings. In Mutare, 98% of 204 sex workers and 92% of 508 
clients had attended peer education meetings and 93% of sex workers and 84% 
of clients had received condoms during meetings. In Mutare, a survey showed 
that peer educators were the primary source of condoms compared to bars, 
health centers family planning clinic and friends. 
 
High coverage has provided a basis for behavior change. In Bulawayo, condom use 
in sex work rose from 18% at the outset to 72% within two years. Condom use was 
closely related to intervention coverage and exposure. Condom use in the last 
commercial sex act was reported by 27% of those who had attended no meetings, 
46% of those who had attended one meeting and 77% of those who had attended 
two or more meetings. 
 
Behavior change appears to have contributed to reduced STD/RPR rates. In 
Zimbabwe project sites, STD/RPR rates fell by 48% in Bulawayo, 52% in Mutare, 
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63% in Kariba, 71% in Chitungwiza and 74% in Masvingo. In Zambia project sites, 
RPR rates fell by 77% in George, 78% in Kanyama and 47% in Matero. 
 
The projects’ impact have been independently evaluated by international 
universities, including the London School of Tropical Medicine, Johns Hopkins 
University, University of Michigan, University of North Carolina and Amsterdam 
University. 
 
The most challenging aspect of scaling up was trying not to dilute quality and 
building country support mechanisms in each country.  It was also a challenge to 




Internal organizational implications 
 
The core organization has become more involved in management.  It has 
increasingly delegated training and support to downstream partners, particularly 
associate group members. 
 
Expansion improved morale, because staff and volunteers felt part of a growing, 
expanding, evolving organization. In addition, the organization has become more 





PSG has powerful project impact data from Zimbabwe, Zambia and South 
Africa, which gives confidence that the approach works. 
 
The organization has made significant progress towards the development of a 
project monitoring and evaluation framework. 
 
The prevention and mitigation components have both developed monitoring 
forms, for peer educators/care supporters, coordinators and project managers. 
These forms are included in the project information packages. The prevention 
component has developed baseline and follow-up behavioral surveillance 
surveys for priority groups. These surveys have been translated into Shona, 
Ndebele, Zulu, Sotho and Nyanja.  Community coping and quality of care surveys 
have been developed, to assess baseline and follow-up coping capacity and 
quality of support.  
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PSG has developed a comprehensive framework for evaluating projects.  The 
framework encompasses inputs, outputs, unit costs, coverage, behavioral 
outcomes and STD/RPR trends.   
 
The framework has a detailed, logical results chain.  The results chain is as 
follows: Inputs lead to outputs.  These outputs are achieved within specified 
costs.  Through large-scale outputs, high coverage is achieved.  Coverage is 
imperative for change: a project cannot modify behavior unless it actually reaches 
communities.  Through high coverage, important behavioral outcomes especially 
increased condom use and improved STD symptoms knowledge, suspicion, 
recognition and care seeking behavior, occur.  These behavioral outcomes lead 












Inputs       
 
Outputs    » Inputs lead to outputs  
 
 
Unit costs    » Outputs are achieved within specified  
costs 
 
Coverage    » Through large-scale outputs, high  
          Coverage, a prerequisite for change is  
        achieved 
 
Behavioral outcome   » Through high coverage, behavior change  
          outcomes, especially increased condom 
                    use and improved STD care utilization  
                    occur 
 
STD/RPR declines                     » These behavior change, STD/RPR rates 
decline, showing  “real world results” have 
been achieved 
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PSG's inputs include: a suite of 10 program management modules, available in 
English and Portuguese, a suite of six peer educator training manuals, over 100 
participatory outreach activities, an average of 10 training courses annually and 
over 500 person days field support annually.  These inputs have contributed to 
significant outputs. Since 1987, the oldest project, in Bulawayo (population 
900,000) recruited 80 peer educators, held 250,000 outreach meetings, reached 





PSG has managed to build in-country training and support mechanisms.  It 
expanded without run-away administration costs.  This was because it was able 
to develop a structured, standardized approach that could be replicated in each 
of its focal countries.  Each country is unique and there are slight differences and 
challenges during implementation of the projects. 
  
One of the major drawbacks that the PSG encountered was the failure to access 
sufficient STI care, home care medicines and food and condoms as needs grow. 
Current need and /or use of condoms are about 100 million annually. Many 
partner countries are experiencing drug and condom stock outs. Home care 
programs are critically short of food. 
 
To have a successful program one needs a structured, standardized approach, 
with supporting modules and packages.  In short, an organization needs to build 
its systems as rapidly as the growth of the organization.  There is need to 
develop horizontal training approaches, through site visits, internships, mentoring 
partnerships as projects are being implemented. 
 
If PSG were to go through the process of scaling up again, it would try to develop 
fully standardized materials more rapidly. It would also establish the horizontal 
training school earlier.   
 
In all its projects there has been no major resistance.  However, early 
partnerships resent the loss of attention and uniqueness as scaling-up proceeds.  
Before replication of any projects in any country, PSG consulted with 
beneficiaries on expansion plans in each region. Their expertise was used to 
identify sites and approaches that were appropriate in the relevant countries. 
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The larger impact of scaling up was expanded coverage and scope of services.  
This led to truly district (Zambia), provincial (SA) and national (Zimbabwe) 
coverage.  
 
Above all, projects must have a commitment to structured, methodical 
approaches and to a rigorous results orientation. Process cannot be a substitute 
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Appendix: B 
Potential Target Groups for HIV/AIDS Interventions and 
Prevention, Care and Support Activities According to Need, 
Complexity and Cost 
 
The following two tables are included to provide more information about specific 
HIV/AIDS Interventions.  It should be noted, however, that the interventions are 
listed from the perspective of a national agency delivering services, rather than 
that of NGOs as described in this paper.  
 
Source: WHO/UNAIDS 2000: “Key Elements in Care and Support” (draft working 
document) as cited by Lamptey, P.R., Zeitz, P., Larivee, C. (Eds.) (2001) 
Strategies for an Expanded and Comprehensive Response (ECR) to a National 
HIV/AIDS Epidemic.  Draft of July 10. MODULE 6: Technical Considerations of 
an Expanded and Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Response. Family Health 
International (Washington, D.C.) 
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Table 1: Potential Target Groups (PTG) for HIV/AIDS  
              Interventions and Activities 
 
Potential Target Group    Activity/Intervention 
School Youth interventions 
Out of school youth 
Sex worker interventions 
Strengthening public sector 
condom distribution 
Condom social marketing 
(including female condom) 
Strengthening STI 
services 





Prevention of MTCT 
Mass media 
Palliative care 
Clinical management for 
opportunistic illness 
Home-based care 
Clinical care for children 
Prevention of OIs 
(cotrimoxazole and TB 
preventive therapy) 
Support for orphans 
Psycho-social support and 
counselling  
Treatment (HAART) 
Male and female youth enrolled in primary schools (age 6-11) 
Male and female youth enrolled in  secondary  schools(12-16) 
Male and female youth aged 6-11 not enrolled in schools 
Male and female youth aged 12-16 not enrolled in schools 
Sex workers in urban areas 
Protection by condoms for all casual sex acts and of sex acts in 
regular partnerships (proportion of sex acts in regular partnerships 
set at 2% for the analysis) 
Protection by condoms for all casual sex acts and proportion of sex 
acts in regular partnerships (proportion of sex acts in regular 
partnerships set at 2% for the analysis)
Men (15-49) with curable symptomatic STIs and access to health 
services 
Non-pregnant females (15-49) with curable symptomatic STIs and 
access to health services 
Pregnant women with syphilis and access to health services 
Current sexually active population 
HIV prevention activities: all males and females in formal employment 
STI treatment: same groups as those for strengthening STI services, 
but limited to workplaces that have STI treatment. 
Condom distribution: the number of sex acts requiring a condom (set at 
100% causal and 2% of regular partnerships) for those in formal 
employment 
Units of blood used in transfusions 
Screening (VCT): Pregnant women 15-49 with access to ante-natal 
services. 
ARV treatment for pregnant women testing positive and formula for 
infants. 
National campaigns for entire country 
For PLWHA who are symptomatic 
For PLWHA with access to health services 
For PLWHA who are symptomatic and have access to health services 
Includes palliative care for all children who are HIV positive and 
symptomatic, and clinical care for children who are HIV positive and 
symptomatic with access to health services
For PLWHA who are symptomatic and have access to health services 
All AIDS orphans less than 15 years old 
For PLWHA who are symptomatic 
For PLWHA with access to health services 
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Table 2: Care and Support Activities, by  
              Need, Complexity and Cost








• HIV Voluntary counselling and testing 
• Palliative care and treatment for common OIs: 
pneumonia, oral thrush, vaginal candidiasis and 
pulmonary TB (DOTS) 
• Nutritional care 
• STI care and family planning services 
• Cortrimoxazole prophylaxis for individuals with 
HIV/Aids (PLWHA) 
• Community activities that mitigate the impact of HIV, 
including legal structures against stigma 
All the above plus 
 
• Active case finding and treatment for TB 
• Preventative therapy for TB for PLWHA 
• Systematic antifungals for systemtic mycosis such as 
cryptococcosis 
• Treatment of HIV-associated malignancies: Karposi’s 
sarcoma (KS), Lymphoma and cervical cancer 
• Treatment of severe herpes 
• Prevention of MCT transmission 
• Post exposure prophylaxis of occupational exposure to 
HIV and for rape
All the above plus 
 
• Triple antiretrovial therapy 
• Diagnosis and treatment of difficult to diagnose 
OIs and expensive to treat OIs such as drug 
resistant TB 
• Advanced treatment of HIV-related malignancies 
• Public services to reduce the economic and social 
impacts of living with HIV/AIDS 
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Appendix: C 
Case Study, International HIV/AIDS Alliance, 1993 - 2000  
Jeff O’Malley 
 
The development of the International HIV/AIDS Alliance since its foundation in 
1993 illustrates a continual process of scaling up through a number of the 
strategies identified in the paper. For this reason, and also because different 
approaches to HIV are also illustrated through the Alliance experience, this 
substantial case study is included as an appendix in its own right.  
 
The Alliance was formally established in December 1993 and its first staff person 
took up responsibilities in January 1994. The initiative had begun in 1991 with a 
series of discussions among a group of individuals from northern donor agencies 
about how to increase support to, and therefore the coverage of, community 
responses to AIDS in developing countries. These initial discussions were 
followed by a series of needs assessments, project design activities, and two 
country-level pilot projects leading to a proposal for support to create "The 
International Alliance Supporting Community Action on AIDS" (to be renamed the 
"International HIV/AIDS Alliance").  The following quotation from the original 
proposal for support captures much of the thinking that informed the Alliance's 
creation: 
 
Effective HIV/AIDS prevention, care and community support 
programmes require changes to individual attitudes and sexual 
behaviour which can only be brought about by a sustained and massive 
mobilisation of communities which, whilst small individually, together 
add up to a large-scale response. To effect this, financial and 
technical resources have to be made available at village and 
neighbourhood level on a vast scale and used to supplement existing 
community resources to implement programmes in education, condom 
distribution and STD prevention, and in innovative care and community 
support programmes. The intention of the International Alliance 
Supporting Community Action on AIDS (IASCAA), is to support non-
governmental organisations to implement both small- and large-scale 
interventions which can have a rapid and significant impact on the 
spread and effects of AIDS.50 
 
                                                          
50 Cliff Lenton, "The International Alliance Supporting Community Action on AIDS (IASCAA) 
Proposal for Support", 12 November 1993, pp 3 -4, 
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The Alliance was established with a clear strategy to act as a catalyst and to 
support action on HIV/AIDS by other organisations - NGOs and CBOs operating 
locally in developing countries. The core function was to identify or establish 
national mechanisms (later to be called "linking organisations") and provide them 
with technical and financial support. These linking organisations would support 
NGOs already working on HIV/AIDS in their country to scale up; catalyse new 
groups to begin responding to AIDS for the first time; and support both those new 
to HIV/AIDS and those already engaged through providing organisational and 
technical support. This reflected a commitment to community action by NGOs 
and CBOs, (later changed to community action by local NGOs and CBOs), rather 
than a commitment to expanding any particular type of programme or 
intervention. 
 
From the Alliance's inception it was anticipated it would support the expansion of 
these other organisations through "organisational expansion", as well as through 
"mainstreaming in development"51.  
 
The key target adopted for the first three years was to establish and support 
"NGO support mechanisms" in 14 countries with an anticipated funding level of 
approximately US$21 million of unrestricted funds. These would be channelled to 
a central fund, approximately 80% of which would be invested in programme 
expenditure, for which the Alliance itself would develop technical criteria. The 
funding would cover international and local technical support, linking organisation 
running costs and grants to NGOs and CBOs. Costs needed to provide technical 
support from an international base were estimated, but no projection was made 
of the relative cost of supporting linking organisations vis-à-vis investment in local 
implementation of prevention, care and impact mitigation activities. No targets 
were articulated concerning either the number of people to be reached, or the 
quality of activities to be supported.  
 
The needs for organisational and technical support to linking organisations were 
far greater than initially anticipated. At first this was because the Alliance's model 
of supporting an indigenous organisation to raise funds, disburse funds and 
provide technical support was unusual not just in HIV/AIDS work, but 
development work overall. Support needs then increased with increasing 
pressure on performance and deviation from the original programme design 
(more donor restrictions requiring more complicated finance and programme 
                                                          
51 "The roles of the national mechanisms will be to help organizations already engaged in 
HIV/AIDS … to expand and scale up their work…and to reach out to a wide variety of private 
sector groups not yet engaged in the prevention and management of the epidemic", Lenton, op 
cit, p. 3 
   Appendix: C     Page 3 of 17 
  
   
systems, more detailed requirements for monitoring and evaluation data, more 
emphasis on programme quality in addition to quantity). 
 
The need for in-country technical support was recognised when the Alliance was 
established, but local technical support costs were not clearly differentiated from 
the costs of in-country service delivery.  In the Alliance's initial business plan, no 
explicit acknowledgement was made of the very clear cost difference between 
supporting successful and capable organisations to expand, as opposed to 
convincing and supporting organisations with very little HIV/AIDS experience to 
begin, improve and expand work on HIV/AIDS. 
  
Just over 10% of the anticipated funding was committed at the start of the 
programme. With further fundraising (a task not initially anticipated in the 
Alliance's business plan), an additional $9 million was raised over the initial three-
year period.  About 60% of this was restricted, with the majority of the restrictions 
requiring marked deviations from the Alliance's original plans. From the 
perspective of the Alliance's Executive Director, the Alliance's most significant 
mistake in its first two years was its failure to convene stakeholders to agree a 
new business plan and new targets in light of real commitments and restrictions 
rather than original projections and hopes.  
 
 
Evolution of the Alliance's approaches 
 
The start-up period: Alliance development from 1994 to 1996 
 
By mid 1996, the Alliance had worked with local partners to conduct national 
assessments of the NGO/CBO sector’s response to HIV/AIDS, and the potential 
to expand and improve that response, in ten countries: Philippines, Bangladesh, 
Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Morocco, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Tanzania, Mozambique 
and Ecuador. To some degree this mix of countries reflected a strategy to test the 
Alliance’s approach in both low and high prevalence settings and in countries 
with weaker and stronger NGO sectors; to establish a programme base in each 
of Asia, Africa and Latin America; and to avoid particularly complex settings such 
as India or Brazil in the start-up period.  To a great degree, however, the mix of 
countries reflected donor restrictions on how funds could be used, including 
geographical restrictions which dictated, for example, the choice of countries in 
West Africa and the exclusion of the Caribbean. Funds covered assessments in 
Tanzania and Mozambique, but were insufficient for programme development. 
Programme development was suspended in Pakistan because there was no 
suitable in-country partner and the national government did not strongly support 
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the initiative.  The Alliance’s first seven country programmes were thus 
developed in Ecuador, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Morocco, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh 









Community responses were developed in more than 50 sites. In each 
of these, a participatory community assessment was undertaken, leading to 
project design and community mobilisation. In general, these assessments were 
highly successful, both as a prelude to successful project design and as a means 
to cultivate community ownership. Following assessment, programme and project 
design included peer education programmes for young people, participatory 
prevention (largely adapted from the “Stepping Stones” programme of 
participatory community discussion groups), and interactive awareness raising 
activities. Self-help groups were also created and supported.  
 
During 1994-1997, the Alliance also had limited experience of supporting pilot 
projects in areas such as peer education in particularly vulnerable populations 
(men who have sex with men, sex workers) NGO based sexual health delivery, 
NGO based care and support services and intensive community development 
with key vulnerable populations. In the start-up period, there was little or no 
involvement in a number of other possible programme areas related to HIV/AIDS, 
such as condom social marketing, in-patient care, mass media harm reduction 
activities and blood safety programmes.  
 
National level NGO/CBO support included assessments of national 
NGO/CBO sector strengths and weaknesses, the establishment and 
management of grant making facilities, the development of a limited range of 
methodologies to identify and respond to NGO/CBO technical support needs, and 
partnership building and external relations for partner organisations. Little or no 
attention was paid in this period to some other NGO/CBO support functions, such 
as fundraising, either for implementing NGOs/CBOs or linking organisations: 
development of skills in building partnerships; policy analysis and advocacy; 
formal operations research; epidemiological surveillance; production and/or 
dissemination of training materials and educational materials; or maintenance, 
development and promotion of resource centres or libraries.  
The Alliance’s scale-up strategy hinged on two levels of action,  
• Community-level responses to prevention, care and (to very
limited degree) alleviating the impact of HIV/AIDS 
• National-level NGO/CBO support. 
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After two years of operation a donor-organised external evaluation team reviewed 
the Alliance’s programme.  The evaluation’s broad conclusions were positive: 
 
 
The Mission's unequivocal answer to the central question of the 
Evaluation is therefore that if donors wish to continue to develop the 
civil society response to the epidemic in the developing world, they 
should continue to fund the Alliance.52 
 
 
By 1996, 86% of the Alliance's expenditure, a higher proportion than originally 
anticipated, was allocated to technical assistance and funding for local 
programmes.  In a total of seven countries, 220 organisations had received 
financial and technical support for HIV/AIDS work, 200 of which were general 
health or development organisations rather than HIV/AIDS groups. Although this 
scale of activity was obviously less than initially projected, most stakeholders 
recognised that it was a significant achievement, particularly in view of the 
reduced funding. 
 
It was acknowledged that it was too early and too difficult to assess the impact of 
this work on the epidemic, but both the Alliance's own evaluation and other 
evaluations indicated that promising approaches were being promulgated at a 
community level, as reflected in these citations from USAID and EU documents: 
 
 
When there is uncertainty about what contextual changes are 
appropriate or most significant, a valid strategy is to enable the 
people who are closest to the problem to decide, to experiment with 
different approaches, and to see what works. This is the 
methodological approach taken by the International HIV/AIDS 
Alliance, which offers one example of how to develop contextual 




Despite these overall positive assessments, however, the Alliance's external 
evaluation and other analyses and discussions pointed out some problems and 
                                                          
52 "Joint Donor Evaluation of the International HIV/AIDS Alliance", October 1996, p. 5 
53 "Process evaluation of the AIDS Technical Support Project" of USAID, July 1996, pp 79 -80. 
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controversies with the Alliance's approach and performance. The three most 
significant were: 
 
• Concern that a greater proportion of expenditure than anticipated was 
absorbed in support and operational costs of linking organisations, and that in 
some cases  this exceeded the funds allocated to local NGOs and CBOs to 
carry out activities in  prevention, care and impact mitigation.  Different 
stakeholders cited different reasons for this. The Alliance external evaluation 
team believed that the Alliance had over-emphasised NGO support capacity 
as a goal, rather than seeing such capacity as a delivery cost. The Alliance 
secretariat countered that developing such capacity was a legitimate goal in 
itself, and that, as country programmes inevitably have a certain level of fixed 
costs, under-funding would increase the proportion of expenditure on "NGO 
support" vis-à-vis implementation.  
• The international donor landscape had evolved considerably over the 
Alliance's first two years, with significant changes including a strong trend to 
devolving funding decisions to missions or delegations based in developing 
countries; the elimination of many HIV/AIDS specific budgets following the 
Cairo Conference consensus on integrated approaches to sexual and 
reproductive health; and the creation of UNAIDS to replace WHO/GPA.  
Together, these changes considerably challenged the Alliance's structure and 
model. 
• It was unlikely that the Alliance itself could increase its operating budget 
significantly. Nevertheless, there was strong pressure to pay more attention to 
quality and impact of interventions and responses, and a strong desire for the 
Alliance to play an increased role in learning and influencing others. 
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Transition phase: 1997 
 
A new scale-up strategy was developed by the Alliance and endorsed by its 
donors in February 1997.  Key features of this new strategy included54: 
 
• An emphasis on the Alliance’s technical rather than financial contributions to 
scaling up community responses to AIDS.  This led to a strategy of influencing 
existing initiatives (that already had secure funding) rather than supporting 
new programmes. 
• An emphasis on catalysing rather than directly sustaining expanded 
responses, and reducing support over time 
• A commitment to experiment with new methodologies – development and 
testing of tools, operations research, advocacy - to influence practice 
indirectly rather than directly 
• New goalposts for performance measurement: mobilising new responses; 
improving the quality of responses; building capacity of NGOs and NGO 
support organisations; and learning and influencing. 
 
The new strategy was based on the implicit assumption that, rather than being 
concerned about finding a global mechanism to deliver funds to community level, 
donors and multilateral agencies now had a growing appreciation of the Alliance’s 
knowledge and experience of leveraging funds and improving community 
responses to HIV/AIDS. The Alliance’s value-added was thus to be in learning, 
influencing and leveraging rather than funding.   
 
With reference again to de Jong’s proposed typology in this publication, the 
Alliance’s post-1997 strategy depended strongly on “diffusion” approaches and 
explicitly introduced “influencing policy/legislation”. Commitment was maintained 
to “catalysing other organisations”, but with the emphasis on “catalysing” rather 
than “supporting in an ongoing manner”. This distinction suggests that de Jong’s 
“Strategy 2: Catalysing Other Organisations” might usefully be separated into two 
distinct strategies.  
 
 
Scaling Up: 1997-2000 
 
The Alliance’s original design was informed by needs assessments, 
consultations and pilot projects with key developing country partners. In contrast, 
the strategies adopted in February 1997 to scale up impact were the result of 
                                                          
54 “The International HIV/AIDS Alliance Proposal for Support 1997 – 1999”, 28 January 1997 
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external evaluation processes and extensive consultations with donors. There 
was no formal or informal consultation with developing country partners, who 
almost certainly would have expressed concern about the implications. Linking 
organisations were informed of the Alliance’s new goals and strategies and were 
required to change some of their own approaches to monitoring and evaluation 
but most key linking organisation staff and volunteers did not contribute to the 
shift in strategy and perhaps never fully understood it.  
 
Depending on one’s organisational perspective, the Alliance’s strategic shift in 
1997 could be represented as “more with less” or “less with more”.  For donors, 
by and large, the strategy offered “more with less”: more countries influenced, 
more NGOs and CBOs influenced, more tangible products such as toolkits and 
operations research findings. For the Alliance’s existing partners, the opposite 
held true: the Alliance secretariat and its budget grew, while funding for any 
particular country programme tended to remain steady or declined. Steady or 
declining funds from the Alliance accompanied increasing pressures: to 
implement particular kinds of activities with particular populations; to pay much 
more attention to strengthening quality and evaluation; to document and market 
success-stories; and to fundraise. 
 
In 1998, within a year of adopting the new strategy, one of the Alliance’s largest 
donors (USAID) introduced a new requirement for funding – to measure the 
number of people being reached.  Although relatively straightforward, the 
measurement was at odds with the explicit goals of the new strategy and 
introduced conceptual difficulties to performance measurement and “ownership” 
(People reached with services financed by the Alliance? People reached by 
organisations influenced by the Alliance? People reached effectively or people 
reached at all?)  More positively, despite redesigning the Alliance's overall 
strategy to increasing impact at low cost, donor funding increased considerably 
from 1997 to 2000.  
 
During this period the Alliance actively discouraged investment in broad public 
awareness raising, programmes designed to serve the general public, and 
income generation activities. In contrast, there was a growing awareness of the 
importance of concurrent community action to address supply of services and 
commodities for prevention and care and to stimulate demand for these services, 
while taking account of context issues such as gender roles and stigma. More 
support was therefore channelled into following up discussion groups with 
outreach programmes, home care initiatives which integrated prevention and 
referrals, and the promotion of the involvement of people with HIV/AIDS. Gender 
issues such as violence against women and creating a sense of responsibility 
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among men and boys, and STI service delivery including condom promotion were 
all emphasised. Peer education and community development activities with 
marginalized communities key to the dynamics of the epidemic were encouraged. 
New pilot activities included harm reduction and prevention of sexual 
transmission with people who inject drugs, community mobilisation linked to 
voluntary testing and counselling, and a response to the needs of orphans and 
vulnerable children. Links between care, prevention and impact alleviation began 
to be emphasised, and community based advocacy took a higher priority.  
 
There have been some seemingly contradictory pressures on the Alliance from 
its donors – pressure to influence linking organisations to influence NGOs and 
CBOs to reach more people, pressure to increase quality of activities at the 
community level, and pressure to increase “influencing” and “advocacy” functions 
based on community lessons. The tension between these goals had resulted in 
many positive changes and an increase in the Alliance’s impact. Most notably at 
the level of community implementation, a healthy balance has been found 
between intensive prevention and care work with populations key to epidemic 
dynamics, broader awareness activities, and partnerships with governments to 
reach larger numbers of vulnerable people, especially young people.  
  
 
Results to date 
 
From 1994 to 1999, mostly after the strategic shift in 1997, the Alliance raised 
approximately $23 million from international donors to support its work. The 
target funding for its first three years was thus achieved over six years. Donors 
also provided $5 - $6 million directly to linking organisations or partner 
organisations. By the end of 2000, the Alliance had worked with NGOs or CBOs 
from 25 countries, and was supporting ongoing NGO/CBO support programmes 
in 13 countries. The linking organisations had provided technical and financial 
support to over 1,520 projects implemented by over 950 different NGOs and 
CBOs, about 85% of which were not AIDS groups – in fact about 70% of them 
became intensively involved in AIDS for the first time through the Alliance’s 
support. Many of the linking organisations also became key institutions 
influencing their national policy environments 
The Alliance has not had a comprehensive external evaluation since 1996, but 
evaluations of particular initiatives and ongoing monitoring point to the 
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Perhaps most notably, the Alliance's shift in strategy in 1997 allowed it to 
maintain (and even expand to some degree) the development and support of in-
country NGO support systems which in turn assist local NGOs and CBOs which 
in turn organise and facilitate prevention, care and impact-mitigation responses. 
These activities, however, are no longer the sole or even primary criteria against 
which the Alliance's performance is measured. 
 
 
Evolving ideas about scaling up 
 
The Alliance was established within a rhetoric of "scaling up community 
responses to AIDS".  What did that mean to different stakeholders? If more 
attention had been paid to the phrase, more contradictions in approach amongst 
and within different sets of stakeholders would have been identified.  There was a 
• In 1999 alone, almost 1.5 million people were beneficiaries of prevention,
care and/or impact-mitigation programmes or services supported by the
Alliance, at a cost of about US$ 2.50 per person.  Over 325,000 volunteers,
mostly young people, were involved in intensive activities as "peer
educators" or “care givers” in their communities. It is estimated that over 8
million people were reached in 1999 through Alliance-supported mass media
and IEC initiatives. 
• In depth evaluations of particular initiatives show these programmes as 
making a real difference in people’s lives.  
• An evaluation of a home care programme in Cambodia in early 2000
concluded, “It is reducing the suffering of people living with HIV/AIDS
(PLHA) and improving the quality of their lives and the lives of their
families and caregivers; it is increasing understanding of HIV/AIDS and
reducing discrimination against PLHA in the community; it is helping to
empower some of the poorest and most disadvantaged individuals and
families in the community”.   
• An evaluation of prevention activities in Senegal in 2000 concluded, 
“ANCS has achieved remarkable results with relatively modest means 
…ANCS has contributed significantly to the HIV prevention and care 
response in Senegal”.  
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broad agreement at the time that "scaling up" meant doing more, and in particular 
having NGOs and CBOs do more. There was relatively little explicit discussion at 
the time amongst NGO/CBO actors - or their supporters - of population-level 
impact, of priorities amongst different countries, of priorities amongst different 
technical approaches, or of how priorities might change at different phases of the 
epidemic. All of these are now understood as key issues. 
 
In 1991 and 1992, many donors were concerned about investing available 
HIV/AIDS funds through the "multi - bi" channels of WHO/GPA, and were looking 
for a new mechanism to absorb and disburse resources.  Although this situation 
had already started to change by the time of the Alliance's formal establishment 
in late 1993, it deeply informed the logic of the Alliance's creation. It is important 
to note that now, years later, a number of donor agencies seem to be once again 
concluding that scaling up means spending more money at community level. 
Hopefully some lessons have been learned.  
 
In addition to Northern donors, the other key set of stakeholders involved in the 
Alliance's establishment were (mostly Southern) NGO and CBO activists.  
Amongst the most vocal and visible actors in the community response to AIDS, 
there was already some genuine debate in the early 1990s about what to do and 
how to do it. Key features of the debate at the time included pressure from 
community groups for more attention to care as opposed to a singular focus on 
prevention; more attention to marginalised populations and in particular their 
human rights; and debate about the relative merits of "AIDS-focused" versus 
"integrated" responses.  NGOs and CBOs also wanted a larger share of the 
available resources for HIV/AIDS work, in particular vis-à-vis investments in 
national AIDS programmes. More recently, a similar consensus has emerged 
amongst many local NGO and CBO activists, but vis-à-vis international NGOs 
rather than vis-à-vis national AIDS programmes.  Then, as now, it was rare to find 
individual NGOs or CBOs making a case for different types of response (for 
example, condom promotion versus youth-abstinence clubs), or between different 
levels of response (for example, community-level services versus national 
awareness campaigns), or between different types of actors (for example, 
national NGOs versus national government agencies). Part of the Alliance's 
function has been to engender reflection and debate on these issues at a national 
level, although consensus on such priorities among NGOs and CBOs is probably 
unlikely to be reached.   
 
In retrospect, one of the most striking elements of the discourse around the 
Alliance's creation was the focus on the non-governmental sector, differentiated 
from the government sector, as opposed to, for example, community and district 
   Appendix: C     Page 12 of 17 
  
   
responses differentiated from national or regional responses. Consciously or 
unconsciously, the Alliance brought together a set of donors who were looking to 
move beyond WHO/GPA and its support to National AIDS Programmes 
(governmental, health-focused rather than multisectoral, and largely policy-
orientated rather than operational), with NGOs and CBOs looking to access more 
resources for their operations. (The original design of the Alliance did not 
differentiate between local CBOs or NGOs and international NGOs - this was an 
added emphasis introduced by the Alliance's Trustees and management in 
1994.)  Key stakeholders largely missing from the Alliance's original design 
included people living with HIV themselves, as well as national AIDS programme 
managers and national governments.    
 
Over the period since the Alliance's establishment, perceptions of "good practice" 
have been constantly evolving, informed by practice and experience as well as 
shifting theoretical paradigms. Some generalisations can be made about how 
"scaling up" is viewed at different levels. 
 
About 1,000 participatory community assessments were conducted with Alliance 
support from 1994 to 2000. Depending on the priorities of the Alliance partner 
and the technical and strategic biases of technical support providers, assessment 
methodologies varied: focused just on needs, or also on resources and hopes; 
embracing a broad range of community priorities, or focusing on HIV in the 
context of gender, sexuality and sexual health; working with key populations such 
as sex workers, or working with neighbourhoods or villages as a whole55.  In 
general, however, individuals and communities tend to see HIV prevention as a 
medium- or long-term issue: in low prevalence countries, a threat that may 
emerge in years to come, or in higher-prevalence countries, an important issue 
for a new generation. A wide range of other issues have a higher short-term 
profile, from helping young people get jobs to reducing gender violence to 
maintaining or achieving clean water supplies. The most dominant theme 
emerging from prevention-focused assessments has therefore been scoping out 
rather than scaling up – that is, linking HIV to other contextual and development 
issues, such as gender relations and poverty.  
 
The active involvement of people living with HIV in the process of participatory 
community assessment and programme design helps to keep results focused on 
both care needs and the reality of vulnerability to infection.  Recently, affected 
communities have drawn attention to the importance of equity in access to 
                                                          
55  Many of these experiences and methodologies have now been consolidated into a 
recommended approach by the Alliance, in the toolkit “Getting Started”, 2001. 
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treatment, especially equity with Northern communities’ access to anti-retroviral 
treatment.  The stark reality of how few people with HIV have access to any care 
at all creates a tremendous pressure for scaling up action on AIDS. 
 
From an organisational perspective, community based associations and smaller 
community-focused NGOs may share an interest in "scoping out" but are often 
also interested in reaching more people through expanding their own activities, 
especially to nearby communities, districts or neighbourhoods.  Despite this 
commonality, however, larger NGOs - local, national and international - have 
quite diverse priorities for increased action on HIV/AIDS, embracing the full range 
of scale up strategies identified in de Jong's paper.  It is rare indeed for an NGO 
of any size to conclude that it is doing enough, or that it has enough resources. 
 
Not surprisingly, national AIDS programmes (like NGOs) also share the 
perception that action on HIV/AIDS needs to be scaled up, and the belief that this 
requires additional resources, but their priorities for scaling up NGO and CBO 
action vary.  Some place a strong priority on an institutional and geographic 
diversification of support to NGOs while maintaining a belief in "targeted 
approaches" for particular populations. Others very clearly identify priority districts 
for increased action as well as functionally supporting particular NGOs to grow in 
expertise, coverage and resources.  Still others appear to argue for increased 
support to and engagement of community groups, while challenging strong roles 
for national or international NGOs. These distinctions typically reflect both 
legitimate differences in priorities in particular places (regarding how and why to 
scale up action on AIDS), and inevitable differences in politics both within NGO 
sectors, and between NGOs and governments. 
 
Donor thinking on "scaling up" has also evolved.  Rhetoric about "leveraging 
other resources" or “ensuring sustainability” is still a common feature in much 
donor discourse – this may be influenced by political concerns.  There is also a 
great deal of recent interest and commitment to having an impact on the 
epidemic rather than simply "learning" and "piloting" initiatives. Although some 
donors like DFID place more emphasis on partnerships with governments and 
others like USAID on partnerships with NGOs, most are more conscious than in 
the past of how their investments fit in to other activities to achieve a critical mass 
of coverage. In addition to paying attention to measuring the gross numbers of 
people reached, there is a strong trend to pay attention to quality, synergies 
between different approaches, and the potential of partnerships, as well as to 
impact. This highlights differences of opinion on issues such as the relative merits 
of rapidly rolling out a limited number of key interventions as opposed to a 
“programme approach” emphasising a package of responses; the relative priority 
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of working in low versus high prevalence countries; and the relative merits of 
concentrating limited resources on "core transmitters" versus reaching a new 
generation of vulnerable young people.  
 
The Alliance’s unusual structure of a “two tier umbrella programme” has meant 
that tensions and synergies between local actors (implementing CBOs and 
NGOs) and national actors (linking organisations and their donors) are almost 
always mirrored between national actors (linking organisations) and international 
actors (the Alliance secretariat and its donors). In almost all cases, the Alliance 
and its partners have achieved their most notable results in the balance or 
compromise between competing pressures.  
 
One key tension has been between “community led” and “evidence based” - or 
“bottom up” and “top down” - approaches. The Alliance began with a strong bias 
towards community led approaches, but through a combination of donor pressure 
and internal decisions, began to promote more aggressively what it perceived as 
good practice (including good practice in being community led!). The strongest 
and most sustainable initiatives are rooted in processes such as participatory 
community assessment and national-level decision-making about priorities and 
strategies, informed by “expert” advice on matters such as key populations for 
epidemic dynamics, and effective strategies. Balancing these perspectives and 
processes is slower and more intensive than either a straightforward replication 
of standard interventions or a laissez-faire approach of funding what the 
community wants to do. 
 
Another tension has been between “targeted” and “general population” 
approaches, or “intensive and expensive” approaches versus “broad and cheap”.  
A key lesson from the Alliance’s programming experience has been the 
importance of paying attention to key populations for epidemic dynamics, 
especially in concentrated epidemics in low prevalence countries.  This does not 
mean ignoring other populations; it is important to recognise that one community 
impinges on another’s choices and options, as well as to respond to multiple and 
shifting community identities and behaviour patterns. This again points to a view  
of scaling up that synthesises intensive services and programmes with and for 
key populations, and  working more cheaply with broader communities for 
awareness, against stigma and to ensure referrals.  
 
Finally there has been a clear tension for the Alliance between intensifying 
programmes in a smaller number of countries and having some involvement in a 
larger number of countries and regions.  Funding pressures have had more 
influence than programme strategy on this.  It seems reasonable to speculate 
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that costs per person reached would be significantly lower had the Alliance 
worked in fewer countries and languages with the same level of overall funding. 
The politics and processes of organisational growth and fundraising are central to 
any strategy to achieve more impact and it is difficult to say whether the Alliance 
could have achieved more with a more focused strategy, or if its attempts to 
respond to perceived donor pressures and funding availability were essential to 
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Activity With whom? Outcomes Comments 
Participatory 
community assessment 
CBOs at community level 
• led to project and programme 
design,  
• sensitised key 
populations/stakeholders, 
• began community mobilisation 
process 
Generally very successful – led to successful 




Young people in and out of 
school 
• Large numbers of young people 
trained in HIV basics, 
prevention and referral for 
further information and 
services 
• Condoms demonstrated 
Successfully promoted and sustained behaviour 
change in peer educators but  
little impact beyond awarene4ss raising on wioder 
groups on young people 
Participatory 
discussion groups 
Members of specific 
communities, in age and 
gender-specific discussion 
groups, culminating in 
common discussion group 
• Debates and action planning on 
HIV/AIDS  
• Change in attitude and 
behaviour at community level 
Highly effective but expensive and requires 
extensive training/skills building 




• Income generation 
• Adult literacy Relevance and impact not clear 
Interactive awareness 
raising activities 
General population: activities 
such as neighbourhood 
meetings, World AIDS Day 
rallies, red ribbon folding, 
pamphlet distribution 
• Increased awareness of HIV 
From 1997, scepticism about the value, but more 
recently,  recognition of importance where awareness 
is low, to include young people and to create a 
favourable environment for more focused activities 
Creation of self-help 
groups for people with 
HIV 
People with HIV 
• Peer psychosocial support 
• Treatment activism 
• Income generation 
• Succession planning activities 
for children 
“With this disease, the people who suffer the 
most are the poorest… If we don’t get together in 
groups and find help and medicines , we don’t 
stand a chance”, person with HIV, member of 
EUDES in Ecuador 
Table 1: Main community responses supported by the Alliance in the start-up phase, 1994-96 
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Changes in 1997-2000 are outlined in the text.  These included more emphasis care and support through home care, and a greater
attention to the integration of care and support, prevention and impact mitigation.  Pilot projects began to emphasise work with key
vulnerable populations, the introduction of harm reduction concepts community mobilisation linked to children’s issues and to voluntary
testing and counselling, and initiatives against stigma and discrimination.  In Zambia, the Alliance joined a wide range of other partners in
the “Zambia Integrated Health Project” a multi-issue health initiative. 
Activity With Whom? Outcomes Comments 
Peer education with 
specially vulnerable 
populations 
Men who have sex with men 
Sex workers • Behaviour change 
If run well, particularly cost effective 
NGO based sexual health 
service delivery and HIV 
testing and counselling 
Sex workers 
Attenders at reproductive 
health/MCH clinics 
• Pre and post-test counselling provided 
• STI counselling, diagnosis and 
treatment 
• Referrals to care facilities 
Particularly effective with specialist government 
services eg Philippines services for sex workers 
Less effective with NGO provided Reproductive 
health or maternal/child health clinics in lower 
prevalence countries 
NGO based care and 
support services 
400 people with AIDS 
and 5,000 family 
members and close 
associates 
• Home care including basic medical 
care and prevention activities 
Cost about $20 per person with AIDS per month 
including start-up costs, with falling costs in later 
years 
Intensive community 
development with key 
vulnerable populations 
Sex workers 
Adolescent men who have 
sex with men 
transvestites 
• community organisation 
• building self-esteem 
Examples are IWAG-Davao on the Philippines and 
FAES in Ecuador 
Table 2: Pilot Projects 1994-97 
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